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We should include courts in the climate change picture
because we have no other option. No substitute exists
for the court system. If judges are in charge of deciding all
sorts of conflicts about life, death, love, human rights, and
national security, it makes no sense to leave climate change
outside the courtroom.
—Justice Antonio Herman Benjamin
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FOREWORD
CLIMATE CHANGE AND JUDGES

C

limate change poses the most urgent existential challenge of our lifetime—not
only for humanity’s survival and protection of the planet’s biodiversity, but also
for the proper functioning of the Environmental Rule of Law. Our global climate’s
accelerating volatility—with its adverse impacts on ecosystems, vast landscapes,
and human health and dignity—is transforming how lawyers and judges
address Environmental Law’s traditional principles, objectives, instruments, and
institutions. From an institutional point of view, the climate crisis fundamentally
affects the way we perceive the role of courts in natural resource disputes.
Judges are trained and work in boxes of legal knowledge, practical expertise, and jurisdiction. The “little
world” of a judge is one of unavoidable boundaries: political and judicial arenas that fragment ecological
spaces instead of respecting them.
Climate change profoundly modifies these ancient premises and rattles judges’ comfort zones. Some
perceive the subject matter of climate protection—the atmospheric common good, ecosystem
services, and intergenerational values—as extending beyond the jurisdiction of local courts. In fact,
judges may feel that climate issues reside outside the sovereign borders of national courts. Particularly
in respect to the planet’s climate, the material good—the atmosphere as a whole—is one that just a few
decades ago, following the lessons of Roman law, was considered alien to the categories addressed by
domestic legislation.
It is also disturbing to judges that, while those who need protection and would benefit from judicial
measures taken to address climate change are spread across the world, only a fraction might live
within their jurisdiction. The same applies to the causes of climate change—perpetrated in large part
by seemingly faraway activities and actors. Even more complicated for the generalist judge is the
inability to see, touch, hear, or directly know the subject of the case. Although intangible categories are
not unknown in the judicial context, the more this “physicality” is weakened or dissipated, the more
ordinary judges begin to think that the conflict should be decided by someone else or somewhere else.
The climate crisis poses even greater judicial complication when we realize that many countries still do
not have comprehensive or effective environmental laws. In others, judges may lack jurisdiction over
the whole spectrum of environmental matters. Or, worse, when they can exercise authority, judges
may lack the independence, knowledge, or integrity to discharge their responsibilities properly. In
other words, although the biodiversity and climate change crises are universal, environmental law and
adequate access to courts and justice are not. People in developed countries with robust democratic
systems take fair and effective environmental adjudication for granted. For a large portion of the world,
however, fundamental access to justice cannot be assumed. Sadly, those large areas are frequently
home to rich biodiversity hot spots and tropical forests in desperate need of judicial enforcement.
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Therefore, we may fairly raise the question: should we expect—and trust—courts to address climate
change? Despite the above difficulties, my qualified answer is yes, for at least four pragmatic, legal,
ethical, and policy and/or institutional reasons.
First, the pragmatic argument. We should include courts in the climate change picture because we
have no other option. No substitute exists for the court system. If judges are in charge of deciding all
sorts of conflicts about life, death, love, human rights, and national security, it makes no sense to leave
climate change outside the courtroom. This assumption does not mean that we do not recognize the
enormous differences between climate and “regular” environmental cases. However, the lack of other
or better alternatives makes courts an inevitable choice.
Second, it would not be reasonable to entrust Environmental Law to judges, as we already do globally,
without including climate change. At the end of the day, many key parts of nature—biomes, ecosystems,
species, and genetic diversity—and the human environment will be directly and perhaps irreversibly
affected by climate change. For obvious reasons, the exclusion of climate cases would handicap and
ossify environmental jurisdiction, transforming it into a body without its heart and preventing the legal
system’s evolution in a world of rapid transformations. Climate change is already affecting and will
continue to affect not just Environmental Law. It will also impact most, if not all, legal disciplines that
compose the conventional field of judicial intervention—from constitutional to tax and insurance law,
from civil and administrative liability to criminal law, and from family to international and civil procedure
law. In other words, if climate change is not allowed to enter the courtroom through the front door
(Environmental Law), it will undoubtedly invade the judicial sanctum through the back door.
Third, except for a few areas of law (contracts, for example), judges are merely part of the solution for
social problems; even then, they are not the only or even the best option. Courts do not replace the
constellation of actors and measures in the climate change domain—both national and international.
They complement whatever is in place. Some judges may see this role as a second-class type of judicial
intervention, one filled with humility (not a widespread characteristic in the profession) as opposed to
the ordinary exercise of jurisdiction in which judges have the final and most authoritative word on any
complaint brought before them. That misguided but understandable sentiment fails to grasp judges’
role in contemporary society as one that is not uniform for all aspects of human conflicts.
Fourth, the position of judges in climate adaptation is much less daunting than in climate mitigation. Take,
for instance, the thousands of cases around the world where judges are already dealing with permits,
environmental impact assessments, protected areas, deforestation, water resources, wetlands, and
desertification. Is it really defensible to keep addressing those legal issues without taking into account the
impacts of climate change? Can a judge decide an objection to a permit for building a hotel resort in the
middle of endangered mangroves without considering sea level rise due to climate change? Or adjudicate
a case of significant deforestation in a region that is already suffering from growing water stress?
None of these reasons ignore or reduce the relevance of legitimate counterarguments that advocate
that climate change policy issues should be fought outside the courtroom. Climate change is not the
only or the first highly technologically or economically complex issue facing the courts. Software and
DNA cases are common nowadays in many countries. Climate change is no more politically charged
than national security, torture, discrimination, abortion, immigration, corruption, same-sex marriage, or
election disputes. Even war and peace are not entirely beyond the judicial realm.

FOREWORD

It is also worthwhile mentioning that, in light of general or specific legislation dealing with the subject,
including constitutional provisions, judges do not make climate change law. They apply (within the limits of
the separation of powers) norms discussed and approved by legislative bodies or enacted by administrative
authorities. Under these circumstances, it is not judicial lawmaking, but rather judicial law implementation.
Once clear and detailed policies—that go much further than vague, conditional and noncommittal
statements of public intentions—are legislated, they become legal policies that can and should be
enforced by judges. Otherwise, what would be the purpose of legislating? Therefore we should here make a
distinction between activist environmental judges and activist environmental legislation (or legislators).
Thus, with a qualified yes, I respond to the initial question I have posed. It is qualified because it comes
with one major and several secondary requirements, especially if we want to have judges involved in
responding to the climate change crisis adequately. Let me focus on the primary requirement only.
In general, judges are still not fully aware of the existential threat that the climate crisis poses to humanity
as a whole and every person on the planet, in every jurisdiction. Judges tend to ignore that environmental
law regimes they use in their daily practice already include contact points that allow for easy connection
to the climate change dimension. In other instances, new and specialized laws have been passed,
but remain unknown to or insufficiently understood by judges and therefore endure as untouched
laws in the books. Finally, bound by their training and jurisdictions, judges are prone to feel isolated as
professionals—a state of mind that discourages innovation and the kind of learning from each other that
greater interaction and communication could bring. From the judges’ perspective, the most effective
medicine for this complex set of attributes and attitudes, which impair their ability to confidently manage
climate change litigation, is judicial education.
And judicial education has been precisely the road chosen by the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
in its work with judges from this immense and diverse part of the world. It has been a most successful
journey, one that developed a judicial community around Environmental Law. The present reports are
testimony to such an initiative and a component of the broader series of successful ADB endeavors in
the Environmental Rule of Law universe. As the first publication of its kind with a focus on judges, this
report series will greatly benefit those who already know the subject. It will also particularly serve the
many for whom climate change is (until now) a remote area of law.
On behalf of the Global Judicial Institute on the Environment, I offer my effusive congratulations to
ADB’s extraordinary team and the distinguished coauthors of this innovative report series.

ANTONIO HERMAN BENJAMIN
Justice, National High Court of Brazil
Lead founding member of the Global Judicial Institute on the Environment
6 November 2020
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Climate change is a global challenge.
While the emphasis on the Paris Agreement is on
nationally determined contributions, to be
enforced by national legal measures, the problems
are common to all, and we all have much to learn
from each other.
—Lord Robert Carnwath

Photo by Eric Sales/ADB.

FOREWORD

I

am delighted to welcome this important series of reports on climate litigation
and legal frameworks.

It was in 2002 that the Global Judges’ Symposium in Johannesburg affirmed
the vital role of an independent judiciary and judicial processes in interpreting
and enforcing environmental laws, and called for a UNEP-led programme of
judicial training and exchange of information on environmental law. Since then,
as member of the UNEP judicial advisory group, I have taken part in numerous
judicial conferences on environmental law in different parts of the world. Since
2010, the Asian Development Bank has taken a lead in encouraging judicial
interchange and training through its Law and Policy Reform Programme, including a series of judicial
conferences in the Asia and Pacific region, in which I have been honoured to participate. The cases
collected in this study are testament to the richness of the contribution of judges from that part of
the world.
Climate change is a global challenge. While the emphasis on the Paris Agreement is on nationally
determined contributions, to be enforced by national legal measures, the problems are common to
all, and we all have much to learn from each other. Two of the most significant climate change cases
in recent years—the Urgenda case in Holland and the Leghari case in Pakistan—came from countries
with widely differing legal systems. But the principle they established is universal—that effective action
on climate change is a human right and fundamental constitutional responsibility of governments
everywhere. As was said in 1993 by the Philippines’ Supreme Court in the famous Oposa case, rights to
a balanced and healthful ecology are “basic rights” which “predate all governments and constitutions”
and “need not be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind.” a
I congratulate the Asian Development Bank team responsible for these remarkable reports. I have no
doubt that they will be of immense value to all those involved in giving legal force to the Paris commitments,
whether as judges, legislators, or legal professionals.

LORD ROBERT CARNWATH
Commander of the Royal Victorian Order (CVO)
Former Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
April 2020

a

Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993.

This report chronicles green and climate
jurisprudence that emerged over the years
and is a testament to ADB’s tireless effort
over a decade in building a judicial coalition.
— Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah

Photo by Rahim Mirza/ADB.
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“I don’t want you to be hopeful. I want you to panic...
and act as if the house was on fire.”
—Greta Thunberg

U

nbridled human desire, supported by unsustainable development over
centuries, has disrupted the rhythm of nature. Defiling of the local environment
slowly snowballed into a threat for the entire planet as carbon emissions sullied
the atmosphere. Humanity’s disruption of Earth’s system is climate change.
Any remedial response to this global challenge can only be through the collective
coordination of humankind. Nationalism needs to give way to global cooperation and solidarity. While
nations of the world try to coalesce to combat this challenge, politics and powerful vested interests
continue to hamper such a consensus. Nations have been unable to implement their international
commitments to meet this most serious existential threat. Dissatisfied citizenry of the world has been
compelled to consider other options to combat this challenge. Some of them have knocked at the
doors of the courts of justice to fight climate change by making their governments answerable and
accountable and by seeking climate justice.
Courts, unlike other limbs of government, are not elected and have no constituencies or voters or
political agendas to tow. They are not swayed by politics or other vested or corporate interests, but
are guided by ethos of justice and fair play. They function within the frame of constitutionalism and
the rule of law. This gives the courts of the world a common language to communicate. It is, therefore,
easy to build a global judicial consensus on climate justice. The Asian Development Bank (ADB)
realized this and put together a judicial environmental coalition in Asia and the Pacific in 2010. Since
then, “green” judges in Asia and the Pacific have met and shared ideas in a series of roundtables and
knowledge-sharing events. This unique congress of judges from different jurisdictions debated and
dialogued to evolve innovative and avant-garde judicial techniques to safeguard the environment.
These judges put these ideas to work and produced far-reaching jurisprudence that has touched the
soul of the planet.
Several judiciaries from Asia have a rich tradition in public interest litigation and enforcement of
constitutional human rights and, therefore, did not take long to absorb environmentalism in its fold.
The jurisprudence that evolved showcased a new judicial technique of forming judicial commissions
comprising environmental scientists, experts, and members of the civil society to sit face to face with
the government and evolve sustainable solutions. The overarching environmental judicial approach of
this period remained inquisitorial and consensus-based.
These judges were ready with their jurisprudence and sharpened tool kit when climate change walked
into their courtroom. Climate litigation brought with it a host of new issues that slowly overshadowed
the erstwhile environmental litigation. Climate change cut across sectors which were not earlier part of
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the environmental checklist. Climate litigation has to embrace multiple new dimensions like Health
Security, Food Security, Energy Security, Water Security, Human Displacement, Human Trafficking,
and Disasters Management. Climate Justice covers agriculture, health, food, building approvals, industrial
licenses, technology, infrastructural work, human resource, human and climate trafficking, disaster
preparedness, health, etc.
Most countries from Asia and the Pacific do not significantly contribute to climate change but suffer at
the hands of it. Adaptation, as opposed to mitigation, has a totally different judicial response. Climate
change, therefore, has a much broader meaning for the judiciaries of Asia and the Pacific. Adaptation
entails issues that, facially, might not appear to be climate related but, upon deeper probe, show a
causal link with climate change. The jurisprudence on climate justice emerging from the developed
economies is more focused on mitigation and review of governmental decisions to curb emissions. On
the whole, jurisprudence evolved by the courts has played a key role in fashioning climate governance
and effectively combating climate change.
This report chronicles green and climate jurisprudence that emerged over the years and is a testament
to ADB’s tireless effort over a decade in building a judicial coalition. The Asian Judges Network on
Environment helped the judges meet, discuss, and share ideas, which contributed to developing judicial
inventiveness that emerged from Asia and the Pacific. The report is an invaluable exposé of judicial
innovation and a valuable source for judiciaries around the world.
As I close this foreword, the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has stalled the wheels of
human activity and has caged humans with self-isolation and global lockdown. Weeks into it, I see
blues skies out of my window, greener pastures, clean air, less noise, singing of the birds, and a general
sense of relief on the face of nature. I guess the lesson for humankind is to back up and learn to coexist
with nature. A new world is taking shape as I write this. A world that requires us to shed our old ways
and move to a new normal. This report and the rich jurisprudence it puts out on display will help
us fight and defy going back to the pre-corona world of greed, avarice, mindless consumerism, and
unchecked carbon emissions.
I wish this report a huge success.

SYED MANSOOR ALI SHAH
Justice
Supreme Court of Pakistan
Islamabad
20 April 2020

Photo by Samir Jung Thapa/ADB.

ADB is committed to supporting the global climate agenda,
including by developing the capacity of judicial systems
within Asia and the Pacific to play their vital role.
—Thomas M. Clark
Photo by ADB.

PREFACE

J

udges are vital development partners for institutions promoting a sustainable
and inclusive future, with an indispensable role to play in climate governance in
Asia and the Pacific. This work is for them.
The Office of the General Counsel within the Asian Development Bank (ADB)
started judicial capacity development on environmental law in 2010 as part
of its Law and Policy Reform Program. ADB chose to work with judges for
three principal reasons. First, judges form a distinct, independent, and critical
branch of government; yet, development partners frequently overlook the
benefits of judicial capacity building. Second, judges play a significant role in
advancing the rule of law and as guardians of justice in Asia and the Pacific. Third, despite these
critical responsibilities, judges need greater resources and opportunities for professional development,
information sharing, and judicial networking.
Initially, ADB’s program focused on judicial trainings on environmental protection issues, more narrowly,
without inclusion of climate mitigation and adaptation. Then, over the past decade, global awareness
of climate change and of the need for concerted action to address it surged. Countries expanded their
domestic legal and policy frameworks to address climate impacts, and came together in global fora to
coordinate this response, most notably by signing the Paris Agreement in 2015. Driven by the need to
protect themselves, their children, and their environment from climate change, people turned more to
litigation to address climate change, under a variety of theories. With these shifts, ADB expanded the focus
of its judicial capacity building program to incorporate climate change and sustainable development.
In our work with judiciaries over the last 10 years, ADB has seen the extraordinary potential of judicial
capacity building, along with the huge gaps that remain to be filled.





Issuing judgments advancing environmental protection can see judges labeled “anti-development.”
This label isolates and demotivates judges and can hamper them from addressing the serious
legal and constitutional issues that may be implicated by climate change. For such judges, we
created the Asian Judges Network on Environment (AJNE), a platform to connect judges and
legal professionals, facilitate the sharing of knowledge and legal developments on a regional and
global level, and boost motivation. ADB also launched annual conferences on environmental
and climate law to share best practices. We complemented that work with assisting on targeted
national judicial reforms in almost all host countries.
During the annual judicial conferences, Asian and Pacific judges debated and developed the
concepts of environmental and climate justice for the region. These sessions helped develop
shared judicial language and frameworks to assess climate issues, and gave impetus to the
development of seminal jurisprudence across the region. Despite these successes in the region,
broader global audiences are often not aware of the phenomenal work that Asia and Pacific
judiciaries do for lack of international reporting.
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The Law and Policy Reform Program realized that ADB could, with these reports, both provide practical
support to judges facing complex climate litigation as well as showcase climate jurisprudence from Asia
and the Pacific to a broader audience.
In service of these overarching objectives, this report series seeks to (i) share environmental and
climate jurisprudence from Asia and the Pacific, contributing to global knowledge on regional climate
law and litigation; (ii) provide a comprehensive benchbook and tool kit for judges, especially those
from Asia and the Pacific, to facilitate decision-making in this ever-evolving field of law; (iii) capture
the results of ADB’s judicial capacity development work—the legacy of ADB’s work to date; and finally,
(iv) acknowledge the prodigious work done by the judiciaries of Asia and the Pacific—ADB applauds
their dedication and progress.
ADB was pleased to collaborate with the Sabin Center for Climate Change Law on this project.
Michael Burger, Ama Francis, and the team at Sabin provided extraordinary support for ADB,
contributing authoritatively on climate litigation around the world in Report Two, supplementing ADB’s
own research, and drafting the national legal frameworks report.
With pleasure, I acknowledge and introduce ADB’s young and extraordinarily smart team of
researchers and authors. Seventeen researchers gathered laws and cases from the 32 countries covered
by these reports. Gregorio Rafael P. Bueta and Francesse Joy J. Cordon-Navarro contributed to and
assisted with reviewing the reports. Maria Cecilia T. Sicangco wrote the report on international climate
change legal frameworks and assisted with reviewing and editing these reports.
Many thanks to Irum Ahsan who led this initiative. Irum headed the Law and Policy Reform team
between 2017 and 2020, under the guidance of ADB’s former Deputy General Counsel Ramit Nagpal.
Her energy, drive, and creativity have created a flagship program for ADB. I thank Briony Eales, who
steered this initiative tirelessly over the last 3 years, working with researchers and authors, and juggling
work with a young child. She worked with the researchers; wrote about climate science, climate
litigation, and climate laws; and created a synthesized and cohesive series of reports.
The team diligently works on strengthening the rule of law, a key driver for robust and sustainable
economic development. This will be vital work over the coming years. The global efforts to mitigate
climate change and address its harmful impacts must only intensify in the near future, especially in
Asia and the Pacific. The region is too large, diverse, and globally significant not to be at the center of
these efforts. ADB is committed to supporting the global climate agenda, including by developing the
capacity of judicial systems within Asia and the Pacific to play their vital role.
We look forward to our continued work with the region’s judiciaries to strengthen climate justice and
the rule of law.

THOMAS M. CLARK
General Counsel
Office of the General Counsel
Asian Development Bank
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Sea abundance. Fisherfolk across the Pacific
rely on their local fish stocks for nutrition and
livelihood (photo by Raul del Rosario/ADB).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Climate Change: A Clarion Call for Judges
It is 2020 and the world is at a crossroads on climate change.
The Paris Agreement aims to limit global warming to 1.5ºC–2ºC above preindustrial
temperatures. Current international climate responses will not meet these targets.
Thus, urgent and widespread action is indispensable. Recent Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change reports showed a significant difference in the degree of
impact between 1.5ºC and 2ºC of warming. Indeed, the 1.5ºC goal is the safest for
most of Asia and the Pacific.
And then the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic entered the equation,
shutting down economies and claiming almost 1,163,459 lives by 28 October 2020.
Its devastating impacts leave the world struggling to rebuild. After COVID-19, the
world must choose the path toward a safer, inclusive, dignified, and resilient future.
Frustrated by government inaction and threatened by climate change impacts on
their lives and human rights, global citizens are taking the fight for climate justice
to the courts. Climate litigation is demanding that judges play a role in climate
governance.
Asian courts have issued groundbreaking climate decisions. Their approaches
diversify the global discourse on climate jurisprudence and are worth sharing. For
other judges in Asia and the Pacific, climate change is coming soon to your courts.
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has worked with courts in Asia and the
Pacific for over 10 years to build networks and support judges with environmental
and now climate change decision-making. This report series captures the wisdom
gained over the last 10 years and provides resources for judges, decision-makers,
and lawyers involved in climate litigation.

Why These Reports?
Climate Change, Coming Soon to a Court Near You is a series of four reports on
climate law, policy, and litigation. Climate litigation is growing in Asia and the
Pacific, so judges and quasi-judicial decision-makers must have access to climate
law resources.

xxvi

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Cases from high-income countries dominate global literature about climate
litigation. These countries have different mindsets, legal and policy frameworks,
and climate change challenges. Although judges from Asia and the Pacific
have much to gain from reading this literature, they also need perspectives and
approaches closer to home from peers working with similar challenges.
Most Asia and the Pacific countries have low emissions and are incredibly
susceptible to climate change. The region therefore focuses on climate
adaptation and resilience—activities supported by ecosystem resilience and
biodiversity.
Unfortunately, weak environmental governance is common in Asia and the
Pacific, creating cascading effects in this era of climate change. Frail ecosystems
and biodiversity offer communities less protection from the impacts of climate
change, e.g., healthy mangrove forests protect humans and other species from
storm surges. Ecosystems are also more easily damaged by climate change.
Unchecked environmental degradation leaves indigenous, agrarian, and island
communities even more vulnerable to death, homelessness, and displacement.
Judiciaries in the region benefit from understanding the role of ecosystem
protection, biodiversity, and sustainable development in boosting local climate
resilience. Hence, these reports outline links between environmental protection,
biodiversity, and climate change.
Prioritizing environmental protection and low-emission development is challenging
in Asia and the Pacific, a region dominated by low to lower middle-income
countries with development objectives. Judges who do that are often labeled
“anti‑development,” isolating them from their peers. Judges need access to
resources and networks that boost their knowledge, and to information that
proves that balanced and appropriate environmental and climate protection
makes business sense and aligns with national climate commitments.
Judicial knowledge about climate change, legal frameworks, and relevant legal
principles are fundamental to a strong rule of law. Many core principles in climate
law stem from environmental law, a field that a few judges in Asia and the Pacific
have studied or practiced.
Resource limitations, ad hoc publication of laws, and language barriers in Asia
and the Pacific also make it difficult for judges to maintain current knowledge
about climate law, climate science, and local climate change impacts, diminishing
judicial effectiveness. These reports seek to overcome some of these barriers
by synthesizing climate information and achievements and weaving a regional
perspective into the global discourse on climate law.
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Report Series Structure
Within this series are four reports:







Report Series Purpose and Introduction to Climate Science: a brief
introduction to climate change and climate science
Climate Litigation in Asia and the Pacific and Beyond: a comparative
analysis of climate litigation in Asia and the Pacific and the rest of the world
National Climate Change Legal Frameworks in Asia and the Pacific:
analyses of the national climate change policy and legal frameworks in ADB
developing member countries in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific
and the People’s Republic of China, with tables to highlight constitutional
provisions relevant to climate change and a discussion of trends in climate law
International Climate Change Legal Frameworks: a ready reference to key
international climate change instruments and soft law, with tables showing
treaty commitments by country

ADB has specifically designed these reports for judges, quasi-judicial decisionmakers, lawyers from Asia and the Pacific, and those interested in Asian and
Pacific climate law.

Key Takeaways
Litigation
Climate litigation is growing—in Asia and the Pacific and around the world. Most
climate lawsuits in Asia target government respondents, seeking climate action
or challenging decisions with climate impacts. The number of cases against
governments based on treaty obligations, particularly the Paris Agreement, is
increasing, and so is litigation against private entities.
Litigation preferences reflect domestic legal frameworks, with litigants looking
for appropriate hooks to support their claims. Of the countries surveyed in
this report, 25% have adopted framework climate legislation—economy-wide
framework climate change law. The other states use climate policies and existing
laws to achieve their goals. Unclear or incomplete legal and policy frameworks
combined with weak enforcement frequently lead litigants to sue for violations of
constitutional rights.
Petitioners in Asia favor constitutional litigation because it (i) has been used
successfully in environmental litigation, (ii) allows direct access to superior courts,
(iii) provides a legal basis for a claim where the existing legal and policy framework
is incomplete, and (iv) is easier for petitioners to demonstrate standing where a
constitutional right has been breached. The preference for rights-based litigation
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reflects a global trend. Roughly one-third of all climate litigation outside the
United States hinges on fundamental, human, and constitutional rights.
Most lawsuits target climate mitigation—the reduction of greenhouse gas
emissions. However, litigation seeking climate change adaptation is growing and
frequently emerges as a silent issue in Asian environmental lawsuits. In various
cases, neither the parties nor the court identified climate change as an issue,
but the case outcomes had co-benefits for climate resilience and, therefore,
adaptation. These reports treat such cases as climate cases.
Climate litigation in Pacific courts remains rare, which does not reflect the
existential nature of the climate threat in the Pacific.
Pacific islanders are more likely to rely on customary dispute resolution to
resolve local conflicts, reducing the likelihood of litigation. Pacific nations know
that their contribution to climate change is negligible. Lawsuits against national
governments are also counterproductive if the state has limited resources to
respond. Therefore, Pacific islanders are more likely to pursue human rights
petitions in United Nations bodies or engage in transnational litigation, e.g., the
climate migration cases filed in Australia and New Zealand.
Women, children, indigenous communities, and older adults—people who are
particularly vulnerable to climate change—have also been active in domestic and
international climate litigation.

National Legal and Policy Frameworks
Legal and policy frameworks are growing in Asia and the Pacific as governments
plan for low-emission and resilient growth and ramp up climate responses in line
with the Paris Agreement.
National legal and policy frameworks help drive global climate action. The period
preceding the Paris Agreement (2009–2015) saw the most intense adoption
of domestic laws and policies globally. This factor underscores the relationship
between bolstering national climate action and driving forward the global agenda.
Only collaborative, widespread, and urgent local responses can limit climate change,
requiring quality national legal and policy frameworks backed up by well‑informed
judiciaries supporting implementation.
Legal and policy commitments need strengthening across the region. Most
procedures for environmental impact assessments do not expressly require
consideration of climate change. Laws requiring proponents to account for
climate effects on a project and incorporate climate durability into its design
are rare, undermining climate-resilient development. A few laws cover climate
change and oceans.
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Climate impacts, the Paris Agreement, technology, and markets will shape
domestic climate laws and policies, as governments seek to keep up with changes.
Courts in Asia and the Pacific are shaping national legal and policy frameworks
with their decisions. Further, given the existential crisis presented by climate
change, courts have been willing to assess whether national laws and policies
meet international climate commitments.

International Legal and Policy Frameworks
COVID-19 put much of 2020 on hold, including meetings central to the Paris
Agreement implementation. The 26th Session of the Conference of the Parties to
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was postponed
until 2021, delaying agreement on a carbon trading mechanism, common time
frames for reporting under the agreement, and ramping up climate finance and
technology transfers.
The Paris Agreement is mainly silent on oceans and aviation. However, the adoption
of domestic laws and policies in the 6 years leading up to the Paris Agreement
showed the power of national legal frameworks to shape global action.

Judges Can Contribute to Better Climate Outcomes
Judges’ role in government makes them gatekeepers, even climate emergency
managers. Judges are central to
• holding governments accountable for meeting policy commitments and
complying with legal obligations on climate change, the environment, and
sustainable development, and thereby shaping legal and policy frameworks;
• admitting relevant and credible scientific evidence for climate change in
courtrooms and making judicial findings of fact about climate change,
which can elevate the national discourse on climate change (indeed,
courts have successfully incorporated international scientific consensus,
synthesized by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, into
domestic legal common ground, ensuring that advancements in climate
science filter into local law); and
• balancing outcomes and protecting citizens’ fundamental, constitutional,
and other legal rights, frequently closing the gaps through which people and
ecosystems fall.
These functions demonstrate that judges have a vital role in climate governance
in Asia and the Pacific. Supporting judges to respond to climate litigation
contributes to better quality climate governance.
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Moving Forward
Today’s judges are being asked to decide on the burning issue of our generation—
climate change. It is a challenge that threatens to eclipse all others in modern
history.
As Albert Einstein once said, “We cannot solve our problems with the same
thinking we used when we created them.” Significant judicial advancements
have often rested on the shoulders of jurists who were willing to apply new
consciousness and imagination to existing principles to resolve society’s pressing
problems. We need new perspectives to create climate justice. Justice will only
be fair if it considers diverse perspectives and rights—those of women, children,
elders, indigenous peoples, the differently abled, and future generations, as well as
those of the traditional power structures.
These reports are for those who must adjudicate climate litigation in Asia and the
Pacific. ADB lauds the advancements that Asia and the Pacific judiciaries have
made in environmental and climate justice and sustainable development. The
authors hope that this jurisprudence brings diversity and a fresh perspective to
the global discourse on climate law.
As for climate justice, more work is needed. Emissions continue to rise, and global
commitments do not yet have the world on track to limit global warming to well
below 2ºC above preindustrial temperatures. Gaps persist in climate change
legal and policy frameworks, allowing action to stagnate. To promote climate
justice in Asia and the Pacific, judges can assess these gaps. They can ask, do
these frameworks support the overarching 1.5ºC–2ºC temperature goal under the
Paris Agreement?
These reports encourage judiciaries to equip themselves with knowledge about
climate science and law because litigation demands that judges take part in
reckoning climate justice. The future rests heavily on each of us. Those able to
make powerful decisions must choose action. This work is in the service of judges
and decision-makers. We hope it lights the way, a little.

Photo by Lester Ledesma/ADB.

Building climate resilience. Village girls in Nepal play on a dam
that is part of an erosion control structure in the village, to slow
down flash floods. Extreme rainfall, which translates into massive
floods, is a climate change impact felt throughout Asia and
the Pacific. The region is home to the most number of climatevulnerable people in the world (photo by Gerhard Jörén/ADB).

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

D

omestic adjudication has increasingly driven climate change governance
in the last decade. Courts in Asia,1 Europe,2 the Americas,3 Africa,4 and
the Pacific5 have had to contend with how climate change intersects with
constitutional, commercial, administrative, civil, international, environmental, and
human rights law. Strategic litigation, especially cases aiming to cut emissions, has
also been used to link domestic action with collective global targets.
This report forms part of a series of reports on climate law and policy for judges in
Asia and the Pacific. Judges play a crucial role in protecting the rule of law, helping
their nations achieve climate resilience, and advancing human and constitutional
rights. Familiarity with global comparative jurisprudence and international and
national legal frameworks helps judges in the adjudication process—making this
information a crucial element of the judicial tool kit on climate change.6

Report One of this series provides information about climate science and lays
out the introduction to the report series. Report Two focuses on global climate
jurisprudence, specifically comparing between the judicial approaches in Asia
and the Pacific and the rest of the world. Report Three discusses national
legal frameworks.
This report (Report Four) presents an overview with a regional perspective of the
international legal framework governing climate change law and policy. National
courts use international concepts and instruments in their judgments. The
report seeks to build the capacity of judges in Asia and the Pacific to effectively
reference relevant treaties and principles when adjudicating climate change
cases. It covers 31 countries in Asia and the Pacific (Table 1.1).

1
2

3

4

5
6

See, e.g., Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2018 Lahore 364.
See, e.g., The State of the Netherlands (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy) v Urgenda
Foundation, Case No. 19/00135, ECLI:NL:HR:2019:2007, Supreme Court of the Netherlands,
20 December 2019 (translation).
See, e.g., Demanda Generaciones Futuras v. Minambiente (Future Generations v. Ministry of the
Environment and Others), Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Abril 5, 2018, M.P:
L. Villabona, Expediente: 11001-22-03-000-2018-00319-01 (Colomb.) (unofficial translation).
See, e.g., Earthlife Africa Johannesburg v the Minister of Environmental Affairs and others, High
Court of South Africa, Case no. 65662/16 (Mar. 8, 2017).
See , e.g., Gloucester Resources Limited v Minister for Planning [2019] NSWLEC 7.
Legal citations vary by jurisdiction. As this document is written for judges and legal practitioners
in Asia and the Pacific, the authors preserve national case citation differences, wherever feasible.
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Table 1.1: Regions and Countries Covered by the Report
South Asia

Southeast Asia

Pacific

Afghanistan

Cambodia

Cook Islands

Bangladesh

Indonesia

Federated States of Micronesia

Bhutan

Lao People’s Democratic Republic

Fiji

India

Malaysia

Kiribati

Maldives

Myanmar

Marshall Islands

Nepal

Philippines

Nauru

Pakistan

Singapore

Palau

Sri Lanka

Thailand

Papua New Guinea

Viet Nam

Samoa
Solomon Islands
Timor-Leste
Tonga
Tuvalu
Vanuatu

Source: Authors.

While the report does not lay out a detailed commentary of each international
instrument, it provides basic information on
(i)
(ii)

what the relevant legal frameworks articulate;
which countries have signed, ratified, accepted, or acceded to treatybased instruments;
(iii) what principles of international law outside the conventional regime
are binding on states, either as generally accepted principles or as
rules of customary law; 7 and
(iv) what instruments, while not legally binding, inform state practice and
the progressive development of law.
The report follows the structure in Table 1.2. It describes each international
instrument and, when appropriate, the circumstances of its adoption. It covers
the following topics: (i) international climate law framework (in the strict sense);

7

Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice enumerates the three sources of
international law: “(1) international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules
expressly recognized by the contesting states; (2) international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law; and (3) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations; […]”
International custom (item 2), in turn, has two elements: (1) state practice, and (2) opinio juris sive
necessitatis, or the state’s belief that a particular action was carried out due to a legal obligation.
See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v. Denmark and Germany v. The Netherlands),
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969. p. 3.
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(ii) related global multilateral environmental instruments; (iii) regional
instruments from South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific; and (iv) human
rights-based instruments that are not strictly climate-focused, but have been
interpreted to include the rights impacted by climate change. The report also
highlights when an instrument principle may simultaneously be regarded as a
customary norm or a general principle of law, thus binding states independent of
the instrument.

Table 1.2: International Instruments Covered by the Report
International
climate change
legal framework

 Pre-United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Work (1992)

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 1721 (XVI)
The Stockholm Declaration (see details in Part Three Section II.A.)
First World Climate Conference
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (see details in
Part Three Section I.E.)
• United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (see details in
Part Three Section I.F.)
• Brundtland Commission Report (“Our Common Future”)
• Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (see details in
Part Three Section I.G.)
• Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer
(see details in Part Three Section I.G.)
• Toronto Conference Declaration
• UNGA Resolution No. 43/53 (“Protection of global climate for present
and future generations of mankind”)
• Noordwijk Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric Pollution and
Climate Change Declaration
• Second World Climate Conference Declaration
• UNGA Resolution No. 45/212 (“Protection of global climate for present
and future generations of mankind”)
• Instruments from the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development
- Agenda 21
- Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (see details in
Part Three Section II.B.)
- Statement of Forest Principles
- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(see details in Part Two Section II.)
- Convention on Biological Diversity (see details in Part Three
Section I.K.)
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
Kyoto Protocol
Cancun Agreements
Doha Amendment
Paris Agreement
•
•
•
•







continued on next page
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Table 1.2 continued

Multilateral
environmental
legal instruments

 Hard Law

• Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as
Waterfowl Habitat
• Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter and Its 1996 Protocol
• Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and
Natural Heritage
• International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and
the 1978 Protocol
• Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
• United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
• Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer,
1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
and 2016 Amendment to the Montreal Protocol (Kigali Amendment)
• Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal
• Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context
• Energy Charter Treaty and Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency
and Related Environmental Aspects
• United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, Cartagena Protocol
on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, and the
Nagoya Protocol
• United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those
Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification,
Particularly in Africa

 Soft Law

Stockholm Declaration
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–2030)
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Addis Ababa
Action Agenda
• Draft Global Pact for the Environment
• Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
• Global Compact on Refugees
•
•
•
•

continued on next page
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Table 1.2 continued

Regional
environmental and
climate change
instruments

 South Asia

• Malé Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change
• South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Convention on
Cooperation on Environment

 Southeast Asia

• Association of Southeast Asian Nations Agreement on Transboundary
Haze Pollution
• Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy, and the Environment
• ASEAN Human Rights Declaration
• Action Plan on Joint Response to Climate Change
• ASEAN Sociocultural Community Blueprint 2025

 Pacific

• Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and
Environment of the South Pacific Region and Related Protocols
• Pacific Islands Framework for Action on Climate Change 2006–2015
• Framework for the Resilient Development of the Pacific
• Boe Declaration on Regional Security

Rights-based
Instruments

 Hard Law

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women
• Convention on the Rights of the Child
•
•
•
•

 Soft Law

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Universal Declaration of Human Rights
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
Equator Principles
International Law Association Declaration of Legal Principles Relating
to Climate Change
Oslo Principles on Climate Change Obligations
World Declaration on the Environmental Rule of Law
Charter of the Global Judicial Institute for the Environment
Principles on the Climate Obligations of Enterprises
Climate Action 100+ Initiative

ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
Source: Authors.

5

6

INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

The report also seeks to link substantive international climate change law with
general principles of international law, which may affect how domestic courts
integrate these concepts in climate change decisions. It discusses, for instance,
the following:






What are the consequences if the state has signed and ratified a treaty, but
has not incorporated the treaty in municipal law?
If the state has signed but not ratified a treaty, is it still legally bound in
some way?
In the two scenarios above, may the judge still reference the treaty as legal
basis for his or her decision?
May the judge legitimately cite a principle of law outside of the treaty
regime to support his or her decision, including instances when the principle
is also articulated in a treaty that the state has not signed at all?

Each section provides tabular summaries of treaty status in relation to the
states covered in this report. The comparative information on treaty obligations
provided in this report can benefit the judges, and is useful for them to
understand which treaties their states have signed and/or ratified. Along with the
key takeaways from this report, the tabular summaries would help them ascertain
(i) which international instruments may be used in domestic adjudication (e.g., which
human rights treaty bolsters a citizen’s rights-based climate claim against the state),
and (ii) the legal ramifications of the treaty as it relates specifically to their state.

Photo by Abir Abdullah/ADB.

Forest conservation. Villagers from the K’ho ethnic minority
patrol a pine forest near the Da Nhim commune in Viet Nam.
This is part of the Payment for Forest Environment Services
(PFES) rendered for the national park authorities. Forests
play an essential role in mitigating climate change by
capturing carbon dioxide emitted into the atmosphere
(photo by Lester Ledesma/ADB).

PART TWO

INTERNATIONAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
I. Pre-United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change Work

I

n 1961, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed Resolution 1721
(XVI), which led to the creation of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO)
World Weather Watch (WMO-WWW) and the WMO-International Science
Council (ICSU) Global Atmospheric Research Programme. UNGA Resolution 1721
recommended that UN member states, the WMO, and other appropriate specialized
agencies undertake a study of measures “[t]o advance the state of atmospheric
science and technology so as to provide greater knowledge of basic physical
forces affecting climate and the possibility of large-scale weather modification.” 1

Subsequently, the UN Conference on the Human Environment, the first global
environmental conference, was held in Stockholm, Sweden in 1972. It culminated
in the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
(the Stockholm Declaration) (see Part Three Section II.A. of this report).2
Seven years later, the First World Climate Conference was held in Geneva,
Switzerland in 1979. The Conference Declaration identified “climatic variability
and change” as an urgent challenge, and called on nations “to foresee and to
prevent potential man-made changes in climate that might be adverse to the
well-being of humanity.” 3 It thus called for the establishment of the World Climate
Programme, which was set up later in the year under the cosponsorship of WMO,
ICSU, and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The Convention
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP), adopted and opened

1

2

3

General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), International Co-Operation in the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space, A/RES/1721(XVI)[B] (20 December 1961).
United Nations. 1973. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Stockholm, 5–16 June 1972. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1. New York. pp. 3–5.
World Meteorological Organization. 1979. Proceedings of the World Climate Conference–A
Conference of Experts on Climate and Mankind, Geneva, 12–23 February 1979. WMO–No. 537.
Geneva. pp. 709–716.

10

INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

for signature also in 1979, is the first international legally binding instrument on
climate (see Part Three Section I.E.).4
In December 1982, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS) was opened for signature (see Part Three Section I.F.).
In 1983, the UNGA passed Resolution 38/161, Process of Preparation of the
Environmental Perspective to the Year 2000 and Beyond, which established
the Brundtland Commission (formerly known as the World Commission on
Environment and Development). The commission aimed to unite states in pursuing
sustainable development in a manner that protects and enhances the environment.
The commission report, Our Common Future, published in 1987, discussed:
• sustainable development in the context of equity and common interest;
• the persisting dilemma of fossil fuels and the potential of renewable energy; and
• the need for “negotiating new global and regional conventions or
arrangements aimed at promoting cooperation and coordination in the field
of environment and development (including, for example, new conventions
and agreements on climate change…).” 5
In March 1985, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer
(VCPOL) was adopted and opened for signature (see Part Three Section I.G.).
In August 1987, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer (a protocol to the VCPOL) was adopted and opened for signature
(see Part Three Section I.G.).
In June 1988, more than 300 scientists, policymakers, and corporate and
environmental leaders from 46 countries and organizations attended the
Toronto Conference (officially entitled International Conference of the Changing
Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security). The final Conference Declaration
was a strongly worded statement that described the existing atmospheric situation
as a human-induced “unintended, uncontrolled, globally pervasive experiment
whose ultimate consequences [on global security, world economy, and the natural
environment] could be second only to a global nuclear war.” 6 It further defined
“climate warming…and changed frequencies of climatic extremes” as an urgent
problem, which would become “progressively more serious, more difficult to
reverse, and more costly to address” (footnote 6). The declaration recommended
• that states establish a “comprehensive global convention as a framework for
protocols on the protection of the atmosphere” (footnote 6);
4

5

6

P. Jackson. 2007. From Stockholm to Kyoto: A Brief History of Climate Change. UN Chronicle.
XLIV (2).
United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the World Commission on Environment and
Development: Note by the Secretary-General, A/42/427 (4 August 1987).
WMO/OMM. 1990. The Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security. Statement
from international meeting sponsored by Government of Canada. Toronto. 27–30 June 1988
(Reprinted in 5 AM1. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 515).
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• the creation of a “World Atmosphere Fund financed in part by a levy on the
fossil fuel consumption of industrialized countries” (footnote 6); and
• a “reduction in CO2 emissions by approximately 20% of 1988 levels by the
year 2005 as an initial goal” (the ‘Toronto target’) (footnote 6).
In the same year, the WMO and UNEP established the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC). The UNGA subsequently endorsed the creation of
the IPCC.7 The IPCC is an intergovernmental body within the UN framework. It
assesses literature on “human-induced climate change, its potential impacts and
options for adaptation and mitigation.” 8 It also produces reports that feed into
the global climate discourse, including negotiations within the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) framework. The IPCC’s
First Assessment Report (1990) that had confirmed the threat of climate change
was instrumental in negotiations for, and the eventual language of, the UNFCCC.9
Similarly, the Fifth Assessment Report, finalized in 2014, was crucial in the run-up
to the 2015 Paris Agreement.10
Malta introduced climate change into UNGA proceedings in September 1988, in
its pursuit to include the item “Conservation of Climate as Part of the Common
Heritage of Mankind” in the agenda.11 This initiative was broadly supported and,
in December 1988, the UNGA passed Resolution 43/53 “Protection of Global
Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind” (footnote 7). The
resolution endorsed the establishment of the IPCC and characterized climate
change as a “priority issue.” It also
• acknowledged that human activities could contribute to changes in global
climate patterns, threatening present and future generations;
• noted the emerging evidence indicating that increased concentrations of
greenhouse gases (GHGs) in the atmosphere could lead to global warming,
the consequences of which “could be disastrous for mankind if timely steps
are not taken at all levels;” and
• recognized that a global framework that takes into account the vital
interest of “all mankind” is required to address climate change, as it affects
humanity as a whole.

7

8
9

10

11

General Assembly Resolution 43/53, Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future
Generations of Mankind, A/RES/43/53 (6 December 1988).
IPCC. Principles Governing IPCC Work. Art. 2.
IPCC. 1992. Climate Change: The IPCC 1990 and 1992 Assessments–IPCC First Assessment Report
Overview and Policymaker Summaries and 1992 IPCC Supplement. Geneva.
C.F. Schleussner et al. 2016. Science and Policy Characteristics of the Paris Agreement
Temperature Goal. Nature Climate Change. 6 (9). p. 827.
D. Bodansky. 1993. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: A Commentary.
Yale Journal of International Law. 18 (2). Footnote 86 of the article states, “Letter from
Dr. Alexander Borg-Olivier, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Malta to the
United Nations, to Javier Perez de Cuellar, U.N. Secretary-General (Sept. 9, 1988) (on file with author).
The characterization of climate as "the common heritage of mankind" echoed Malta's 1967
introduction of the "heritage of mankind" concept to describe deep seabed mineral resources.”
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However, Malta’s initial formulation of climate as “common heritage of
mankind” did not make it into the resolution. Some states were concerned that
this characterization (used beforehand in the context of deep seabed mineral
resources and the moon) was inappropriate in the context of climate (footnote 11).
The resolution thus described the climate as the “common concern of mankind”
(footnote 11).
In November 1989, the Noordwijk Ministerial Conference on Atmospheric
Pollution and Climate Change was held in the Netherlands. Representatives
of 67 developed and developing countries (split almost equally) (footnote 11),
11 international organizations, and the Commission of the European Community (EC)
attended the conference.12 Significantly, the Noordwijk Declaration recognized
the need to (i) increase carbon sinks, and (ii) while ensuring stable development
of the world economy, stabilize carbon dioxide emissions and emissions of
other GHGs not covered by the Montreal Protocol. The latter provision was
understood to be on an “as soon as possible” basis for industrialized nations, but
the declaration did not specify a timetable.13
The Noordwijk Declaration also acknowledged several core principles relevant
to a climate treaty, such as “the concept of climate change as a common
concern of humankind, the common but differentiated responsibilities of states,
the sovereign right of states to manage their own natural resources, and the
necessity of sustainable development” (footnote 12). In particular, the Noordwijk
Declaration was sensitive to the North-South divide, and included provisions
pursued by developing countries. These provisions related to the “principle
of sovereignty, the need for international cooperation and resolution of the
external debt problem, the responsibility of industrialized countries to take the
lead in initiating action to combat climate change, and the need for financial and
technical assistance, in part through the mobilization of additional resources.” 14
Not all of the developed countries agreed to concrete commitments on emission
targets (footnote 12). Still, the Noordwijk Declaration represents an initial
step toward recognition of such targets (footnote 12). The EC Member States
were among those that agreed to concrete targets, and the EC referenced the
Noordwijk deliberations when it set its policy targets on climate change in 1990.15

12

13

14
15

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Noordwijk
Ministerial Declaration on Climate Change (Fact Sheet).
The Noordwijk Declaration states, “The Conference recognizes the need to stabilize, while
ensuring stable development of the world economy, CO2 emissions and emissions of other
greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. Industrialized nations agree that
such stabilization should be achieved by them as soon as possible, at levels to be considered by
the IPCC and the Second World Climate Conference of November 1990. In the view of many
industrialized nations, such stabilization of CO2 emissions should be achieved as a first step at
the latest by the year 2000."
Footnote 11, referencing Noordwijk Declaration, paras. 6, 7, 11, 26.
Footnote 12, citing communication from the EC Commission to the Council on community
policy targets on the greenhouse issue, 16 March 1990 (Document SEC[90] final).
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In October–November 1990, the Second World Climate Conference
(SWCC) was held in Geneva, Switzerland. The SWCC had “6 days of scientific
and technical presentations and discussions involving 747 participants from
116 countries, and 2 days of ministerial sessions attended by 908 participants
from 137 countries.” 16 Similar to the Noordwijk Declaration, the SWCC
Declaration emphasized the need to stabilize GHG emissions, but failed to
provide specifics, such as levels and timelines. It further called for a global treaty
on climate change.
The UNGA passed Resolution 45/212 “Protection of Global Climate for
Present and Future Generations of Mankind” on 21 December 1990.17 It
established a single intergovernmental negotiating process under the auspices of
the General Assembly for the preparation of a framework convention on climate
change. It also created the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee to lead
the negotiation process and complete the framework convention and related
agreements prior to the UN Conference on Environment and Development in
June 1992. The resolution likewise established a special voluntary fund to ensure
that developing countries are able to participate fully in the negotiating process.
The UN Conference on Environment and Development (also known as the
Earth Summit or the Rio Summit) was held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in June 1992.
Representatives of 178 governments attended the Earth Summit and adopted
three major non-binding instruments and two legally binding conventions, which
were then opened for signature.18



Non-binding Instruments and Declarations
(i) Agenda 21 is a comprehensive plan of action on sustainable
development.19 It is premised on “the need to take a balanced and
integrated approach to environment and development questions” 20 on
the basis of international, subregional, national, and local cooperation
(i.e., global partnership for sustainable development).21 Agenda 21
discusses climate change and climate variability in the context of
conservation and management of resources (e.g., protection of the
atmosphere; combating deforestation; protection of oceans, seas, and
marine resources; improving the scientific basis for decision-making;
contingency plans for both natural and human-induced disasters; and

16

17

18

19

20
21

J.W. Zillman. 2009. A History of Climate Activities. Bulletin of the World Meteorological
Organization. 58 (3).
General Assembly Resolution 45/212, Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future
Generations of Mankind, A/RES/45/212 (21 December 1990).
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Sustainable
Development Goals. Agenda 21.
United Nations. 1993. Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
Rio de Janeiro, 3–14 June 1992. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I). New York. pp. 9–479. (Agenda 21 is
Annex II of Resolution 1.)
Footnote 19, Preamble, Art. 1.2.
Footnote 19, Preamble, Art. 1.1.
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addressing the disproportional effects of climate change on vulnerable
countries such as small island developing states).
(ii) The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development consists of
27 principles that define the rights and obligations of states with respect
to environment and development issues (see Part Three Section II.B.).22
(iii) The Statement of Forest Principles,23 a set of principles for the
sustainable management of forests, is the first global consensus
reached on forests.24 It recommends that (i) states assess the impact
of their development activities on their forest resources, and (ii) all
aspects of environmental protection and social and economic
development as they relate to forests and forest lands should be
integrated and comprehensive.25 At the same time, it affirms that states
have a right to develop forests according to their socioeconomic needs,
in keeping with national sustainable development policies.26



Legally Binding Conventions
(i) The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) had 197 parties as of October 2020.27 It entered into force
on 21 March 1994.28 It is considered to be one of the few conventions
with universal, or near universal, membership (see Part Two Section II.).
(ii) The principal aims of the Convention on Biological Diversity 29 are
conservation of biological diversity, sustainable use of its components,
and fair and equitable sharing of benefits from utilization of genetic
resources.30 The convention has 196 parties, and entered into force on
29 December 1993 (see Part Three Section I.K.).

Both conventions were opened for signature at the Rio Summit.

22

23

24
25
26
27

28
29

30

Footnote 19, pp. 3–8. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development is Annex I of
Resolution 1.
Footnote 19, pp. 480–485. The Non-Legally Binding Authoritative Statement of Principles
for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and Sustainable Development of
All Types of Forests (commonly known as the Statement of Forest Principles) is Annex III of
Resolution 1.
Footnote 23, Preamble (d).
Footnote 23, Art. 3(c).
Footnote 23, Art. 2(a).
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New York, 9 May 1992, United Nations
Treaty Series, Vol. 1771, No. 30822, p. 107.
United Nations Treaty Collection. UNFCCC (Information Page).
Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, United Nations Treaty Series,
Vol. 1760, No. 30619, p. 79.
Footnote 29, Art. 1.
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II. 1992 United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change
The UNFCCC is a framework treaty for intergovernmental efforts to address
climate change. It aims to curb the average global temperature increase and its
impacts which, by the time the treaty was adopted, were already inevitable.31
The framework is divided into four parts:
(i)

The preliminary section, stating the definitions, objectives, and
fundamental principles of the convention.
(ii) General and specific commitments of developed and developing countries
in relation to the sources and sinks of GHGs; scientific cooperation, public
information, and education; financial resources and technology transfer;
adoption of national policies and corresponding measures to address
climate change; and the use of best available scientific information, as well
as relevant technical, social, and economic information.
(iii) Institutional arrangements to facilitate and monitor implementation
of the convention.
(iv) Procedural provisions regarding annexes, entry into force, reservations,
ratification, accession, protocols, and interim arrangements.32

A. Preamble, Objectives, and Principles
The UNFCCC addresses all GHG emissions that were not covered by the 1987
Montreal Protocol. Article 2 states that the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is
to stabilize GHG concentrations in the atmosphere “at a level that would prevent
dangerous [human-induced]33 anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”34
The use of the word “dangerous” connotes some level of judgment, which the
UNFCCC clarifies must be based on relevant scientific, technical, and economic
considerations, and continually reevaluated in the light of new findings.35 The
IPCC’s periodic reports play an important role in this assessment. In addition, the
“level” referenced in Article 2 is to be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow
ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not
threatened, and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.36
The preamble references several international environmental law principles,
such as the characterization of climate as the “common concern of mankind,” 37
31
32
33

34
35
36
37

UNFCCC. History of the Convention.
Footnote 11, p. 492.
UNFCCC defines climate change in Art. 1(2), as “a change of climate which is attributed directly
or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in
addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.” (italics supplied)
Footnote 27, p. 9.
Footnote 27, Preamble, para. 16.
Footnote 27, Art. 2.
Echoing UN General Assembly Resolution 43/53. Footnote 7.
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the sovereign right of states to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental and developmental policies,38 the responsibility of states to avoid
transboundary environmental harm,39 and the principle of intergenerational
equity.40 It also contextualizes the differentiated response measures expected
of developed and developing countries, noting that “standards applied by some
countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and social cost
to other countries,” 41 and that the energy consumption of developing countries
“will need to grow” “to achieve sustainable social and economic development.” 42
Furthermore, the preamble invokes the “no regrets” principle—i.e., that various
actions responding to climate change challenges can be rationalized economically
in and of themselves (separate from climate considerations),43 and can also help
in solving other environmental problems.44
Under international law, the location of a provision in a treaty determines its
character and norm-generating capacity. The preamble provides the context
for interpreting a treaty, but does not itself create binding rights and duties on
parties.45 In contrast, if the provision is located in the operational part of the
treaty, it may create rights and obligations depending on the language used.46
This explains why some of the principles set forth in Article 3 of the UNFCCC
explicitly reaffirm several preambular provisions. For example, the first principle
clearly mirrors the concept that the climate should be protected for the benefit of
present and future generations, the principle of equity, and the principle of common
38

39

40

41
42

43
44
45

46

See also Principle 2 of the Rio Declaration, footnote 22, which states, “States have, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law,
the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and
developmental policies […].”
Footnote 38. The relevant section of Principle 2 states, “States have, in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law, […] the responsibility
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”
Footnote 27, Preamble, para. 23: “Determined to protect the climate system for present and
future generations […]”. This is restated under Art. 3 [Principles] (1): “The Parties should protect
the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis
of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating
climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”
Footnote 27, Preamble, para. 10. This is a restatement of Principle 11 of the Rio Declaration.
Footnote 27, Preamble, para. 22. The paragraph also references energy efficiency: “Recognizing
that all countries, especially developing countries, need access to resources required to achieve
sustainable social and economic development and that, in order for developing countries to
progress towards that goal, their energy consumption will need to grow taking into account the
possibilities for achieving greater energy efficiency and for controlling greenhouse gas emissions in
general, including through the application of new technologies on terms which make such an
application economically and socially beneficial.” (italics supplied)
Footnote 11, p. 499.
Footnote 27. Preamble, para. 17.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969, United Nations Treaty Series,
Vol. 1155, No. 18232, p. 331. Art. 31(2).
L. Rajamani. 2016. The 2015 Paris Agreement: Interplay Between Hard, Soft and Non-Obligations.
Journal of Environmental Law. 28 (2). pp. 337–358.
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but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC).47
Furthermore, the second principle gives “full consideration” to the specific needs
and special circumstances of developing countries, especially those that are
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, and countries that
would have to bear a disproportionate or abnormal burden under the UNFCCC.48
On the other hand, the remaining three principles, while not expressly referred to
in the preamble, build upon it. The precautionary principle—that where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be
used as a reason for postponing precautionary measures—is embodied in the third
principle.49 The fourth principle recognizes that development and climate change
are intertwined. While states parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable
development, the UNFCCC recognizes that economic development is essential for
adopting measures to address climate change.50 The fifth principle expounds on the
relationship between climate change and international trade—that measures taken
to combat climate change should not constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.51
Despite the efforts of developing countries to champion other principles,
academic and climate law expert Daniel Bodansky (footnote 11) notes that some
of these principles did not make it to the final text of the UNFCCC. These include
the principles that (i) states have an equal right to ocean sinks; (ii) the GHG
emissions of developing countries “must” grow; (iii) no environmental conditions
should be imposed on aid; and (iv) developed countries have the “main
responsibility” for addressing climate change, since their overconsumption and
excess emissions are its primary causes.52 Other related principles on liability and
compensation, corollary to the “main responsibility” principle, also did not make it
to the UNFCCC (footnote 52).

B. General and Specific Commitments
The CBDR-RC concept is fundamental to understanding the UNFCCC. It
acknowledges that while states have a shared obligation to address climate
change, developed countries have historically contributed most to the problem
and have more resources to remedy it.53 They should thus take the lead in
combating climate change and its adverse effects.54
47
48
49
50
51
52

53

54

Footnote 27, Art. 3(1).
Footnote 27, Art. 3(2).
Footnote 27, Art. 3(3).
Footnote 27, Art. 3(4).
Footnote 27, Art. 3(5).
Footnote 11, p. 502. Professor Bodansky is an expert in international climate change law and
policy, as well as environmental law. He is Regents’ Professor of Law in the Sandra Day O’Connor
College of Law (Arizona State University) and Senior Adviser at the Center for Climate and
Energy Solutions.
UNFCCC Secretariat. 2003. Caring for Climate: A Guide to the Climate Change Convention and
the Kyoto Protocol. Bonn. p. 6.
Footnote 27, Art. 3(1).
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Consequently, for purposes of specific commitments, the UNFCCC divides states
parties into three categories:







55
56
57
58
59

60

61
62
63
64
65

Annex I Parties consist of (i) industrialized countries that were
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
members in 1992, and (ii) countries with economies in transition (the EIT
Parties) (i.e., the former Eastern bloc consisting of the Russian Federation,
the Baltic states, and several Central and Eastern European states).55
They have a specific commitment to adopt national policies and take
corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change,56 with the
aim of returning GHG emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000.57 The
UNFCCC nevertheless grants EIT Parties “a certain degree of flexibility,” 58
which some states have used to set a year other than 1990 as the base
year (footnote 55). Nevertheless, negotiations between developed and
developing countries resulted in softer language with respect to emission
targets and the applicable timeline (e.g., “with the aim of returning” to
1990 emissions levels).59 There is, therefore, no express commitment to
reduce emissions by a certain date.60 Annex I Parties are also obliged to
provide more frequent and more detailed national reports on their GHG
emissions.61
Annex II Parties consist of the OECD subset of Annex I Parties. They have
a specific commitment to provide financial resources to enable developing
countries to undertake emissions reduction activities, and to help them
adapt to the adverse effects of climate change.62
The rest of the states parties are, for simplicity, categorized as Non-Annex I
Parties. They do not have any specific commitments under the UNFCCC.
While most are developing countries, the UNFCCC specifically recognizes
certain categories of countries as being particularly vulnerable to the
adverse impacts of climate change, such as small island countries and
countries with arid areas.63 Others are more economically vulnerable to
climate change response measures, such as those with economies that are
highly dependent on fossil fuels.64 The UNFCCC gives “full consideration”
to their specific needs and concerns, emphasizing activities such as
investment, insurance, and technology transfer.65

Footnote 53, p. 5.
Footnote 27, Art. 4(2)(a).
Footnote 27, Art. 4(2)(b).
Footnote 27, Art. 4(6).
Footnote 57 (italics supplied). Cf. “stabilize.” Professor Bodansky notes that “return” unlike
“stabilize” does not necessarily have “an ongoing temporal dimension.” (Footnote 11, p. 515.)
P.J. Sands and I. Millar. 2011. Climate, International Protection. In Max Planck Encyclopedias of
International Law [MPIL]. Oxford Public International Law.
Footnote 27, Art. 4(2)(b).
Footnote 27, Art. 4(3) and 4(4).
Footnote 27, Art. 4(8).
Footnote 27. See also Art. 4(10).
Footnote 27, Art. 4(8).
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All parties (i.e., Annex I and Non-Annex I Parties) are bound by UNFCCC’s
general commitments. These commitments are qualitative in nature. They oblige
parties to (i) establish national inventories of their GHG emissions; (ii) prepare
and implement programs on adaptation, mitigation, environment friendly
technologies, sustainable management of carbon sinks, climate research, and
education and public awareness on climate change; and (iii) provide reports on
steps taken to implement the convention.66
The parties to the UNFCCC meet annually at the Conference of the Parties (COP)
to regularly monitor implementation of the convention, discuss the way forward
in addressing climate change, and negotiate new commitments. The COP is the
supreme decision-making body of the UNFCCC.67

III. 1997 Kyoto Protocol
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was adopted in response to the lack of
legally binding emission reduction targets and timelines in the UNFCCC. It shares
the UNFCCC’s objective and is likewise based on the principle of common but
differentiated responsibilities.
The protocol, adopted and opened for signature on 11 December 1997, entered
into force on 16 February 2005. It had 192 parties as of October 2020.68
The heart of the Kyoto Protocol lies in Article 3, whereby UNFCCC Annex I Parties
committed to specific, quantified, and binding emissions limitation and reduction
commitments (contained in the Protocol’s Annex B). These commitments were
to be achieved by the end of the first commitment period (2008–2012), “with a
view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5% below 1990
levels.” 69 The process by which the parties arrived at the Annex B commitment
targets was contentious and difficult (footnote 60). In the end, the parties agreed
to differentiated targets for Annex I countries (e.g., 8% reduction in the first
commitment period for the European Union and its member states, 7% reduction
for the United States, 6% reduction for Japan and Canada) (footnote 60).
Commitments for subsequent periods are to be set by amendments to Annex B.70

66
67
68

69

70

Footnote 27, Arts. 4(1), 5, 6, and 12(1).
Footnote 27, Art. 7.
Including the European Union. All UN member states are parties to the Kyoto Protocol except
Andorra, Canada (withdrew in 2012), South Sudan, and the United States (US) (signed but has
not ratified the Protocol). See United Nations Treaty Collection. Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Information Page). In June 2001, President
George W. Bush decided to withdraw US support from the Kyoto Protocol, which he described
as “fatally flawed in fundamental ways.” See Office of the Press Secretary. President Bush
Discusses Global Climate Change.
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Kyoto,
11 December 1997, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 2303, No. 30822, p. 162. Art. 3(1).
Footnote 69, Art. 3(9).
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The Kyoto Protocol envisions the attainment of these emission limitation and
reduction commitments through a two-pronged approach: (i) by national actions,
policies, and measures; and (ii) through international market mechanisms.
Examples of national policies and measures given by the Kyoto Protocol include
enhancing energy efficiency, promoting renewable energy and sustainable
agriculture, removing subsidies and other market distortions, reducing transport
sector emissions, and recovering methane emissions through waste management.71
For international market mechanisms, the protocol established three flexible
mechanisms:







71
72

73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Article 6 of the protocol allows “joint implementation.” Annex I Parties
may implement projects that reduce emissions, or increase removals using
sinks, in the territories of other Annex I countries, and to credit the resulting
“emission reduction units” against their own emission targets.72 Joint
implementation projects must provide a reduction in emissions by sources,
or an enhancement of removals by sinks, that is additional to any that
would otherwise occur.73 Further, these projects should be supplemental
to domestic actions.74 “In practice, joint implementation projects are most
likely to take place in EIT countries, where there is generally more scope for
cutting emissions at a lower cost.” 75
Article 12 of the protocol defines the clean development mechanism,
whereby Annex I Parties may gain certified emission reductions (CERs) by
implementing or funding sustainable development project activities that
reduce emissions (or enhance sinks through afforestation or reforestation)76
by non-Annex I Parties.77 These CERs could then be credited toward
compliance with the Annex I Party’s emission commitments under Article 3
of the protocol. Projects under the clean development mechanism must
lead to real, measurable, and long-term climate benefits in the form of
emission reductions or removals that are additional to any that would have
occurred without the project.78 They have the additional purpose of assisting
Non-Annex I Parties (typically developing countries) in achieving sustainable
development and contributing to the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC.79
Article 17 of the protocol permits Annex B Parties to achieve their
emission targets through emissions trading. It involves the sale and
purchase of emission reduction credits (assigned amount units) between

Footnote 69, Art. 2(1)(a).
Footnote 53, p. 19. See also UNFCCC. Issues in the Negotiating Process. Kyoto Protocol
Mechanisms: “Joint Implementation”, the Clean Development Mechanism and Emissions Trading.
Footnote 69, Art. 6(1)(b).
Footnote 69, Art. 6(1)(d).
Footnote 53, p. 19.
See UNFCCC. 2009. Fact Sheet: The Need for Mitigation. November. p. 4.
Footnote 53, p. 21.
Footnote 69, Art. 12(5).
Footnote 69, Art. 12(2).
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Annex B Parties,80 in cases where (i) it would be more cost-effective for
the purchasing party to do so rather than to undertake the reduction
domestically,81 and (ii) the selling party’s actual emission level is lower than
its quota under Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol. Other trading units aside
from assigned amount units come in the form of removal units (RMUs,
based on land use, land-use change and forestry [LULUCF] activities
such as reforestation), emission reduction units generated by joint
implementation projects, and CERs generated from a clean development
mechanism project activity.82 However, Article 17 of the protocol
emphasizes that any such trading shall be supplemental to domestic
actions to meet quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments.
In addition, to avoid overselling of units and consequently fail to meet
their emission reduction targets, all Annex B Parties have to maintain a
commitment period reserve. This reserve is defined as 90% of the party’s
assigned amount under Annex B, or five times the amount of emissions
reported in its most recent emissions inventory (for the 5 years of the
commitment period), whichever figure is lower.83
Article 10 of the Kyoto Protocol states general commitments that are applicable
to both Annex I and Non-Annex I Parties, taking into account their common
but differentiated responsibilities and their specific national and regional
development priorities, objectives, and circumstances.84 These general
commitments mirror those in the UNFCCC, including
•
•
•
•
•

improving the quality of emissions data;
establishing national mitigation and adaptation programs;
promoting environment friendly technology transfer;
cooperating in scientific and technical research;
promoting systematic observation systems and development of data
archives to reduce uncertainties related to the climate system, the adverse
impacts of climate change, and the economic and social consequences of
various response strategies; and
• supporting education, training, public awareness, and capacity building.85

80
81
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83

84
85

Footnote 69, Art. 17.
P.J. Sands et al. 2012. Principles of International Environmental Law. 3rd ed. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press.
UNFCCC. Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol: Emissions Trading.
Conference of the Parties, UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on the Second Part of
Its Sixth Session, Held at Bonn from 16 to 27 July 2001, FCCC/CP/2001/5 (25 September 2001).
See specifically Decision 5/CP.6 (‘The Bonn Agreements on the implementation of the Buenos
Aires Plan of Action’), Annex [VI(4)].
Footnote 69, Art. 10(1).
Footnote 53, p. 16.
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IV. 2010 Cancun Agreements
The 2010 United Nations Climate Change Conference (officially the 16th Session
of the COP, or COP 16) was held in Cancun, Mexico, from 29 November to
10 December 2010. It resulted in the Cancun Agreements (one under the Kyoto
Protocol track)86 and one under the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term
Cooperative Action (or LCA track).87 The agreements contained key actions
toward addressing climate change through a hybrid international and domestic
approach. At the same time, the core decisions of the agreements aimed to assist
developing countries in protecting themselves against climate change impacts
while simultaneously pursuing sustainable development.

A. Decisions under the Kyoto Protocol Track
The preamble of the agreements under the Kyoto Protocol track clearly stated
that Annex I Parties as a group should reduce emissions within the range of
25%–40% below 1990 levels by 2020 to avert the worst impacts of climate
change. The agreements took note of the quantified economy-wide reduction
targets of Annex I countries that are parties to the Kyoto Protocol,88 and urged
them to raise the level of ambition of the emission reductions they are to achieve.89
The agreements also confirmed that the three flexible mechanisms created under
the Kyoto Protocol (i.e., emissions trading, the Clean Development Mechanism
[CDM], and Joint Implementation) shall continue to be available for meeting
Annex I targets. They also expanded eligible CDM projects to include carbon
dioxide capture and storage in geological formation,90 and allowed the use of
“standardized baselines” for CDM purposes.91 “Standardized baselines” are
established to facilitate the calculation of emission reduction and removal.92 Their
use was permitted because they are seen to reduce transaction costs; enhance
transparency, objectivity, and predictability; facilitate access to the CDM; and
86

87

88
89
90

91
92

Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Report of
the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on Its Sixth
Session, Held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010–Addendum–Part Two: Action
Taken by the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at Its
Sixth Session, FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/12/Add.1 (15 March 2011).
Conference of the Parties, UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Sixteenth Session,
Held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010–Addendum–Part Two: Action Taken by
the Conference of the Parties at Its Sixteenth Session, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (15 March 2011),
Decision 1/CP.16 (‘The Cancun Agreements: Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention’).
Footnote 86, Decision 1/CMP.6, para. 3.
Footnote 86, Decision 1/CMP.6, para. 4.
Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Report of
the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on Its Sixth
Session, Held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010–Addendum–Part Two: Action
Taken by the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at Its
Sixth Session, FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/12/Add.2 (15 March 2011). See Decision 7/CMP.6.
Footnote 90, Decision 3/CMP.6.
Footnote 91, para. 44.
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scale up the abatement of GHG emissions, while ensuring environmental
integrity.93 They are to be used at the discretion of the host countries’ designated
national authorities.94
Lastly, the agreements under the Kyoto Protocol track established a review and
monitoring process for forest management reference levels under LULUCF
provisions.

B. Decisions under the Long-term Cooperative Action Track
The LCA Agreements were anchored on the premise that warming of the climate
system is unequivocal.95 They also recognized that most of the observed increase
in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to
the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations, as assessed by the
IPCC in its Fourth Assessment Report (footnote 95). The agreements’ key steps
were therefore in the context of the long-term goal to hold the increase in global
average temperature below 2°C above preindustrial levels.96 They called on the
parties to take urgent action to meet this long-term goal, consistent with science
(footnote 96), and on the basis of equity and in accordance with CBDR-RC.97
However, the agreements also acknowledged that the long-term goal may need
to be strengthened on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge and
in the context of the first review in 2015.98 They thus hold open the possibility
of modifying the long-term goal to a more ambitious increase in global average
temperature below 1.5°C above preindustrial levels (footnote 98).
The agreements also established the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to help facilitate
financial support to developing countries via thematic funding windows.99 The
GCF would provide funds to accredited entities for approved projects intended
to mitigate climate change in developing countries and assist them in adapting to
climate change impacts. The GCF would be supported by a significant portion of
the $100 billion per year that developed countries agreed to jointly mobilize by
2020 under the Copenhagen Accord.100
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Footnote 91, Preamble.
Footnote 91, para. 47.
Footnote 87, para. 3.
Footnote 87, para. 4.
Footnote 87, para. 1.
Footnote 87, para. 4, states, “[The Conference of the Parties …] also recognizes the need to
consider, in the context of the first review, as referred to in paragraph 138 below, strengthening
the long-term global goal on the basis of the best available scientific knowledge, including in
relation to a global average temperature rise of 1.5°C.” (italics in the original)
Footnote 87, para. 102–112.
Footnote 87, para. 98. See also Conference of the Parties, UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of
the Parties on Its Fifteenth Session, Held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009–Addendum–
Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at Its Fifteenth Session, FCCC/CP/2009/11/
Add.1 (30 March 2010), Decision 2/CP.15 (‘Copenhagen Accord’), para. 8.
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The agreements further created a Technology Mechanism101 to facilitate the
innovation, development, and transfer of climate-friendly and environmentally
sound technology to developing countries.102 The Technology Mechanism is
composed of
• the Technology Executive Committee (TEC),103 comprised of nine
members from Annex I Parties and 11 members from non-Annex 1 Parties
(three each from Africa, Asia and the Pacific, and Latin America and the
Caribbean; one member from a small island developing state; and one
member from a least developed country party);104 and
• the Climate Technology Centre and Network, tasked with facilitating
a network of national, regional, sectoral and international technology
networks, organizations, and initiatives.105
The TEC is mandated to “identify global technology needs, provide
recommendations on how to address these needs, as well as to foster
engagement and collaboration with relevant organizations and other platforms
working on technology transfer.” 106 On the other hand, the Climate Technology
Centre and Network is responsible for providing advice, support, capacity
building, and information dissemination on environmentally sound technologies.
The LCA Agreements also established the Cancun Adaptation Framework to
enhance adaptation action through
• planning and implementation of adaptation actions identified in national
adaptation planning processes;
• impact, vulnerability, and adaptation assessments;
• strengthening institutional capacities and enabling environments;
• building resilience of socioeconomic and ecological systems;
• enhancing disaster risk reduction strategies;
• technology development and transfer; and
• improving access to climate-related data.107
In this regard, the Adaptation Committee was created to promote the
implementation of enhanced action on adaptation through technical support
and guidance, sharing of relevant information and good practices, and promoting
synergy and strengthening engagement with national, regional, and international
organizations.108
101
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103
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Footnote 87, para. 117.
Footnote 87, Preamble of Section IV(B).
Footnote 87, para. 121.
Footnote 87, Appendix IV, Art. 1(b).
Footnote 87, para. 123.
United Nations Environment Programme. United Nations Environment Programme Finance
Initiative Climate Change Working Group Briefing on COP 16 and the Cancun Agreements. p. 2.
Footnote 87, para. 14.
Footnote 87, para. 20.
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On issues relating to deforestation and degradation, the LCA Agreements encourage
developing countries to slow, halt, and reverse forest cover and carbon loss109 by
reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, conservation of
existing forest carbon stocks, sustainable forest management, and enhancement of
forest carbon stocks (REDD+).110 These activities are to be undertaken in the context
of adequate and predictable support to developing country parties and based
on national circumstances.111 The agreements thus request developing countries
to develop a national strategy or action plan, national forest reference levels or
subnational reference levels as an interim measure, a robust and transparent national
forest monitoring system, and a system for providing information on how safeguards
are being addressed throughout implementation.112
The agreements also emphasized the need for enhanced action on mitigation.
Consequently, Annex I countries are held to a higher standard of monitoring
and reporting, in particular with respect to their national communications
on mitigation targets, and on the provision of financial, technological and
capacity building support to developing country parties.113 Guidelines on the
development of common reporting formats, methodology for finance, and review
of information in national communications (e.g., progress made in achieving
emission reductions) were also enhanced.114 Annex I Parties are required to
communicate information on their national GHG inventories annually.
To complement these efforts, developing countries are to take nationally
appropriate mitigation actions in the context of sustainable development, aimed
at achieving a deviation in emissions relative to “business as usual” emissions in
2020.115 They are encouraged, on a voluntary basis, to inform the Conference of
the Parties (COP) of their intention to implement nationally appropriate mitigation
actions.116 Their national communications are to be submitted every 4 years.117
Furthermore, consistent with their capabilities and the level of support provided
for reporting, developing countries are also to submit biennial reports containing
updates of national GHG inventories, including a national inventory report and
information on mitigation actions, needs, and support received (footnote 117).
Additional flexibility will be given to the least developed country parties and small
island developing states (footnote 117).
Internationally supported mitigation actions will be measured, reported, and
verified domestically, and will be subject to international measurement, reporting,
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Footnote 87, Preamble of Section III(C). This is deemed as the “aim” of the REDD+ provisions.
Footnote 87, para. 70.
Footnote 87, Preamble of Section III(C) and para. 71.
Footnote 87, para. 71.
Footnote 87, para. 40.
Footnote 87, para. 42.
Footnote 87, para. 48.
Footnote 87, para. 50.
Footnote 87, para. 60.
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and verification.118 States that finance mitigation action independently will not
be subject to the measurement, reporting, and verification requirement, but will
report their own progress.119

V. 2012 Doha Amendment
The Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol120 established (i) new quantified
emission limitation or reduction targets for parties listed under its Annex B,
which replaces the original Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol, and (ii) the second
commitment period, which began on 1 January 2013 and will end in 2020. The
parties committed to GHG emission reductions by at least 18% below 1990 levels
by the end of the second commitment period. The Doha Amendment also adds
nitrogen trifluoride to Annex A of the Protocol (i.e., list of GHGs covered).
The amended Annex B consists of 38 parties with binding emission reduction targets.
It does not include four original Annex B countries—Canada, Japan, New Zealand,
and the Russian Federation—which had either withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol,121 or
participated in the first round but indicated their intention not to take on new emission
reduction targets in the second commitment period.122 It also does not include the
United States, which had previously stated that it would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol.
Similar to the original Annex B under the Kyoto Protocol, developing country
parties do not have binding reduction targets. Consequently, the Doha Amendment
was received with mixed reactions, as the second commitment period affects only
14% of global emissions.123
The Doha Amendment has not yet come into force, but it will do so on
31 December 2020. Entry into force requires 144 parties to the Kyoto Protocol
to deposit their instruments of acceptance with the Depositary,124 and 146 have
done so as of October 2020.125 Nonetheless, parties are allowed to provisionally
apply the Amendment pending its entry into force.126 Parties that do not
118
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120
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Footnote 87, para. 61.
N. Hultman. 2014. The Cancun Agreements on Climate Change. The Brookings Institution. 14 December.
Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, Doha, 8 December 2012.
In the case of Canada.
In the case of Japan, New Zealand, and the Russian Federation.
G. Erbach. 2015. Briefing Note on the Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol. Brussels: European
Parliamentary Research Service.
See Kyoto Protocol, footnote 69, Art. 20(4) and Art. 21(7), which provide that amendments to
the Kyoto Protocol enter into force on the 90th day after the date of receipt by the Depositary of
an instrument of acceptance by at least three-fourths of the parties to the Protocol. With 192 parties to
the Kyoto Protocol, the three-fourths threshold is 144 parties.
United Nations Treaty Collection. Doha Amendment (Information Page).
Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, Report of
the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on Its Eighth
Session, Held in Doha from 26 November to 8 December 2012–Addendum–Part Two: Action Taken by
the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at Its Eighth
Session, FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.1 (28 February 2013). See Decision 1/CMP.8, para. 5.
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provisionally apply the Amendment are to implement their commitments and
other responsibilities in relation to the second commitment period, in a manner
consistent with their national legislation or domestic processes, as of 1 January
2013.127 In any event, Article 18 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties requires parties that have accepted the Doha Amendment to refrain
from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of the Amendment,
pending its entry into force.128

VI. 2015 Paris Agreement
The 2015 Paris Agreement, an agreement within the UNFCCC framework,
was negotiated during COP 21 in Paris.129 It was adopted by consensus on
12 December 2015 and came into force on 4 November 2016. As of October 2020,
it had 195 signatories and 189 parties, including the European Union. All ADB
developing member countries (DMCs) are parties to the Paris Agreement.
Entry into force occurred 30 days after two conditions concurred: (i) at least
55 parties had deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or
accession; and (ii) these parties accounted in total for at least an estimated 55%
of the total global GHG emissions.130 The desire for a truly multilateral instrument
supported by both developed and developing countries accounts for the high
entry into force threshold. Parties are also not allowed to make reservations to the
provisions of the Paris Agreement.131

A. Object and Purpose
The Paris Agreement seeks to enhance the implementation of the UNFCCC,
including its objective.132 At the same time, Article 2 of the agreement declares
that efforts to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change
come in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate
poverty—a clear reference to the needs of developing countries and the
fundamental principles of equity and of CBDR-RC.
The agreement aims to hold the increase in global average temperature to “well
below 2°C above preindustrial levels,” and to pursue efforts toward a 1.5°C
127
128
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Footnote 126, para. 6.
Footnote 45, Art. 18. The provision states, “A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged
instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall
have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or (b) it has expressed its
consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and provided that
such entry into force is not unduly delayed.”
Paris Agreement, Paris, 12 December 2015, United Nations Treaty Series, No. 54113.
Footnote 129, Art. 21(1).
Footnote 129, Art. 27.
Footnote 129, Art. 2(1).
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temperature cap (footnote 132). The aspirational 1.5°C goal was a core demand
of small island developing states and least developed countries that are most
vulnerable to climate change and its impacts.133
The agreement does not contain quantitative emission reduction targets in
pursuance of the temperature goal. Instead, Article 4(1) states a qualitative objective:
to reach global peaking of GHG emissions as soon as possible, and to undertake
rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science. The ambition
is to achieve “climate neutrality,” 134 a balance between anthropogenic emissions by
sources and removals by sinks of GHGs in the second half of the 21st century.135

B. Architecture of the Agreement
The Paris Agreement features a hybrid top–down and bottom–up approach. The
bottom-up element consists of nationally determined contributions (NDCs),
whose collective effect, the parties hope, would achieve the Agreement’s
overarching temperature goal. However, some parties—concerned that the
self-determining character of the contributions would be self-serving—sought
to provide a check to unrestrained autonomy.136 To enhance the oversight
of these contributions at the international level, the agreement provides for
the transparency system, the global stocktake process, and the compliance
mechanism.

1. Bottom–Up Element: Nationally Determined Contributions
Article 4 of the Paris Agreement outlines the core obligation of each party:
to prepare, communicate, and maintain successive NDCs that it intends to
achieve.137 These contributions contain each party’s climate action plan, and
are to be provided every 5 years and recorded in a public registry maintained
by the UNFCCC Secretariat.138 Article 4 of the agreement requires that
these contributions progress over time and manifest the parties’ highest
possible ambition, reflecting their CBDR-RC in the light of different national
circumstances.139 Parties are also obliged to pursue domestic mitigation measures
to achieve the objectives of such contributions.140
133
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L. Rajamani. 2016. Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative
Possibilities and Underlying Politics. International and Comparative Law Quarterly. 65 (2).
pp. 493–514.
UNFCCC. What is the Paris Agreement?
Footnote 129, Art. 4(1).
Footnote 133, p. 502.
Footnote 129, Art. 4(2).
Footnote 129, Art. 4(9), and Art. 4(12).
Footnote 129, Art. 4(3).
Footnote 129, Art. 4(2). See also Art. 4(4), which states, “Developed country Parties should
continue taking the lead by undertaking economy-wide absolute emission reduction targets.
Developing country Parties should continue enhancing their mitigation efforts, and are
encouraged to move over time towards economy-wide emission reduction or limitation targets
in the light of different national circumstances.”
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The language of Article 4 denotes that this core obligation is an obligation of
conduct, not an obligation of result.141 The phrases “intends to achieve” and “with
the aim of achieving the objectives of such contributions” create a good faith
expectation that parties intend and will aim to achieve their NDCs, but stop short
of actually requiring them to do so (footnote 141). The Paris Agreement likewise
does not penalize them if they are unable to fulfill the stipulations in their NDCs.

2. Top–Down Element: Oversight Mechanisms
a) Transparency Framework
The Paris Agreement established an enhanced transparency framework for
action and support.142 It lays down comprehensive information requirements
that underscore both the obligation of conduct in Article 4, and other obligations
in the agreement (e.g., engagement in adaptation efforts under Article 7). The
transparency framework is applicable to all parties, but it has a “built-in flexibility”
which takes into account the varying capacities of developing countries.143
The information requirements are found in parts of the agreement, including






Article 4(8), which requires parties to provide the information necessary for
clarity, transparency, and understanding of their NDCs;
Article 13(7), which obliges parties to provide (i) a national inventory report
of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of GHGs, and
(ii) the information necessary to track progress made in implementing and
achieving their NDCs; and
Article 13(8), which indicates that each party should provide information
related to climate change impacts and adaptation.

Article 13(11) supplements the informational oversight provided under Article 13(7)
(i.e., information provided under Article 13(7) shall undergo a technical expert
review). In addition, each party shall participate in a facilitative, multilateral
consideration of progress with respect to its implementation and achievement of
its NDCs.144
Developed countries are further obliged to provide information on the financial,
technology transfer, and capacity-building support they provide to developing
countries.145 This information is also subject to technical expert review and a
multilateral assessment of progress made.146 Developing countries, on the other
hand, are to provide information on the support they need and have received.147
141
142
143
144
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Footnote 133, pp. 497–498.
Footnote 129, Art. 13(1)–13(15).
Footnote 129, Art. 13(1) and Art. 13(2).
Footnote 129, Art. 13(11).
Footnote 129, Art. 13(9).
Footnote 129, Art. 13(11). The technical expert review will be done in accordance with Decision 1/CP.21.
Footnote 129, Art. 13(10).
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b) Global Stocktake Process
The Paris Agreement requires a global stocktake process, beginning in 2023 and
every 5 years thereafter.148 Article 14 of the Paris Agreement describes this process
as an assessment of the collective progress toward achieving (i) the purpose of the
agreement (i.e., to hold the increase in global average temperature to “well below
2°C” above preindustrial levels, and to pursue efforts toward a 1.5°C temperature
cap), and (ii) the agreement’s long-term goals.149 Article 14 makes clear that only
progress at the collective level is to be considered, thereby shielding individual parties
from determinations of adequacy with respect to their actions (footnote 133).
The agreement requires that the global stocktake process be done in a
comprehensive and facilitative manner—considering mitigation, adaptation, and
the means of implementation and support—and in the light of equity and the
best available science.150 The outcome of the periodic global stocktake shall then
shape and inform the parties’ NDCs.151 Considering equity in the global stocktake
process was a win for developing countries. International climate change expert
and academic Lavanya Rajamani notes that this leaves the door open to equitable
burden sharing.152
The global stocktake is an essential element of the Paris Agreement’s top-down
oversight mechanism. Without it, it would be impossible to determine whether
progress is being made toward the Agreement’s objectives, and whether parties
are contributing as much as they should, given historical responsibilities, current
capabilities, and development needs (footnote 133).

c) Compliance Mechanism
Article 15 of the Paris Agreement established a compliance mechanism to facilitate
implementation of and promote compliance with its provisions. The agreement
does not describe this mechanism in a detailed manner, and only states that it is a
committee that shall (i) be expert-based and facilitative in nature, and (ii) function
in a manner that is transparent, non-adversarial, and non-punitive. The intention
of the parties was to agree on broad principles and leave the modalities and
procedures of the compliance mechanism to future negotiations by the COP
serving as the meeting of the parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA).
In December 2018, the CMA meeting in Krakow, Poland agreed on several
important matters involving the compliance mechanism:
148
149
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Footnote 129, Art. 14(2).
Footnote 129, Art. 14(1). The global stocktake is to be done by the Conference of the Parties
serving as the meeting of the parties to the Paris Agreement.
Footnote 129, Art. 14(1).
Footnote 129, Art. 14(3).
Footnote 133. Professor Rajamani is Professor of International Environmental Law at the Faculty
of Law at the University of Oxford. She is an expert in international climate change law and
policy, and has been involved in climate negotiations in various capacities.
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Scope. In carrying out its work, the Committee shall neither function as an
enforcement or dispute settlement mechanism, nor impose penalties or
sanctions, and shall respect national sovereignty.153
Institutional arrangements. The Committee shall consist of 12 members with
recognized competence in relevant scientific, technical, socioeconomic, or
legal fields to be elected by the CMA on the basis of equitable geographical
representation.154
Consensus-based decision-making. The Committee shall make every
effort to reach agreement on any decision by consensus. If all efforts at
reaching consensus have been exhausted, as a last resort, the decision may
be adopted by at least three quarters of the members present and voting.155
Appropriate measures. To facilitate implementation and promote compliance,
the Committee shall take appropriate measures, which may include:
(i) engaging in a dialogue with the party concerned to identify challenges,
make recommendations and share information, such as on access to finance,
technology, and capacity building support, as appropriate; (ii) assisting the
party concerned in the engagement with the appropriate finance, technology,
and capacity building bodies or arrangements to identify possible challenges
and solutions; (iii) recommending the development of an action plan and, if so
requested, assisting the party concerned in developing the plan; and (iv) issuing
findings of fact in relation to matters of implementation and compliance.156

The Committee’s initial members, elected in December 2019, will develop rules of
procedure for consideration and adoption by the CMA in 2020.157

C. Adaptation
Adaptation became more prominent in the Paris Agreement in relation to other
climate-related international instruments. The Paris Agreement has established a
global goal on adaptation—enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience,
and reducing vulnerability to climate change in the context of sustainable
development and the temperature goal.158 It recognizes that adaptation is a global
challenge faced by all, and that it is a key component of the long-term global
response to climate change.159 It also acknowledges the crucial link between
mitigation and adaptation (i.e., greater levels of mitigation can reduce the need
for additional adaptation efforts).160
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Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, Report of
the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on the Third
Part of Its First Session, Held in Katowice from 2 to 15 December 2018–Addendum–Part Two: Action
Taken by the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement,
FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2 (19 March 2019). See Decision 20/CMA.1, Annex [I(4)].
Footnote 153, para. 5.
Footnote 153, para. 16.
Footnote 153, para. 30.
Footnote 153, para. 17.
Footnote 129, Art. 7(1).
Footnote 129, Art. 7(2).
Footnote 129, Art. 7(4).
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Nevertheless, Professor Rajamani notes that the only individual commitments
in the Paris Agreement (“each party”), formulated in mandatory terms (“shall”)
with no qualifying or discretionary aspects, occur in relation to mitigation and
transparency.161 In contrast, most of the commitments relating to adaptation
are “soft” obligations that recommend and encourage action, rather than create
individual, mandatory, and unqualified obligations (footnote 46).
For example, Article 7(10) of the Paris Agreement states that each party “should”
(but not “shall”) submit and update periodically an adaptation communication,
“as appropriate.” Similarly, Article 13(8) states that each party “should” also provide
information related to climate change impacts and adaptation, “as appropriate.”
The most strongly worded individual party commitment in relation to adaptation is
found in Article 7(9) on adaptation planning and implementation, which uses “each
party” and “shall.” However, even this provision is qualified by “as appropriate.” 162

D. Loss and Damage
Neither the UNFCCC nor the Paris Agreement provides an official definition
of loss and damage in the context of climate change. Nevertheless, a literature
review on loss and damage commissioned by the UNFCCC defines (i) loss as
“negative impacts in relation to which reparation or restoration is impossible
(such as loss of freshwater resources),” and (ii) damage as “negative impacts in
relation to which reparation or restoration is possible (such as windstorm damage
to the roof of a building, or damage to a coastal mangrove forest as a result of
coastal surges).” 163 Many authors refer to loss and damage as the impacts of
161
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Footnote 46. “It matters how the provision is phrased. If the provision uses the imperative ‘shall’, it
typically creates rights and obligations for Parties. If it uses ‘will’, it implies a promise or expectation.
If it uses terms such as ‘should’, ‘strive’ or ‘encourage’, it is recommendatory. […] If the provision
uses discretionary, qualifying and contextual language (using phrases such as ‘as appropriate’),
it will expand the space for self-serving interpretations by Parties, and constrict the space for
consistent application. […] Notwithstanding several ‘soft’ obligations in the mitigation section, […]
the majority of obligations in relation to adaptation, loss and damage, finance, technology and
capacity building are soft obligations. In these areas, provisions recommend and encourage actions
or set aspirations for all Parties or for groups of Parties, rather than establish individual mandatory
obligations. Many of these provisions also contain qualifying and discretionary elements.”
Art. 7(9) states, “Each Party shall, as appropriate, engage in adaptation planning processes and
the implementation of actions, including the development or enhancement of relevant plans,
policies and/or contributions, which may include:
(a) The implementation of adaptation actions, undertakings and/or efforts;
(b) The process to formulate and implement national adaptation plans;
(c) The assessment of climate change impacts and vulnerability, with a view to formulating nationally
determined prioritized actions, taking into account vulnerable people, places and ecosystems;
(d) Monitoring and evaluating and learning from adaptation plans, policies, programmes and actions; and
(e) Building the resilience of socioeconomic and ecological systems, including through economic
diversification and sustainable management of natural resources.” (emphasis supplied)
See Subsidiary Body for Implementation (Thirty-seventh session, Doha, 26 November to
1 December 2012), A Literature Review on the Topics in the Context of Thematic Area 2 of the Work
Programme on Loss and Damage: A Range of Approaches to Address Loss and Damage Associated
with the Adverse Effects of Climate Change: Note by the Secretariat, FCCC/SBI/2012/INF.14
(15 November 2012).
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climate change after adaptation has occurred (i.e., akin to the concept of “residual
damages” or the cost of climate change after optimal adaptation has taken place).164
Article 8 of the Paris Agreement recognizes the importance of averting, minimizing,
and addressing loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate
change, and the role of sustainable development in reducing such risks. These loss
and damage incidents may result from extreme weather events, such as storm surges,
cyclones, droughts, and heat waves; and slow onset events, such as sea level rise, rising
temperatures, desertification, loss of biodiversity, and forest degradation.165
The Conference of the Parties has clarified that Article 8 of the agreement does
not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation.166 Instead, the
Paris Agreement adopts the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and
Damage (L&D Mechanism) to address loss and damage associated with impacts
of climate change in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to
the adverse effects of climate change.167 The L&D Mechanism promotes the
implementation of approaches to address loss and damage in three ways:
• enhancing knowledge and understanding of comprehensive risk
management approaches;
• strengthening dialogue, coordination, coherence, and synergies among
relevant stakeholders; and
• enhancing action and support, including finance, technology, and capacity
building.168
In addition, the global stocktake may take into account, as appropriate, efforts
that avert, minimize, and address loss and damage.” 169
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X. Lu and R. Abrigo. Understanding the Risks of Loss and Damage from Climate Change.
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Footnote 164; D. Puig et al. 2019. Loss and Damage in the Paris Agreement’s Transparency
Framework. Policy Brief. June.
Conference of the Parties, UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Twenty-First Session,
Held in Paris from 30 November to 13 December 2015–Addendum–Part Two: Action Taken by the
Conference of the Parties at Its Twenty-First Session, FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (29 January 2016).
See Decision 1/CP.21, para. 51.
UNFCCC. Frequently Asked Questions - Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and
Damage. See also footnote 129, Art. 8(2).
Conference of the Parties, UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Nineteenth
Session, Held in Warsaw from 11 to 23 November 2013–Addendum–Part Two: Action Taken by the
Conference of the Parties at Its Nineteenth Session, FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add.1 (31 January 2014).
See Decision 2/CP.19, para. 5.
Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement, Report of
the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement on the Third
Part of Its First Session, Held in Katowice from 2 to 15 December 2018–Addendum–Part Two: Action
Taken by the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement,
FCCC/PA/CMA/2018/3/Add.2 (19 March 2019). See Decision 19/CMA.1, para. 6(b)(ii).
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E.

Rulebook

The parties to the Paris Agreement intentionally drafted a text that conveys
agreement on broad principles, a blueprint to the international response on
climate change issues. Much of its language would thus, by design, have to be
clarified by subsequent implementing rules. In December 2018, 3 years after
the Paris Agreement was adopted, the parties agreed on the “Paris Rulebook” to
operationalize the implementation of the Paris Agreement.170 The Rulebook contains
regulations on reporting, formats, tracking of NDCs, review of progress made,
risks and vulnerabilities to climate impacts, and transparency and accountability.
However, two issues remain outstanding and will have to be resolved in the future:
(i) rules on transfer and accounting for emission reduction schemes, such as
international market mechanisms; and (ii) standardization of periods covered by NDCs
—as some cover 2030 while other countries’ contributions cover until 2025 only.171

F.

Human Rights Dimension

The Paris Agreement links the instrument to human rights principles. For
instance, the Preamble states that states parties should, when taking action
to address climate change, respect, promote, and consider their respective
obligations on human rights; the right to health; the rights of indigenous peoples,
local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities, and people in
vulnerable situations; the right to development; gender equality; empowerment of
women; and intergenerational equity. Adaptation action should follow a countrydriven, gender-responsive, participatory, and fully transparent approach, taking
into consideration vulnerable groups, communities, and ecosystems.172

VII. Tabular Summaries of Treaty Status
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 summarize the status of each country covered in this report
in relation to the treaties constituting the international climate change legal
framework. The tabular summaries underscore the universal adoption of these
treaties. All countries mentioned are Non-Annex I Parties.

170
171

172

UNFCCC. Katowice Climate Package.
N. Cogswell and Y. Dagnet. 2019. Why Does the Paris Climate Agreement Need a Rulebook?
7 Questions and Answers. World Resources Institute. 13 June.
Footnote 129, Art. 7(5).
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Table 2.1: Summary of Status (Climate Change Treaties)—
Southeast Asia and South Asia Developing Member Countries
Country

UNFCCC

Kyoto Protocol

Doha Amendment

Paris Agreement

Brunei Darussalam

7 Aug 2007 a

20 Aug 2009 a

14 Nov 2014 A

21 Sep 2016 r

Cambodia

18 Dec 1995 a

22 Aug 2002 a

17 Nov 2015 A

6 Feb 2017 r

Indonesia

23 Aug 1994 r

3 Dec 2004 r

30 Sep 2014 A

31 Oct 2016 r

Lao PDR

4 Jan 1995 a

6 Feb 2003 a

23 Apr 2019 A

7 Sep 2016 r

Malaysia

13 Jul 1994 r

4 Sep 2002 r

12 Apr 2017 A

16 Nov 2016 r

Myanmar

25 Nov 1994 r

13 Aug 2003 a

19 Sep 2017 A

19 Sep 2017 r

Philippines

2 Aug 1994 r

20 Nov 2003 r

13 Apr 2016 A

23 Mar 2017 r

Singapore

29 May 1997 r

12 Apr 2006 a

23 Sep 2014 A

21 Sep 2016 r

Thailand

28 Dec 1994 r

28 Aug 2002 r

1 Sep 2015 A

21 Sep 2016 r

Viet Nam

16 Nov 1994 r

25 Sep 2002 r

22 Jun 2015 A

3 Nov 2016 AA

Afghanistan

19 Sep 2002 r

25 Mar 2013 a

–

15 Feb 2017 r

Bangladesh

15 Apr 1994 r

22 Oct 2001 a

13 Nov 2013 A

21 Sep 2016 r

Bhutan

25 Aug 1995 r

26 Aug 2002 a

29 Sep 2015 A

19 Sep 2017 r

India

1 Nov 1993 r

26 Aug 2002 a

8 Aug 2017 A

2 Oct 2016 r

Maldives

9 Nov 1992 r

30 Dec 1998 r

1 Jul 2015 A

22 Apr 2016 r

Nepal

2 May 1994 r

16 Sep 2005 a

–

5 Oct 2016 r

Pakistan

1 Jun 1994 r

11 Jan 2005 a

31 Oct 2017 A

10 Nov 2016 r

Sri Lanka

23 Nov 1993 r

3 Sep 2002 a

2 Dec 2015 A

21 Sep 2016 r

Southeast Asia

South Asia

Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, UNFCCC = United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Notes: a = accession, A = acceptance, AA = approval, r = ratification.
Sources:
United Nations Treaty Collection. Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol (accessed 27 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(accessed 27 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. Paris Agreement (accessed 27 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (accessed 27 October 2020).
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Table 2.2: Summary of Status (Climate Change Treaties)—Pacific Developing Member Countries
Country

UNFCCC

Kyoto Protocol

Doha Amendment

Paris Agreement

Cook Islands

20 Apr 1993 r

27 Aug 2001 r

5 Nov 2018 A

1 Sep 2016 r a

Fiji

25 Feb 1993 r

17 Sep 1998 r

19 Sep 2017 A

22 Apr 2016 r

Kiribati

7 Feb 1995 r

7 Sep 2000 a

11 Feb 2016 A

21 Sep 2016 r

Marshall Islands

8 Oct 1992 r

11 Aug 2003 r

7 May 2015 Ab

22 Apr 2016 r a

Micronesia,
Federated States of

18 Nov 1993 r

21 Jun 1999 r

19 Feb 2014 Ab

15 Sep 2016 r a

Nauru

11 Nov 1993 r

16 Aug 2001 a

1 Dec 2014 Ab

22 Apr 2016 r

Palau

10 Dec 1999 a

10 Dec 1999 a

10 Mar 2015 A

22 Apr 2016 r

Papua New Guinea

16 Mar 1993 r

28 Mar 2002 r

–

21 Sep 2016 r

Samoa

29 Nov 1994 r

27 Nov 2000 r

18 Sep 2015 A

22 Apr 2016 r

Solomon Islands

28 Dec 1994 r

13 Mar 2003 r

5 Sep 2014 Ab

21 Sep 2016 r c

Timor-Leste

10 Oct 2006 a

14 Oct 2008 a

–

16 Aug 2017 r

Tonga

20 Jul 1998 a

14 Jan 2008 a

22 Oct 2018 A

21 Sep 2016 r

Tuvalu

26 Oct 1993 r

16 Nov 1998 r

4 Dec 2014 A

22 Apr 2016 r a

Vanuatu

25 Mar 1993 r

17 Jul 2001 a

15 Mar 2018 A

21 Sep 2016 r a

UNFCCC = United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
Notes: a = accession, A = acceptance, r = ratification.
Submitted a declaration to the effect that (i) the emission reduction obligations in Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol, the Doha Amendment,
and the Paris Agreement are inadequate to prevent a global temperature increase of 1.5°C above preindustrial levels, and (ii) this will have
severe implications for the country’s national interests.
b
Submitted a declaration to the effect that the emission reduction obligations in Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol and the Doha Amendment
are inadequate to prevent a global temperature increase of 1.5°C above preindustrial levels.
c
Submitted a declaration to the effect that the “low ambition” of the Paris Agreement will have severe impacts and undermine the
country’s sustainable development efforts.
Sources:
United Nations Treaty Collection. Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol (accessed 27 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(accessed 27 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. Paris Agreement (accessed 27 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (accessed 27 October 2020).
a

Photo by Eric Sales/ADB.

Erosion. A washed out seawall that was
intended to protect the village in Tarawa, Kiribati
from waves (photo by Eric Sales/ADB).

PART THREE

MULTILATERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
I. Hard Law
Hard law refers to legally binding sources of law that create rights and duties,
such as treaties and customary norms. They are “precise (or can be made precise
through adjudication or the issuance of detailed regulations) and delegate
authority for interpreting and implementing the law.” 1

A. 1971 Convention on Wetlands of International
Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat
The Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as
Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar Convention) is an international convention for the
conservation and wise use of wetlands and their resources.2 It follows a threefold
approach whereby each contracting party is obliged to (i) designate suitable
wetlands within its territory for inclusion in a List of Wetlands of International
Importance (the “Ramsar List”), and implement a plan promoting their
conservation; (ii) work toward, as far as possible, the wise use of wetlands in its
territory; and (iii) cooperate with other contracting parties, especially with respect
to transboundary wetlands, shared water systems, and their resources.3
It entered into force on 21 December 1975, and had 171 contracting parties as of
November 2019.

1
2

3

K. Abbott and D. Snidal. 2000. Hard and Soft Law in International Governance. Intl Org. 54. p. 421.
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat, Ramsar, Iran,
2 February 1971, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 996, No. 14583, p. 245. See Art. 3(1) for the
convention’s object and purpose. Wetlands are broadly defined in Art. 1(1) as “areas of marsh,
fen, peatland or water, whether natural or artificial, permanent or temporary, with water that is
static or flowing, fresh, brackish or salt, including areas of marine water the depth of which at low
tide does not exceed six metres.”
Footnote 2, Arts. 2, 3, 4, and 5.
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B. 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution
by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter and Its
1996 Protocol
The 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes
and Other Matter (London Convention) aims to protect the marine environment by
regulating pollution caused by ocean dumping. Dumping is the deliberate disposal at
sea4 of (i) wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other human-made
structures at sea, or (ii) vessels, aircraft, platforms or other human-made structures
at sea themselves.5 The convention creates a “black list” and “gray list” of wastes or other
matter, and regulates them according to their hazardous impact on the environment:





The dumping of wastes or other matter listed in its Annex I is generally prohibited.
The dumping of wastes or other matter listed in its Annex II (substances
requiring “special care”) needs a prior special permit.
The dumping of all other wastes or matter requires a prior general permit.6

The London Convention entered into force on 30 August 1975. It had 87 parties
as of September 2020.7 About 21 years later, the 1996 Protocol was adopted
to modernize and, in due course, replace the London Convention (footnote 7).
Thus, parties common to both the London Convention and the 1996 Protocol are
obliged to follow the terms of the latter.8
The 1996 Protocol codifies the precautionary principle9 and the polluter pays
principle.10 It also follows a “reverse listing” approach (i.e., dumping of any waste
or other matter not listed in the 1996 Protocol’s Annex 1 is prohibited). Dumping
of substances specified in Annex 1 is allowed, but requires a permit issued by the
4

5

6
7

8

9

10

Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, London,
Mexico City, Moscow, Washington, DC, 29 December 1972, United Nations Treaty Series,
Vol. 1046, No. 15749, p. 120. Art. III(3) defines “sea” as all marine waters other than the internal
waters of states.
Footnote 4, Art. III(1)(a). Therefore, the convention does not cover the deliberate disposal at
sea of wastes or other matter from land-based sources.
Footnote 4, Art. IV.
International Maritime Organization. Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by
Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (Information Page).
1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and
Other Matter, London, 7 November 1996, International Legal Materials, Vol. 36, p. 7. Art. 23 states,
“This Protocol will supersede the Convention as between Contracting Parties to this Protocol
which are also Parties to the Convention.”
Footnote 8, Art. 3(1) states, “In implementing this Protocol, Contracting Parties shall apply a
precautionary approach to environmental protection from dumping of wastes or other matter
whereby appropriate preventative measures are taken when there is reason to believe that
wastes or other matter introduced into the marine environment are likely to cause harm even
when there is no conclusive evidence to prove a causal relation between inputs and their effects.”
Footnote 8, Art. 3(2) states, “Taking into account the approach that the polluter should,
in principle, bear the cost of pollution, each Contracting Party shall endeavour to promote
practices whereby those it has authorized to engage in dumping or incineration at sea bear the
cost of meeting the pollution prevention and control requirements for the authorized activities,
having due regard to the public interest.”
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appropriate authority designated by the state. The 1996 Protocol entered into
force on 24 March 2006, and had 53 parties as of September 2020 (footnote 7).

C. 1972 Convention Concerning the Protection of the
World Cultural and Natural Heritage
On 16 November 1972, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) General Conference adopted the Convention Concerning
the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage
Convention). It came into force on 17 December 1975, and had 194 states parties
as of 23 October 2020.
Through this treaty, the states parties committed to identify, protect, and
conserve cultural and natural heritage of such outstanding universal value that its
conservation and transmission to future generations are paramount (the “World
Heritage List”).11 Examples of natural heritage properties in Asia and the Pacific include
the Sinharaja Forest Reserve of Sri Lanka, the Chitwan National Park of Nepal, the Great
Himalayan National Park of India, Ha Long Bay of Viet Nam, the Mount Hamiguitan
Range Wildlife Sanctuary of the Philippines, and the Phoenix Islands of Kiribati.12

D. 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships and the 1978 Protocol
The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships and the 1978
Protocol (ICPPS 73/78) constitute the principal treaty dealing with preventing and
minimizing pollution of the marine environment caused by ships from accidental
or routine operational causes. The convention was adopted in November 1973.
However, prior to its entry into force, the states parties decided to come up with
the 1978 Protocol to address issues arising from tanker accidents in 1976–1977.13
The 1978 Protocol thus absorbed the ICPPS main convention and entered into
force in October 1983. As of September 2020, it had 159 parties, collectively
representing 98.95% of the world’s tonnage.14
11

12

13

14

Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Paris,
16 November 1972, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1037, No. 15511, p. 151. Art. 4.
Footnote 11, Art. 2 defines natural heritage as “(i) natural features, or physical and biological
formations or groups of such formations, which are of outstanding universal value from the
aesthetic or scientific point of view; (ii) geological and physiographical formations and precisely
delineated areas which constitute the habitat of threatened species of animals and plants of
outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation; and (iii) natural
sites or precisely delineated natural areas of outstanding universal value from the point of view
of science, conservation or natural beauty.”
International Maritime Organization. International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
from Ships (Information Page); and Protocol of 1978 Relating to the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973 (with annexes, final act and International Convention of
1973), London, 17 February 1978, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1340, No. 22484, p. 61.
International Maritime Organization. Status of Treaties (where the convention and the 1978
Protocol are collectively referred to as “MARPOL 1973/1978”).
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The ICPPS has undergone several amendments since its entry into force. In
its current form, it has six technical annexes which cover types of pollutants
including oil and oily water; noxious liquid substances in bulk; harmful substances
carried by sea in packaged form; and sewage, garbage, and air pollution from ships.

E.

1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary
Air Pollution

The Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (CLRTAP) was
adopted and opened for signature in November 1979. It came into force on
16 March 1983, and had 51 parties as of October 2020.15 The CLRTAP aims to
limit and, as far as possible, gradually reduce and prevent air pollution, including
long-range transboundary air pollution.16
The convention has been extended by eight protocols that specify measures to
reduce states’ emissions of air pollutants:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)

F.

1984 Protocol on long-term financing of the cooperative programme
for monitoring and evaluation of the long-range transmission of air
pollutants in Europe;
1985 Helsinki Protocol on the reduction of sulfur emissions or their
transboundary fluxes by at least 30%;
1988 Protocol concerning the control of emissions of nitrogen oxides
or their transboundary fluxes;
1991 Protocol on the control of emissions of volatile organic
compounds or their transboundary fluxes;
1994 Oslo Protocol on further reduction of sulfur emissions;
1998 Protocol on heavy metals;
1998 Aarhus Protocol on persistent organic pollutants; and
1999 Gothenburg Protocol to abate acidification, eutrophication and
ground-level ozone.

1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) entered
into force on 16 November 1994, and had 168 parties as of October 2020.17
It established the legal framework for marine and maritime activities, articulating
the rights and responsibilities of states with respect to their use of the world’s
oceans. While it was negotiated and adopted in 1982 outside the then nascent
climate change framework, its provisions present some overlap with the climate
change regulatory space. For example:
15

16

17

United Nations Treaty Collection. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
(Information Page).
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Geneva, 13 November 1979, United
Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1302, No. 21623, p. 217. Art. 2.
United Nations Treaty Collection. UNCLOS (Information Page).
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The Article 1 definition of marine pollution is broad enough to cover GHG
emissions.18
The general due diligence obligation under Article 194 (measures to
prevent, reduce, and control pollution of marine environment from any
source) can be interpreted in light of mitigation measures.
In the context of pollution from land-based sources (Article 207) and
pollution through or from the atmosphere (Article 212), UNCLOS mandates
that states take into account internationally agreed rules, standards, and
recommended practices and procedures when adopting laws and regulations
to prevent, reduce, and control pollution of the marine environment.

G. 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone
Layer, 1987 Montreal Protocol on Substances that
Deplete the Ozone Layer, and 2016 Amendment to the
Montreal Protocol (Kigali Amendment)
The Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (VCPOL)
entered into force on 22 September 1988, and as of October 2020 had 198
parties.19 The convention did not require parties to have legally binding reduction
targets for the use of human-made chlorofluorocarbons. However, the Ozone
Secretariat of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has noted
the convention’s landmark nature on two fronts:
(i)
(ii)

18

19

20

It serves as a framework agreement for further regulatory action in the
international sphere on the issue of ozone layer protection (e.g., 1987
Montreal Protocol).
It is likely the first major international negotiation that accepted the
“precautionary principle” whereby states reached an agreement
in principle to address a global environmental challenge prior to
full-scale manifestation of its effects.20

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, 10 December 1982, United
Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1833, No. 31363, p. 3. Art. 1 defines pollution of the marine
environment as “the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the
marine environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such deleterious
effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards to human health, hindrance to marine
activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of
sea water and reduction of amenities.”
Including the European Union and the Holy See. See United Nations Treaty Collection. Vienna
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (Information Page); and Vienna Convention
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 22 March 1985, United Nations Treaty Series,
Vol. 1513, No. 26164, p. 293.
Secretariat for the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer & The Montreal
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. 2001. The Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer. November. p. 26.
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The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (a protocol to the
VCPOL) was adopted and opened for signature in September 1987.21 It entered into
force on 1 January 1989. Along with the framework 1985 Vienna Convention, it is the
most universally ratified treaty in United Nations history, with 198 parties.22 The protocol
aims to protect the stratospheric ozone layer by phasing out the production and use
of ozone depleting substances in a step-wise fashion. The stratospheric ozone layer
protects the earth from harmful levels of ultraviolet radiation from the sun. The protocol
has been amended several times since its entry into force: in 1990 (London), 1992
(Copenhagen), 1995 (Vienna), 1997 (Montreal), 1999 (Beijing), and 2016 (Kigali).23
The 2016 Kigali Amendment, in particular, represents an innovative use of the
Montreal Protocol to combat climate change and its adverse impacts.24 It aims
for a global phasedown of hydrofluorocarbons by reducing their production
and consumption. Hydrofluorocarbons, used mainly in refrigeration and air
conditioning as substitutes for ozone-depleting hydrochlorofluorocarbons and
chlorofluorocarbons, are potent GHGs that are more harmful to the climate than
carbon dioxide.25 Global implementation of the Kigali Amendment could prevent up
to 0.5°C of global warming by the end of this century (footnote 25). It entered into
force on 1 January 2019, and had 110 states parties as of October 2020.26

H. 1989 Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Basel Convention) is an international
treaty that seeks to reduce the movement of hazardous wastes between
countries, especially between developed and developing countries (“toxic
trade”).27 Its principal objective is to minimize the risk of damage to human health
and the environment caused by hazardous wastes and other wastes, and the
transboundary movement thereof, by reducing their generation to a minimum in
terms of quantity and/or hazard potential.28
21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Montreal, 16 September 1987,
United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1522, No. 26369, p. 3.
Including the European Union and the Holy See. See United Nations Treaty Collection.
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Information Page).
United States Environmental Protection Agency. International Treaties and Cooperation about
the Protection of the Stratospheric Ozone Layer.
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Kigali, Rwanda,
15 October 2016, United Nations Treaty Series, No. 26369.
United Nations Environment Programme. 2016. The Kigali Amendment to the Montreal
Protocol: Another Global Commitment to Stop Climate Change. 8 December.
Including the European Union. See United Nations Treaty Collection. Kigali Amendment
(Information Page).
K.K. Peiry. 2010. Introductory Note. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. Audiovisual Library of International Law,
United Nations.
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their
Disposal, Basel, 22 March 1989, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1673, No. 28911, p. 57. Preamble.
(See first and third paragraphs).
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The term “hazardous wastes” covers a broad range of wastes that fulfill two
conditions: (i) listed under Annex I of the convention, and (ii) demonstrate one of
the characteristics stated in Annex III (e.g., explosive, flammable, toxic, oxidizing,
poisonous, or corrosive).29 Nevertheless, wastes that do not comply with the Annex I
and Annex III requirements are still considered “hazardous waste” if they are
considered to be such by the domestic legislation of the party of export, import or
transit (footnote 29). “Other wastes,” also covered under the convention, are those
listed under the convention’s Annex II (i.e., household waste and incinerator ash).30
Transboundary movement of wastes covered by the convention is restricted, except
if it is compliant with the principles of environmentally sound management.31
The Basel Convention entered into force in May 1992, and had 188 parties as of
November 2020.32

I.

1991 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment
in a Transboundary Context

The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context
(Espoo Convention) was adopted in 1991 under the auspices of the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). The convention acknowledges the
interrelationship between economic activities and their environmental consequences,
and the need to ensure environmentally sound and sustainable development,
especially in the transboundary context.33 It thus obliges states parties to conduct
environmental impact assessments of activities listed under its Appendix I34 prior
to a decision to authorize or undertake the activity.35 Proposed activities not listed
under Appendix I will nevertheless require an environmental impact assessment
if concerned parties agree that they are likely to cause a significant adverse
transboundary impact and thus should be treated as if they were so listed.36
The Espoo Convention came into force on 10 September 1997, and initially was
open only to states within the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) region. Its
First Amendment, adopted in 2001 and which entered into force on 26 August 2014,

29
30
31
32

33

34

35
36

Footnote 28, Art. 1(1).
Footnote 28, Art. 1(2).
Footnote 28, Art. 4.
United Nations Treaty Collection. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements
of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Information Page).
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo, Finland,
25 February 1991, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1989, No. 34028, p. 309. Preamble.
For example, installations for the reprocessing of irradiated nuclear fuel; integrated chemical
installations; large-diameter pipelines for the transport of oil, gas, or chemicals; and large dams
and reservoirs.
Footnote 33, Art. 2(3).
Footnote 33, Art. 2(5).
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allowed accession to the convention by states outside the ECE region.37 As of
October 2020, the Espoo Convention had 45 parties.38

J.

1994 Energy Charter Treaty and Energy Charter Protocol
on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects

The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) is a multilateral convention that created a
framework for transboundary cooperation in the energy industry. It aims for
energy security via non-discriminatory energy markets, balanced with the
principles of sustainable development and sovereignty over energy resources.39
It focuses on the following areas:
(i)

trade of energy materials (e.g., crude oil), final energy products (e.g.,
electricity), and energy-related equipment, with the goal of establishing open
and competitive energy markets through World Trade Organization rules;
(ii) protection of foreign direct investment in energy against core political
risks (e.g., expropriation, contractual breach, and nationalization),
via the principle of national treatment (equal treatment of foreigners
and the state’s own citizens) and the most favored nation treatment,
whichever is more favorable;40
(iii) energy efficiency, whereby parties are exhorted to “minimize in an
economically efficient manner harmful environmental impacts…from
all operations within the energy cycle” in a cost-effective manner, taking
into account the precautionary principle and the polluter pays principle;41
(iv) dispute settlement, covering (a) disputes between two states parties,
and (b) disputes between the host state party and an investor holding
the nationality of another state party (investor-state disputes); and
(v) energy transit (i.e., trade and transportation of energy across jurisdictions).
37

38

39

40

41

Amendment to the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context,
Sofia, 27 February 2001, United Nations Treaty Series, No. 34028.
United Nations Treaty Collection. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context (Information Page).
The Energy Charter Treaty, Lisbon, 17 December 1994, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 2080,
No. 36116, p. 95.
The most favored nation treatment ensures that “host States, while not granting national
treatment, would accord a covered foreign investor a treatment that is no less favourable than
that it accords to a third foreign investor and would benefit from national treatment as soon as
the country would grant it.” See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. 2010.
Most-Favoured-Nation Treatment: A Sequel. Geneva and New York. p. xiii.
Footnote 39, Art. 19(1). The provision states, “In pursuit of sustainable development and taking
into account its obligations under those international agreements concerning the environment
to which it is party, each Contracting Party shall strive to minimise in an economically efficient
manner harmful Environmental Impacts occurring either within or outside its Area from
all operations within the Energy Cycle in its Area, taking proper account of safety. In doing
so each Contracting Party shall act in a Cost-Effective manner. In its policies and actions
each Contracting Party shall strive to take precautionary measures to prevent or minimise
environmental degradation. The Contracting Parties agree that the polluter in the Areas of
Contracting Parties, should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, including transboundary
pollution, with due regard to the public interest and without distorting Investment in the Energy
Cycle or international trade. […]”
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The ECT, along with the Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency and
Related Environmental Aspects (Energy Efficiency Protocol), was signed in
December 1994 and entered into force on 16 April 1998. The Energy Efficiency
Protocol builds on the ECT Article 19 provision on environmental aspects.
As of February 2019, the ECT had 52 parties (including the European Union and
Euratom).42

K. 1992 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity,
2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention
on Biological Diversity, and the 2010 Nagoya Protocol
The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity is a key sustainable development
treaty that deals with the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity,
and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of
genetic resources.43 It marks the first time in international environmental law
that conservation of biodiversity was characterized as a “common concern
of mankind,” and links it and its sustainable use to economic and social
development.44 It also codifies the principle of prevention of transboundary harm
(i.e., that states are responsible for ensuring that activities within their jurisdiction
or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of areas
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction).45 Box 3.1 provides a brief summary of
the duties and obligations of states parties under the convention.
The convention recognizes that economic and social development and poverty
eradication are the first and overriding priorities of developing countries
(footnote 44). Therefore, it also covers provision of new and additional financial
resources to developing countries, as well as their access to relevant technologies.46
The convention was opened for signature during the 1992 Rio Summit and entered
into force on 29 December 1993. It had 196 parties as of October 2020.47
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity
(Cartagena Protocol)48 and the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources
42

43

44
45
46
47
48

Australia, Norway, and the Russian Federation have signed but not ratified the Energy Charter Treaty.
Belarus has not ratified the treaty, but applies it provisionally. See International Energy Charter.
Signatories / Contracting Parties. In April 2018, “the Russian Federation officially confirmed their
intention not to be considered as Signatories to the Energy Charter Treaty and the Protocol on Energy
Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects.” See International Energy Charter. Russian Federation.
Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, United Nations Treaty Series,
Vol. 1760, No. 30619, p. 79. Art. 2 defines genetic resources as genetic material of actual or
potential value. In turn, genetic material is defined as any material of plant, animal, microbial, or
other origin containing functional units of heredity.
Footnote 43, Preamble.
Footnote 43, Art. 3.
Footnote 43, Preamble, Arts. 16 and 20.
United Nations Treaty Collection. Convention on Biological Diversity (Information Page).
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Montreal, 29 January 2000,
United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 2226, No. 30619, p. 208.

47

48
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Box 3.1: Duties of States Parties under the Convention on Biological Diversity
The Convention on Biological Diversity covers a broad range of state obligations. These obligations relate
to cooperation; measures for conservation and sustainable use; identification and monitoring of relevant
components, processes, and activities; in-situ and ex-situ conservation; a incentive measures; research and training;
public education and awareness; impact assessments; genetic resources; access to and transfer of technology;
exchange of information; technical and scientific cooperation; handling of biotechnology and distribution of its
benefits; financial resources; and a financial mechanism for developing countries on a grant or concessional basis.
Some of the important state obligations include the duty to
• cooperate with other states parties with respect to areas beyond national jurisdiction or matters of
mutual interest; b
• develop national strategies, plans or programs for the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity; c
• identify and monitor components of biological diversity and processes and activities that have or are likely
to have significant adverse impacts on the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity; d
• establish a system of protected areas or areas where special measures need to be taken to conserve biological
diversity, and develop, where necessary, relevant guidelines for their selection, establishment and management; e
• promote the protection of ecosystems, natural habitats and the maintenance of viable populations of
species in natural surroundings; f
• rehabilitate and restore degraded ecosystems and promote the recovery of threatened species; g
• adopt measures for the ex-situ conservation of components of biological diversity, preferably in the
country of origin of such components; h
• integrate consideration of the conservation and sustainable use of biological resources into national
decision-making; i
• promote public education and awareness with respect to conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity;j
• conduct impact assessments and minimize adverse impacts; k
• notify immediately the potentially affected states of imminent or grave danger or damage to biological
diversity within the area under the jurisdiction of potentially affected states, if such danger or damage
originates from an area under the jurisdiction or control of the notifying state; l and
• in the immediately preceding case above, initiate action to prevent or minimize such danger or damage
(footnote l).
These duties and obligations come in the context of the states’ sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies.m
a

b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
k
l
m

Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1760, No. 30619, p. 79. Art. 2 of the
convention defines “in-situ conservation” as the conservation of ecosystems and natural habitats. It also refers to the maintenance
and recovery of viable populations of species in their natural surroundings and, in the case of domesticated or cultivated species, in the
surroundings where they have developed their distinctive properties. “Ex-situ conservation” means the conservation of components of
biological diversity outside their natural habitats.
Footnote a, Art. 5.
Footnote a, Art. 6.
Footnote a, Art. 7.
Footnote a, Art. 8(a)–(b).
Footnote a, Art. 8(d).
Footnote a, Art. 8(f).
Footnote a, Art. 9.
Footnote a, Art.10.
Footnote a, Art. 13.
Footnote a, Art. 14.
Footnote a, Art. 14(d).
Footnote a, Art. 3. Significantly, the sovereign right to exploit resources was stated alongside the principle of prevention of
transboundary harm.

Source: Authors.
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and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the
Convention on Biological Diversity (Nagoya Protocol)49 serve as supplementary
agreements:

L.



The Cartagena Protocol explicitly references the precautionary approach
contained in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development.50 It seeks to ensure the safe transfer, handling, and use
of living modified organisms resulting from modern biotechnology that
may have adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of
biological diversity (footnote 50). Focusing on transboundary movements,
the Protocol was adopted in January 2000 and entered into force on
11 September 2003. It had 173 parties as of October 2020.51



The Nagoya Protocol establishes a legal framework for the fair and
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic
resources.52 Core obligations of states parties involve access obligations,
benefit-sharing obligations, and regulatory and legislative compliance
obligations.53 It was adopted in October 2010 and entered into force on
12 October 2014. It had 128 parties as of October 2020.54

1994 United Nations Convention to Combat
Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing Serious
Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa

The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa
(UNCCD) is a multilateral treaty that aims to combat desertification and mitigate
the effects of drought in countries experiencing serious drought and/or
desertification, particularly in Africa.55 The UNCCD adopts an integrated
approach, supported by international cooperation and partnership arrangements,
addressing the physical, biological, and socioeconomic aspects of the processes
of desertification and drought.56 The affected parties are primarily obliged to
establish relevant national action programs, strategies, and priorities,57 within
49

50
51

52
53
54

55

56
57

Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity. 2011. Nagoya Protocol on Access to
Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the
Convention on Biological Diversity: Text and Annex. Montreal.
Footnote 48, Art. 1.
United Nations Treaty Collection. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on
Biological Diversity (Information Page).
Footnote 49, Art. 1.
See Convention on Biological Diversity. About the Nagoya Protocol.
United Nations Treaty Collection. Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair
and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological
Diversity (Information Page).
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious
Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, Paris, 14 October 1994, United Nations Treaty
Series, Vol. 1954, No. 33480, p. 3.
Footnote 55, Arts. 2(1) and 4(2)(a).
Footnote 55, Arts. 5(b) and 10.

49

Photo by Eric Sales/ADB.
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the framework of sustainable development plans and in the context of poverty
alleviation.58 The developed country parties, on the other hand, are to actively
support the efforts of the affected developing country parties to combat
desertification and mitigate the effects of drought.59 In addition, the developed
country parties undertake to provide substantial financial resources and other
forms of support to assist the affected developing country parties.60
The UNCCD expressly references the contribution that combating desertification
can make to achieving the objectives of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the Convention on Biological
Diversity, and other related environmental conventions.61 Thus, parties are
encouraged to coordinate activities under these related conventions to derive
maximum benefit and avoid duplication of effort.62
The UNCCD was adopted on 17 June 1994 and entered into force on
26 December 1996. It had 197 parties as of October 2020.63

M. Tabular Summaries of Treaty Status
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 summarize the treaty status of each country covered in this
report in relation to the multilateral environmental treaties discussed in Part Three
Section I.

58
59
60
61
62
63

Footnote 55, Arts. 4(2)(b) and 4(2)(c).
Footnote 55, Arts. 6(a).
Footnote 55, Arts. 6(b).
Footnote 55, Chapeau, para. 23.
Footnote 55, Art. 8.
United Nations Treaty Collection. United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in
those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa
(Information Page).

51

52
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Table 3.1: Summary of Status (Multilateral Environmental Treaties)—
Southeast Asia and South Asia Developing Member Countries

Ramsar
Convention

London
Convention

1996
Protocol to
the London
Convention

−

−

−

12 Nov 2011 e

23 Jan 1987 e

−

5 Nov 1996 r

26 Jul 1990 a

Cambodia

23 Oct 1999 e

−

−

28 Feb 1992 e

28 Feb 1995 e

−

1 Jul 1983a

27 Jun 2001 a

Indonesia

8 Aug 1992 e

−

−

6 Oct 1989 e

21 Jan 1987 e

−

3 Feb 1986 r

26 Jun 1992 a

Lao PDR

28 Sep 2010 e

−

−

20 Jun 1987 e

−

−

5 Jun 1998 r

21 Aug 1998 a

Malaysia

10 Mar 1995 e

−

−

7 Mar 1989 e

1 May 1997 e

−

14 Oct 1996 r

29 Aug 1989 a

Myanmar

17 Mar 2005 e

−

−

29 Jul 1994 e

4 Aug 1988 e

−

21 May 1996 r

24 Nov 1993 a

Philippines

8 Nov 1994 e

30 Aug 1975 e

8 Jun 2012 e

19 Dec 1985 e

15 Sep 2001 e

−

8 May 1984 r

17 Jul 1991 a

Singapore

−

−

−

19 Sep 2012 e

1 Feb 1991 e

−

17 Nov 1994 r

5 Jan 1989 a

Thailand

13 Sep 1998 e

−

−

17 Dec 1987 e

2 Feb 2008 e

−

15 May 2011 r

7 Jul 1989 a

Viet Nam

20 Jan 1989 e

−

−

19 Jan 1988 e

29 Aug 1991 e

−

25 Jul 1994 r

26 Jan 1994 a

Afghanistan

−

30 Aug 1975 e

−

20 Jun 1979 e

−

−

18 Mar 1983c

17 Jun 2004 a

Bangladesh

21 Sep 1992 e

−

−

3 Nov 1983 e

18 Mar 2003 e

−

27 Jul 2001 r

2 Aug 1990 a

Bhutan

7 Sep 2012 e

−

−

17 Jan 2002 e

−

−

10 Dec 1982

23 Aug 2004 a

India

1 Feb 1982 e

−

−

14 Feb 1978 e

24 Dec 1986 e

−

29 Jun 1995 r

18 Mar 1991 a

−

−

−

22 Aug 1986 e

20 Aug 2005 e

−

7 Sep 2000 r

26 Apr 1988 a

Nepal

17 Apr 1988 e

−

−

20 Sep 1978 e

−

−

2 Nov 1998 r

6 Jul 1994 a

Pakistan

23 Nov 1976 e

8 Apr 1995 e

−

23 Oct 1976 e

22 Feb 1995 e

−

26 Feb 1997 r

18 Dec 1992 a

Sri Lanka

15 Oct 1990 e

−

−

6 Sep 1980 e

24 Sep 1997 e

−

19 Jul 1994 r

15 Dec 1989 a

Country

World
Heritage
Convention

ICPPS 73/78

CLRTAP

UNCLOS

VCPOL

Southeast Asia
Brunei
Darussalam

South Asia

Maldives

e

CLRTAP = Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, ICPPS 73/78 = 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships and the 1978 Protocol, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, UNCLOS = United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea, VCPOL = Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer.
Notes: a = accession, A = acceptance, AA = approval, e = entry into force, r = ratification.
Cambodia signed the UNCLOS on 1 July 1983, but has not yet ratified it.
Thailand signed the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their
Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity on 31 January 2012, but has not yet ratified it.
c
Afghanistan signed the UNCLOS on 18 March 1983, but has not yet ratified it.
d
Bangladesh signed the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their
Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity on 6 September 2011, but has not yet ratified it.
e
Bhutan signed the UNCLOS on 10 December 1982, but has not yet ratified it.
f
Nepal signed the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity on 2 March 2001, but has not yet ratified it.
Sources:
Convention on Biological Diversity. List of Parties: CBD (accessed 31 October 2020).
Convention on Biological Diversity. List of Parties: Cartagena Protocol (accessed 31 October 2020).
Convention on Biological Diversity. List of Parties: Nagoya Protocol (accessed 31 October 2020).
Energy Charter Secretariat. The Energy Charter Treaty (accessed 31 October 2020).
Energy Charter Secretariat. The Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects (PEEREA) (accessed 31 October 2020).
International Maritime Organization. 2020. Status of IMO Treaties. 15 September. pp. 111–115, 543–545, 555–556.
a

b
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1987
Montreal
Protocol

2016
Kigali
Amendment

27 May 1993 a

Basel
Convention

Espoo
Convention

Energy
Charter
Treaty

Energy
Efficiency
Protocol

Convention
on Biological
Diversity

2000
Cartagena
Protocol

2010
Nagoya
Protocol

Convention
to Combat
Desertification

−

16 Mar 2003 e

−

−

−

27 Jul 2008 e

−

−

4 Dec 2002 a

27 Jun 2001 a

−

31 May 2001 e

−

−

−

10 May 1995 e

16 Dec 2003 e

19 Apr 2015 e

18 Aug 1997 r

26 Jun 1992 r

−

19 Dec 1993 e

−

−

−

21 Nov 1994 e

3 Mar 2005 e

12 Oct 2014 e

31 Aug 1998 r

21 Aug 1998 a

16 Nov 2017 A

20 Dec 2010 e

−

−

−

19 Dec 1996 e

1 Nov 2004 e

12 Oct 2014 e

20 Sep 1996 A

29 Aug 1989 a

21 Oct 2020 r

6 Jan 1994 e

−

−

−

22 Sep 1994 e

2 Dec 2003 e

3 Feb 2019 e

25 Jun 1997 r

24 Nov 1993 a

−

6 Apr 2015 e

−

−

−

23 Feb 1995 e

13 May 2008 e

12 Oct 2014 e

2 Jan 1997 a

17 Jul 1991 r

−

19 Jan 1994 e

−

−

−

6 Jan 1994 e

3 Jan 2007 e

28 Dec 2015 e

10 Feb 2000 r

5 Jan 1989 a

−

1 Apr 1996 e

−

−

−

20 Mar 1996 e

−

−

26 Apr 1999 a

7 Jul 1989 r

−

22 Feb 1998 e

−

−

−

29 Jan 2004 e

8 Feb 2006 e

31 Jan 2012

7 Mar 2001 a

26 Jan 1994 a

27 Sep 2019 AA

11 Jun 1995 e

−

−

−

14 Feb 1995 e

20 Apr 2004 e

12 Oct 2014 e

25 Aug 1998 a

17 Jun 2004 a

−

23 Jun 2013 e

−

20 Jun
2013 e

20 Jun
2013 e

18 Dec 2002 e

21 May 2013 e

4 Sep 2018 e

1 Nov 1995 a

2 Aug 1990 a

8 Jun 2020 r

30 Jun 1993 e

−

−

−

1 Aug 1994 e

5 May 2004 e

6 Sep 2011 d

26 Jan 1996 r

23 Aug 2004 a

27 Sep 2019 r

24 Nov 2002 e

−

−

−

23 Nov 1995 e

11 Sep 2003 e

12 Oct 2014 e

20 Aug 2003 a

19 Jun 1992 a

−

22 Sep 1992 e

−

−

−

19 May 1994 e

11 Sep 2003 e

12 Oct 2014 e

17 Dec 1996 r

16 May 1989 r

13 Nov 2017 r

27 Jul 1992 e

−

−

−

29 Dec 1993 e

11 Sep 2003 e

29 Sep 2019 e

3 Sep 2002 a

6 Jul 1994 a

−

13 Jan 1997 e

−

−

−

21 Feb 1994 e

2 Mar 2001f

28 Mar 2019 e

15 Oct 1996 r

18 Dec 1992 a

−

24 Oct 1994 e

−

−

−

24 Oct 1994 e

31 May 2009 e

21 Feb 2016 e

24 Feb 1997 r

15 Dec 1989 a

28 Sep 2018 r

26 Nov 1992 e

−

−

−

21 Jun 1994 e

26 Jul 2004 e

−

9 Dec 1998 a

b

Secretariat of the Basel Convention. Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal (accessed 31 October 2020).
The Ramsar Convention Secretariat. 2019. Contracting Parties to the Ramsar Convention. 4 November.
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. States Parties Ratification Status (accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Kigali Amendment)
(accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or
Desertification, Particularly in Africa (accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (accessed 31 October 2020).
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Table 3.2: Summary of Status (Multilateral Environmental Treaties)—
Pacific Developing Member Countries

Ramsar
Convention

London
Convention

1996
Protocol to
the London
Convention

−

30 Aug 1975 x

−

16 Apr 2009 e

12 Jun 2007 e

−

15 Feb 1995 r

22 Dec 2003 a

Fiji

11 Aug 2006 e

−

−

21 Feb 1991 e

8 Jun 2016 e

−

10 Dec 1982 r

23 Oct 1989 a

Kiribati

3 Aug 2013 e

12 Jul 1979 d

−

12 Aug 2000 e

5 May 2007 e

−

24 Feb 2003 a

7 Jan 1993 a

Marshall
Islands

13 Nov 2004 e

−

8 Jun 2008 e

24 Jul 2002 e

26 Jul 1988 e

−

9 Aug 1991 a

11 Mar 1993 a

Micronesia,
Federated
States of

−

−

−

22 Oct 2002 e

−

−

29 Apr 1991 a

3 Aug 1994 a

Nauru

−

25 Aug 1982 e

−

−

−

−

23 Jan 1996 r

12 Nov 2001 a

Palau

18 Feb 2003 e

−

−

11 Sep 2002 e

29 Dec 2011 e

−

30 Sep 1996 a

29 May 2001 a

Papua New
Guinea

16 Jul 1993 e

9 Apr 1980 e

−

28 Oct 1997 e

25 Jan 1994 e

−

14 Jan 1997 r

27 Oct 1992 a

Samoa

6 Feb 2005 e

−

−

28 Nov 2001 e

7 May 2002 e

−

14 Aug 1995 r

21 Dec 1992 a

Solomon
Islands

−

7 Jul 1978 d

−

10 Sep 1992 e

30 Sep 2004 e

−

23 Jun 1997 r

17 Jun 1993 a

Timor-Leste

−

−

−

31 Jan 2017 e

−

−

8 Jan 2013 a

16 Sep 2009 a

Tonga

−

8 Dec 1995 e

24 Mar 2006 e

3 Sep 2004 e

1 May 1996 e

−

2 Aug 1995 a

29 Jul 1998 a

Tuvalu

−

−

−

−

22 Nov 1985 e

−

9 Dec 2002 r

15 Jul 1993 a

4 Nov 2019 e

22 Oct 1992 e

24 Mar 2006 e

13 Sep 2002 e

13 Jul 1989 e

−

10 Aug 1999 r

21 Nov 1994 a

Country
Cook Islands

Vanuatu

World
Heritage
Convention

ICPPS 73/78

CLRTAP

UNCLOS

VCPOL

CLRTAP = Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, ICPPS 73/78 = 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships and the 1978 Protocol, UNCLOS = United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, VCPOL = Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer.
Notes: a = accession, A = acceptance, d = succession, e = entry into force, r = ratification, x = exclusion.
a
The Cook Islands signed the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity on 21 May 2001, but has not yet ratified it.
Sources:
Convention on Biological Diversity. List of Parties: CBD (accessed 31 October 2020).
Convention on Biological Diversity. List of Parties: Cartagena Protocol (accessed 31 October 2020).
Convention on Biological Diversity. List of Parties: Nagoya Protocol (accessed 31 October 2020).
Energy Charter Secretariat. The Energy Charter Treaty (accessed 31 October 2020).
Energy Charter Secretariat. The Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects (PEEREA) (accessed 31 October 2020).
International Maritime Organization. 2020. Status of IMO Treaties. 15 September. pp. 111−115, 543−545, 555−556.
Secretariat of the Basel Convention. Parties to the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and
Their Disposal (accessed 31 October 2020).
The Ramsar Convention Secretariat. 2019. Contracting Parties to the Ramsar Convention. 4 November.
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. States Parties Ratification Status (accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Kigali Amendment)
(accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or
Desertification, Particularly in Africa (accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer (accessed 31 October 2020).
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1987
Montreal
Protocol

2016
Kigali
Amendment

22 Dec 2003 a

Basel
Convention

Espoo
Convention

Energy
Charter
Treaty

Energy
Efficiency
Protocol

Convention
on Biological
Diversity

2000
Cartagena
Protocol

2010
Nagoya
Protocol

Convention
to Combat
Desertification

22 Aug 2019 A

27 Sep 2004 e

−

−

−

29 Dec 1993 e

21 May 2001a

−

21 Aug 1998 a

23 Oct 1989 a

16 Jun 2020 r

−

−

−

−

29 Dec 1993 e

11 Sep 2003 e

12 Oct 2014 e

26 Aug 1998 a

7 Jan 1993 a

26 Oct 2018 r

6 Dec 2000 e

−

−

−

14 Nov 1994 e

19 Jul 2004 e

−

8 Sep 1998 a

11 Mar 1993 a

15 May 2017 r

27 Apr 2003 e

−

−

−

29 Dec 1993 e

11 Sep 2003 e

8 Jan 2015 e

2 Jun 1998 a

6 Sep 1995 a

12 May 2017 r

5 Dec 1995 e

−

−

−

18 Sep 1994 e

−

12 Oct 2014 e

25 Mar 1996 r

12 Nov 2001 a

−

10 Feb 2002 e

−

−

−

8 Feb 1994 e

11 Sep 2003 e

−

22 Sep 1998 a

29 May 2001 a

29 Aug 2017 r

7 Dec 2011 e

−

−

−

6 Apr 1999 e

11 Sep 2003 e

11 Sep 2018 e

15 Jun 1999 a

27 Oct 1992 a

−

30 Nov 1995 e

−

−

−

29 Dec 1993 e

12 Jan 2006 e

−

6 Dec 2000 a

21 Dec 1992 a

23 Mar 2018 r

20 Jun 2002 e

−

−

−

10 May 1994 e

11 Sep 2003 e

12 Oct 2014 e

21 Aug 1998 a

17 Jun 1993 a

−

−

−

−

−

1 Jan 1996 e

26 Oct 2004 e

22 Jan 2020 e

16 Apr 1999 a

16 Sep 2009 a

−

−

−

−

−

8 Jan 2007 e

−

−

20 Aug 2003 a

29 Jul 1998 a

17 Sep 2018 r

24 Jun 2010 e

−

−

−

17 Aug 1998 e

17 Dec 2003 e

1 Jan 2020 e

25 Sep 1998 a

15 Jul 1993 a

21 Sep 2017 r

19 Nov 2020 e

−

−

−

20 Mar 2003 e

−

26 Nov 2018 e

14 Sep 1998 a

21 Nov 1994 a

20 Apr 2018 r

14 Jan 2019 e

−

−

−

29 Dec 1993 e

−

12 Oct 2014 e

10 Aug 1999 r
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II. Soft Law
Soft law refers to instruments or documents, which may have the appearance of
law, but are not legally binding. They do not create rights and obligations. However,
soft law can be politically influential in setting down objectives and aspirations.64

A. 1972 Stockholm Declaration
The Stockholm Declaration consists of a seven-point Preamble and 26 Principles.65
The language of Principle 1 suggests a right to a healthy environment and a correlated
intergenerational responsibility.66 However, several proposals for a more direct and
unequivocal reference to a human right to an adequate or healthy environment were
rejected at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment.67
Principle 6, dealing with “the discharge of toxic substances…and the release
of heat, in such quantities or concentrations as to exceed the capacity of the
environment to render them harmless,” touched on the issue of climate change.68
Principle 21 declared that within the limits set by international law, states have
the sovereign right to exploit their own resources.69 However, this right comes
with the concomitant responsibility to ensure that these activities do not cause
damage to areas beyond their national jurisdiction (footnote 69).
An ambitious action plan accompanies the declaration. Recommendation 70
of the action plan recommends that “Governments be mindful of activities in
which there is an appreciable risk of effects on climate, and to this end, carefully
evaluate the likelihood and magnitude of climatic effects.” 70
64

65

66

67

68

69

70

J.P. Grant, C.J. Barker, and C. Parry. 2004. Parry and Grant Encyclopaedic Dictionary of
International Law. 2nd ed. New York: Oceana Publications, Inc.
United Nations. 1973. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Stockholm, 5–16 June 1972. A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1. New York. pp. 3–5.
Footnote 65, Principle 1 states, “Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality and
adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that permits a life of dignity and
well-being, and he bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for
present and future generations. In this respect, policies promoting or perpetuating apartheid,
racial segregation, discrimination, colonial and other forms of oppression and foreign domination
stand condemned and must be eliminated.”
G. Handl. 2012. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
(Stockholm Declaration), 1972 and the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development,
1992. United Nations Audiovisual Library of International Law.
Footnote 65, Principle 6 states, “The discharge of toxic substances or of other substances
and the release of heat, in such quantities or concentrations as to exceed the capacity of
the environment to render them harmless, must be halted in order to ensure that serious or
irreversible damage is not inflicted upon ecosystems. The just struggle of the peoples of ill
countries against pollution should be supported.”
Footnote 65, Principle 21 states, “States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources
pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.”
Footnote 65, p. 20.
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The declaration in itself was not intended to be a legally binding instrument. However,
some of its provisions were understood to have been reflective of customary
international law at the time of its adoption (footnote 67). Other provisions were
expected to serve as the basis for future normative developments (footnote 67).

B. 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development
The Rio Declaration reaffirms the principles of the Stockholm Declaration
and seeks to build upon them by establishing “a new and equitable global
partnership.” 71 In particular, the Rio Declaration
• affirms the state’s obligation to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction
or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states or of
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; 72
• recognizes that the right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably
meet the developmental and environmental needs of present and future
generations; 73
• urges states to apply the precautionary approach “according to their
capabilities.” 74 (Note: While a European proposal at the Rio Summit to
include the precautionary approach “as a principle” did not get enough
support, the concept is now widely reflected in international practice
[footnote 67]. This is also one of several principles that do not have a
counterpart in the Stockholm Declaration [footnote 67]);
• acknowledges the “common but differentiated responsibilities” of
developed and developing states, in view of their different contributions
to global environmental degradation and the technologies and financial
resources they command; 75
• recognizes that national environmental standards, management objectives,
and priorities must reflect the environmental and developmental context in
which they apply (again, the developed and developing country dichotomy); 76
• calls on states to implement procedural safeguards—such as environmental
impact assessments,77 emergency notifications,78 and customary

71

72

73
74
75
76
77

78

United Nations. 1993. Report of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, 3–14 June 1992. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I). New York: United Nations. pp. 3–8. Preamble.
Footnote 71, Principle 2. See Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v.
Uruguay), Judgment, ICJ Reports 2010, pp. 55–56; and Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, p. 226.
Footnote 71, Principle 3.
Footnote 71, Principle 15.
Footnote 71, Principle 7.
Footnote 71, Principle 11.
Footnote 71, Principle 17 states, “Environmental impact assessment, as a national instrument,
shall be undertaken for proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on
the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national authority.”
Footnote 71, Principle 18 states, “States shall immediately notify other States of any natural disasters
or other emergencies that are likely to produce sudden harmful effects on the environment of those
States. Every effort shall be made by the international community to help States so afflicted.”
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notification and consultation79—for activities that potentially have
significant adverse impacts on other states;80
• calls on states to ensure that citizens have access to information, public
participation, and legal redress and remedies in environmental issues;81 and
• recognizes the vital role of women in environmental management and
development.82 The Rio Declaration is the first international instrument
that expressly acknowledges that women’s participation in their countries’
economic and social processes is crucial for sustainable development
(footnote 67). This perspective continues to inform current climate change
discussions in the context of the disproportionate effects of climate change
on women compared with men.83

C. 2015 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
(2015–2030)
The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015–2030) is a voluntary,
non-binding international instrument on disaster risk reduction adopted by
United Nations member states in March 2015. It applies to the risk of disaster
(small or large scale, frequent or infrequent, sudden or slow onset, or caused
by natural or human-made hazards), as well as to related environmental,
technological, and biological hazards and risks.84
The framework seeks to implement integrated and inclusive measures that
prevent and reduce hazard exposure and vulnerability to disaster, increase

79

80

81

82
83

84

Footnote 71, Principle 19 states, “States shall provide prior and timely notification and relevant
information to potentially affected States on activities that may have a significant adverse transboundary
environmental effect and shall consult with those States at an early stage and in good faith.”
Footnote 67. Günther Handl notes that Principles 17 to 19 of the Rio Declaration have gained
customary norm status: “At the time of the Rio Conference, and perhaps for a short while
thereafter, it might have been permissible to question whether the contents of all three
principles corresponded to international customary legal obligations. However, today given a
consistently supportive international practice and other evidence, including the International
Law Commission’s draft articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous
Activities, any such doubts would be misplaced.” (p. 6).
Footnote 71, Principle 10. Günther Handl (footnote 67) posits that Principle 10 “represents
a trail blazer, laying down for the first time, at a global level, a concept that is critical both to
effective environmental management and democratic governance. Since then, international
community expectations, as reflected notably in the Convention on Access to Information,
Public Participation in Decision Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (Aarhus
Convention), the 2010 UNEP Guidelines for the Development of National Legislation on
Access to Information, Public Participation and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters and
various resolutions of international organizations and conferences, have coalesced to the point
where the normative provisions of Principle 10 must be deemed legally binding.” (p. 6).
Footnote 71, Principle 20.
See, for example, the following discussions on the nexus of women and climate change:
(i) UNFCCC. Introduction to Gender and Climate Change, (ii) UN Women. In Focus: Climate
Action by, and for, Women, and (iii) UNESCO. Climate Change and Gender Equality.
United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction. 2015. Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk
Reduction, 2015–2030. Geneva. Preamble, para. 15.
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Box 3.2: Global Targets of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction
(2015–2030)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

Substantially reduce global disaster mortality by 2030, aiming to lower the average per 100,000
global mortality rate in the decade 2020–2030 compared with the period 2005–2015;
Substantially reduce the number of affected people globally by 2030, aiming to lower the average
global figure per 100,000 in the decade 2020–2030 compared with the period 2005–2015;
Reduce direct disaster economic loss in relation to global gross domestic product (GDP) by 2030;
Substantially reduce disaster damage to critical infrastructure and disruption of basic services,
among them health and educational facilities, including through developing their resilience by 2030;
Substantially increase the number of countries with national and local disaster risk reduction
strategies by 2020;
Substantially enhance international cooperation to developing countries through adequate and
sustainable support to complement their national actions for implementation of the Framework
by 2030; and
Substantially increase the availability of and access to multi-hazard early warning systems and
disaster risk information and assessments to people by 2030.

Source: United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction. 2015. Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015–2030.
Geneva. (Expected outcome and goal, para. 18).

preparedness for response and recovery, and thus strengthen resilience.85 Box 3.2
enumerates the seven global targets of the Sendai Framework.
The Sendai Framework specifically references climate change and variability—along
with consequences of poverty and inequality, unplanned and rapid urbanization,
and poor land management—as an underlying disaster risk driver.86 Accordingly, it
promotes the inclusion of climate change scenarios in disaster risk assessments;87
surveys on multi-hazard risks (footnote 87); and disaster preparedness and
contingency policies, plans, and programs.88 It also emphasizes the importance of
policy, institutional, and instrumental coherence across sustainable development
and growth, food security, health and safety, climate change and variability,
environmental management, and disaster risk reduction agendas.89
The framework also recognizes the critical need to build resilience and
provide particular support to small island developing states, which can be
disproportionately affected by disasters (including climate change-related
disasters) owing to their unique and particular vulnerabilities.90
85

86
87
88
89
90

Footnote 84, Expected outcome and goal, para. 17. “Measures” cover economic, structural, legal, social,
health, cultural, educational, environmental, technological, political, and institutional measures.
Footnote 84, Preamble, paras. 6 and 10.
Footnote 84, Priorities for action, para. 25(b).
Footnote 84, Priorities for action, para. 33(a).
Footnote 84, Preamble, para. 11; Guiding principles, para. 19(h); Priorities for action, para. 28(b).
Footnote 84, International cooperation and global partnership, para. 42.
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D. 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the
Addis Ababa Action Agenda
The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted by the United Nations
General Assembly (UNGA) in September 2015,91 outlines 17 “integrated and
indivisible”92 global goals intended to be attained by 2030 (Box 3.3). These
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) build on the Millennium Development
Goals and cover the economic, social, and environmental dimensions of
sustainable development.93

Box 3.3: Sustainable Development Goals
Goal 1

End poverty in all its forms everywhere.

Goal 2

End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture.

Goal 3

Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages.

Goal 4

Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.

Goal 5

Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls.

Goal 6

Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all.

Goal 7

Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.

Goal 8

Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment
and decent work for all.

Goal 9

Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation.

Goal 10 Reduce inequality within and among countries.
Goal 11

Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.

Goal 12

Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns.

Goal 13

Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.a

Goal 14

Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development.

Goal 15

Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests,
combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss.

Goal 16

Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for
all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels.

Goal 17

Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable
development.

a

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change is recognized as the primary international, intergovernmental forum for
negotiating the global response to climate change.

Source: General Assembly Resolution 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, A/RES/70/1
(25 September 2015). para. 59.

91

92
93

General Assembly Resolution 70/1, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable
Development, A/RES/70/1 (25 September 2015).
Footnote 91, para. 5.
Footnote 91, para. 2.
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The 2030 Agenda characterizes climate change as “one of the greatest
challenges of our time” whose “adverse impacts undermine the ability of all
countries to achieve sustainable development.” 94 Goal 13 on climate change thus
identifies five targets relating to adaptation, mitigation, financing, capacity, and
institutional public programming:
(i)

Strengthen resilience and adaptive capacity to climate-related
hazards and natural disasters in all countries.
(ii) Integrate climate change measures into national policies, strategies,
and planning.
(iii) Improve education, awareness-raising, and human and institutional
capacity on climate change mitigation, adaptation, impact reduction,
and early warning.
(iv) Implement the commitment undertaken by developed-country
parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change to a goal of mobilizing jointly $100 billion annually by 2020
from all sources to address the needs of developing countries in
the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on
implementation and fully operationalizing the Green Climate Fund
through its capitalization as soon as possible.
(v) Promote mechanisms for raising capacity for effective climate
change-related planning and management in least developed
countries and small island developing states, including a focus on
women, youth, and local and marginalized communities.95
The implementation targets of the other SDGs underscore their interdependence
with climate change response and objectives. For instance, one of the targets of
Goal 1 (ending poverty) is build the resilience of the poor and those in vulnerable
situations and reduce their exposure and vulnerability to climate-related extreme
events and other environmental shocks and disasters.96 Goal 2 (food security) seeks
to ensure sustainable food production systems and implement resilient agricultural
practices that can strengthen capacity for adaptation to climate change, extreme
weather, drought, flooding, and other disasters.97 Goal 7 (affordable and clean
energy) urges substantially increasing the share of renewable energy in the global
energy mix and enhancing international cooperation to facilitate access to clean
energy research and technology.98 Goal 11 (sustainable cities and communities)
encourages cities and settlements to adopt and implement integrated policies that
address mitigation and adaptation to climate change and resilience to disasters.99
This objective is premised on minimizing the impact of cities on the global climate

94
95
96
97
98
99

Footnote 91, para. 14.
Footnote 91, para. 59, subparas. 13.1 to 13.b.
Footnote 91, para. 59, subpara. 1.5.
Footnote 91, para. 59, subpara. 2.4.
Footnote 91, para. 59, subparas. 7.2 and 7.a.
Footnote 91, para. 59, subpara. 11.b.
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system.100 Goal 17 (partnerships) promotes the development and transfer of
environmentally sound technologies to developing countries on favorable terms.101
The 2030 Agenda explicitly makes the Addis Ababa Action Agenda an integral
component, the full implementation of which is characterized as “critical” to
realizing the SDGs and implementation targets.102 The Addis Ababa Action
Agenda, the outcome document of the Third International Conference on
Financing for Development, establishes a global framework that aims to coordinate
public and private financing, as well as international development cooperation
and trade—focusing on the priorities of the universal post-2015 development
agenda.103 In addition, it strengthens the follow-up process by (i) mandating an
annual Economic and Social Council forum on financing for development with
universal, intergovernmental participation,104 and (ii) creating an inter-agency task
force to report annually on progress in implementing the outcomes and the means
of implementation of the post-2015 development agenda.105

E.

Draft Global Pact for the Environment

The Draft Global Pact for the Environment is an instrument prepared by an
international group of experts intended to reflect and codify general principles of
environmental law, and fill the gaps in the existing legal framework.106 The President
of France launched the Draft Global Pact in June 2017. It aims to inform the
discussions of the United Nations Open-ended Working Group ‘Towards a Global
Pact for the Environment.’ In 2018–2019, the Working Group deliberated on the
possibility of adopting a legally binding global framework on the environment that
embodies a unified approach (as opposed to the current sectorial approach, such
as on biodiversity, climate, and pollution).107 This global framework, if passed, would
be “the first international treaty on the environment as a whole.” 108
The Draft Global Pact intends to triangulate fundamental rights under
international law by supplementing the 1966 conventions on civil and political
rights109 and economic, social and cultural rights110 with environmental rights
(footnote 108). It is premised on intergenerational equity (i.e., the need to
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102
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108
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110

Footnote 91, para. 34.
Footnote 91, para. 59, subpara. 17.7.
Footnote 91, paras. 40 and 62.
General Assembly Resolution 69/313, Addis Ababa Action Agenda of the Third International
Conference on Financing for Development, A/RES/69/313 (27 July 2015). p. 2, para. 2.
Footnote 103, para. 132.
Footnote 103, para. 133.
Global Pact for the Environment. Draft Global Pact for the Environment (Preliminary Draft of the
Group of Experts).
Global Pact for the Environment. The Pact Explained in 3 Minutes.
Global Pact for the Environment. Objectives.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, 16 December 1966, United Nations
Treaty Series, Vol. 999, No. 14668, p. 171.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, New York, 16 December 1966,
United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 993, No. 14531, p. 3.
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promote sustainable development that allows each generation to satisfy its needs
without compromising the capability of future generations to meet theirs, while
respecting the balance and integrity of Earth’s ecosystem).111
The Draft Global Pact’s two core provisions are reflected in Article 1 (a human
right to live in an ecologically sound environment) and Article 2 (a duty to take
care of the environment—a duty universally held by every state, international
institution, and person, whether natural or legal, public or private). It also lays out
state obligations, including the duties to
• integrate the requirements of environmental protection in government
policies and activities; 112
• ensure the promotion of public support policies, as well as patterns of production
and consumption that are both sustainable and respectful of the environment;113
• prevent environmental harm, including transboundary harm; 114
• ensure environmental impact assessments are conducted prior to any
project or activity that is likely to have a significant adverse impact on the
environment, and keep under surveillance the effect of these projects or
activities (i.e., the related obligation of due diligence); 115
• ensure an adequate remediation of environmental damages; 116
• ensure application of the polluter pays principle (i.e., prevention, mitigation, and
remediation costs for pollution, environmental disruptions, and degradation are
to be borne by their originator, to the greatest extent possible); 117
• encourage the implementation of the Pact by non-state actors and subnational
entities, including civil society, economic actors, cities, and regions; 118
• adopt effective environmental laws, and ensure their effective and fair
implementation and enforcement; 119 and
• take necessary measures to maintain and restore the diversity and capacity of
ecosystems and human communities to withstand environmental disruptions
and degradation, and recover and adapt (i.e., the resilience obligation).120
Other substantive principles include intergenerational equity, the precautionary
principle,121 and the principle of non-regression.122
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

122

Footnote 106, Preamble and Art. 4.
Footnote 106, Art. 3, para. 1.
Footnote 106, Art. 3, para. 2.
Footnote 106, Art. 5, paras. 1 and 2.
Footnote 106, Art. 5, paras. 3 and 4.
Footnote 106, Art. 7.
Footnote 106, Art. 8.
Footnote 106, Art. 14.
Footnote 106, Art. 15.
Footnote 106, Art. 16.
Footnote 106, Art. 6 states, “Where there is a risk of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing the adoption of effective and
proportionate measures to prevent environmental degradation.”
Footnote 106, Art. 17 states, “The Parties and their sub-national entities refrain from allowing
activities or adopting norms that have the effect of reducing the global level of environmental
protection guaranteed by current law.”
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The Draft Global Pact also codifies several important procedural rights on the
part of the citizenry (as reflected in the language “every person has a/the right to”).
These procedural rights include
• access environmental information held by public authorities, without being
required to state an interest;123
• participate, at an appropriate stage and while options are still open, in the
preparation of decisions, plans, activities, and policies of public authorities
that may have a significant effect on the environment;124 and
• access environmental justice (i.e., effective and affordable access to
administrative and judicial procedures, including redress and remedies, to
challenge acts or omissions of public authorities or private persons which
contravene environmental law).125
The Draft Global Pact further recognizes the special situation and needs of
developing countries, particularly the least developed and those that are most
environmentally vulnerable, and mandates that they be given special attention.126
It also reflects the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities (CBDR-RC).127
However, during the third and last session of the Working Group in May 2019, the
states recommended that a simple political declaration (instead of a legally binding
treaty) be adopted, in the context of the 50th anniversary of the Stockholm
Conference. On 21 August 2019, the UNGA endorsed the recommendations of
the Working Group.128

F.

Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCSOR) is a
non-binding129 instrument adopted under the auspices of the United Nations
and endorsed by the General Assembly in December 2018.130 It provides a global
framework covering “international migration in all its dimensions.” 131
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Footnote 106, Art. 9.
Footnote 106, Art. 10.
Footnote 106, Art. 11.
Footnote 106, Art. 20, para. 1.
Footnote 106, Art. 20, para. 2.
General Assembly Resolution 73/333, Follow-up to the Report of the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working
Group Established Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 72/277, A/RES/73/333 (30 August 2019).
General Assembly Resolution 73/195, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,
A/RES/73/195 (19 December 2018). Annex, para. 7.
The countries that voted against the General Assembly resolution adopting the Global Compact
for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration are the Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland, and the
United States.
Footnote 129, Annex, Chapeau.
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At the outset, the GCSOR clarifies that migrants and refugees are distinct
groups governed by separate legal frameworks.132 While refugees and migrants
are entitled to the same universal human rights and fundamental freedoms,
only refugees are entitled to the specific international protection as defined by
international refugee law (footnote 132).
The GCSOR does not distinguish between “legal” and “illegal” migration. Instead,
it makes a distinction between “regular” and “irregular” migration, but does not
explicitly define either. Irregular migration is associated with several factors,
such as desperation and deteriorating environments that compel migrants to
seek a livelihood in countries other than their own;133 smuggling of migrants; 134
exploitation by human trafficking networks to recruit and victimize smuggled
or irregular migrants; 135 and geographic areas beset with consistent impacts of
structural factors (such as poverty, unemployment, climate change and disasters,
inequality, corruption, and poor governance).136 Within their jurisdiction, states
may distinguish between regular and irregular migration status, and have the
sovereign right to determine their national migration policy.137
The GCSOR’s cooperative framework is comprised of 23 objectives for safe,
orderly and regular migration (Box 3.4).
The GCSOR states that it rests, among other things, on the UNFCCC, the Paris
Agreement, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the Addis Ababa
Action Agenda, and the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction.138 It mentions
climate change mitigation and adaptation in the context of human rights and the
fulfillment of the SDGs (i.e., eliminating the adverse drivers and structural factors
that compel people to leave their country of origin).139
States are thus enjoined to strengthen joint analysis and sharing of information to
better map, understand, predict, and address migration movements, such as those
that may result from sudden- and slow-onset natural disasters, the adverse effects of
climate change, and environmental degradation (footnote 139). They are also urged
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Footnote 129, Annex, para. 4.
Footnote 129, Annex, para. 18.
Footnote 129, Annex, paras. 16 and 25.
Footnote 129, Annex, paras. 16 and 26.
Footnote 129, Annex, para. 39.
Footnote 129, Annex, para. 15.
Footnote 129, Annex, para. 2.
Footnote 129, Annex, para. 18. Subparagraph (b) states other drivers and factors: “Invest
in programmes that accelerate States’ fulfilment of the Sustainable Development Goals
with the aim of eliminating the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to
leave their country of origin, including through poverty eradication, food security, health and
sanitation, education, inclusive economic growth, infrastructure, urban and rural development,
employment creation, decent work, gender equality and empowerment of women and girls,
resilience and disaster risk reduction, climate change mitigation and adaptation, addressing the
socioeconomic effects of all forms of violence, non-discrimination, the rule of law and good
governance, access to justice and protection of human rights, as well as creating and maintaining
peaceful and inclusive societies with effective, accountable and transparent institutions[.]”
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Box 3.4: Objectives for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Collect and utilize accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies.
Minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country
of origin.
Provide accurate and timely information at all stages of migration.
Ensure that all migrants have proof of legal identity and adequate documentation.
Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration.
Facilitate fair and ethical recruitment and safeguard conditions that ensure decent work.
Address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration.
Save lives and establish coordinated international efforts on missing migrants.
Strengthen the transnational response to smuggling of migrants.
Prevent, combat and eradicate trafficking in persons in the context of international migration.
Manage borders in an integrated, secure and coordinated manner.
Strengthen certainty and predictability in migration procedures for appropriate screening,
assessment and referral.
Use migration detention only as a measure of last resort and work towards alternatives.
Enhance consular protection, assistance and cooperation throughout the migration cycle.
Provide access to basic services for migrants.
Empower migrants and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion.
Eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape
perceptions of migration.
Invest in skills development and facilitate mutual recognition of skills, qualifications and competences.
Create conditions for migrants and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development in
all countries.
Promote faster, safer and cheaper transfer of remittances and foster financial inclusion of migrants.
Cooperate in facilitating safe and dignified return and readmission, as well as sustainable reintegration.
Establish mechanisms for the portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits.
Strengthen international cooperation and global partnerships for safe, orderly and regular migration.

Source: General Assembly Resolution 73/195, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, A/RES/73/195
(19 December 2018). Annex, para. 16.

to develop adaptation and resilience strategies, taking into account the potential
implications for migration, while recognizing that adaptation in the country of origin is
a priority (footnote 139). Displacement considerations must be integrated in disaster
preparedness strategies (footnote 139). Approaches to address the challenges of
migration movements in the context of sudden- and slow-onset natural disasters
must be coherent and informed by relevant recommendations from state-led
consultative processes (such as the Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border
Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change) (footnote 139).

G. Global Compact on Refugees
The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) seeks to provide predictable and
equitable burden- and responsibility-sharing for hosting and supporting
the world’s refugees among United Nations member states and relevant
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The principle of non-refoulement forms an essential protection
under international human rights, refugee, humanitarian and
customary law. It prohibits States from transferring or removing
individuals from their jurisdiction or effective control when there
are substantial grounds for believing that the person would be at
risk of irreparable harm upon return, including persecution, torture,
ill treatment or other serious human rights violations. Under
international human rights law, the prohibition of refoulement is
explicitly included in the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)
and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons
from Enforced Disappearance (ICPPED). In regional instruments,
the principle is explicitly found in the Inter-American Convention
on the Prevention of Torture, the American Convention on Human
Rights, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union. International human rights bodies, regional human rights
courts, as well as national courts have guided that this principle
is an implicit guarantee flowing from the obligations to respect,
protect and fulfil human rights. Human rights treaty bodies
regularly receive individual petitions concerning non-refoulement,
including the Committee Against Torture, the Human Rights
Committee, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women and the Committee on the Rights of the Child.
The prohibition of refoulement under international human rights
law applies to any form of removal or transfer of persons, regardless
of their status, where there are substantial grounds for believing
that the returnee would be at risk of irreparable harm upon return
on account of torture, ill-treatment or other serious breaches of
human rights obligations. As an inherent element of the prohibition
of torture and other forms of ill-treatment, the principle of
non-refoulement is characterised by its absolute nature without
any exception. In this respect, the scope of this principle under
relevant human rights law treaties is broader than that contained
in international refugee law. The prohibition applies to all persons,
irrespective of their citizenship, nationality, statelessness, or
migration status, and it applies wherever a State exercises jurisdiction
or effective control, even when outside of that State’s territory.
Source: United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Principle of
Non‑Refoulement under International Human Rights Law. p. 1.
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stakeholders.140 It is grounded in the international refugee protection regime and
centered on the cardinal principle of “non-refoulement.” 141
The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol lie
at the core of the GCR (footnote 141). It is also guided by relevant international
human rights instruments, international humanitarian law, and other international
instruments, as applicable.142
The GCR aims to (i) ease pressures on host countries, (ii) enhance refugee selfreliance, (iii) expand access to third country solutions, and (iv) support conditions
in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity.143 It is composed of
• the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework, previously adopted
by the UNGA as Annex I of the New York Declaration for Refugees and
Migrants; 144
• a Program of Action which stipulates (i) arrangements for burden- and
responsibility-sharing (including the quadrennial Global Refugee Forum
at the international level; national arrangements for host countries at
the domestic level; funding and use of resources; partnerships; and
securing reliable, comparable, and timely data); and (ii) areas in need of
support, such as reception and admission, meeting needs and supporting
communities (e.g., education, health, jobs and livelihood, and food
security), and solutions (e.g., support for countries of origin and voluntary
repatriation, resettlement, complementary pathways for admission to third
countries, and local integration); and
• arrangements for follow-up and review.
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144

United Nations, General Assembly, Global Compact on Refugees: Report of the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (Part II), A/73/12 (Part II) (13 September 2018). paras. 1 and 3.
Footnote 140, para. 5.
Footnote 141. Para. 5 enumerates “relevant international human rights instruments” as including,
but not limited to, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (which inter alia enshrines
the right to seek asylum in its Art. 14); the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action; the
Convention on the Rights of the Child; the Convention against Torture; the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women; and the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Para. 5 examples of “other international
instruments as applicable” are the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime; and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants
by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime.
Footnote 140, para. 7.
Footnote 140, para. 10. See General Assembly Resolution No. 71/1, New York Declaration for
Refugees and Migrants, A/RES/71/1 (19 September 2016).
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The GCR refers to climate, environmental degradation, and natural disasters as
not in themselves causes of refugee movements.145 However, they are factors
that increasingly interact with the drivers of refugee movements (footnote 145).
Significantly, the GCR does not recognize “climate refugees,” but does state that
in certain situations, external forced displacement may result from sudden-onset
natural disasters and environmental degradation.146
In certain situations, host countries may request support from the international
community to address the accommodation and environmental impacts of
large numbers of refugees.147 Environmental impact assessments and national
sustainable development projects, among others, will be actively supported.148
The GCR is not legally binding, but it represents the political will and ambition
of the international community as a whole for strengthened cooperation and
solidarity with refugees and affected host countries.149 The General Assembly
affirmed the GCR on 17 December 2018.150
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Footnote 140, para. 8.
Footnote 140, para. 12.
Footnote 140, para. 78.
Footnote 140, para. 79.
Footnote 140, para. 4.
General Assembly Resolution 73/151, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,
A/RES/73/151 (17 December 2018).
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Agriculture and food security. Farmers harvest wheat crop
in Punjab, Pakistan. Climate change threatens crop yields
due to temperature increases and increased rainfall. Reduced
crop yields undermine availability of and access to food, and
adversely affect nutritional value (photo by Sara Farid/ADB).

PART FOUR

REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
AND CLIMATE CHANGE
INSTRUMENTS
I. South Asia
A. 2007 Malé Declaration on the Human Dimension of
Global Climate Change
The Malé Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change is the
outcome document of the Small Island States Conference, convened in Maldives
in November 2007.1 The Malé Declaration characterizes climate change as having
clear and immediate implications on the full enjoyment of human rights, including
the right to life, the right to take part in cultural life, the right to use and enjoy
property, the right to an adequate standard of living, the right to food, and the
right to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.2
The Malé Declaration requested the Conference of the Parties (COP) of the
United Nations Frameworks Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to
seek the cooperation of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights and the United Nations Human Rights Council in assessing
the human rights implications of climate change.3 It also requested the Office of
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to conduct a detailed
study on the effects of climate change on the full enjoyment of human rights, to
be submitted to the Human Rights Council.4
The Malé Declaration was presented during the Thirteenth COP to the UNFCCC
(COP 13) in Bali, Indonesia.

1

2
3
4

Malé Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change, Malé, Maldives,
14 November 2007.
Footnote 1, Preamble, subpara. 4.
Footnote 1, para. 3.
Footnote 1, para. 4.
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B. 2010 SAARC Convention on Cooperation
on Environment
The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)5 Convention
on Cooperation on Environment seeks to promote closer cooperation among the
states parties for the protection, preservation, management, and enhancement of
the environment, in the context of intergenerational responsibility.6 Cooperation
consists of exchange of best practices and knowledge, capacity building, and
transfer of eco-friendly technology.7 The scope of the convention covers
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

afforestation and reforestation,
air quality management,
biological diversity,
climate change,
coastal zone management,
coral reef management,
ecosystem management for sustainable livelihoods,
global environmental issues,
land degradation and desertification,
mountain ecosystem glaciers and glacial lake including high altitude
hydrological monitoring,
river ecosystem including river cleaning,
seawater and freshwater quality management,
strengthening disaster management capabilities,
waste management,
wildlife conservation and combating illegal trade in wildlife and bio-resources,
water management and conservation,
environmental impact assessment studies,
soil erosion and sedimentation, and
role and/or impact of human activity (footnote 7).

A governing council comprising of environmental ministers from member states
implements the convention.8 All eight member states ratified the convention,
which came into force on 23 October 2013.9

5

6

7
8
9

SAARC is composed of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the People's Republic of
Bangladesh, the Kingdom of Bhutan, the Republic of lndia, the Republic of Maldives, Nepal,
the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.
SAARC Convention on Cooperation on Environment, Thimphu, Bhutan, 29 April 2010. Preamble
and Art. 1. The relevant section of the Preamble states, “Taking into consideration the deep
concerns of the Member States on the unabated degradation of the environment and the
adverse impacts of climate change in the region and their shared interest in its conservation for
the well being of present and future generations.”
Footnote 6, Art. 2.
Footnote 6, Art. 5.
SAARC. Areas of Cooperation: Environment, Natural Disasters and Biotechnology.
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II. Southeast Asia
A. 2002 Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)10 Agreement on
Transboundary Haze Pollution (the Haze Agreement) is a legally binding treaty
that seeks to prevent, monitor, and mitigate transboundary haze pollution as a
result of land and/or forest fires.11 The parties are to engage in concerted national
efforts and international cooperation, and are required to
• cooperate in developing and implementing measures to prevent, monitor,
and mitigate transboundary haze pollution, and to control sources of fires—
including identification of fires; development of monitoring, assessment,
and early warning systems; exchange of information and technology; and
provision of mutual assistance;
• when the transboundary haze pollution originates from within their territories,
respond promptly to a request for relevant information sought by the state(s)
that are or may be affected by such transboundary haze pollution, with a view
to minimizing the consequence of the transboundary haze pollution; and
• take legal, administrative and/or other measures to implement their
obligations under the agreement.12
The Haze Agreement was adopted in June 2002 and entered into force on
25 November 2003.13 All ASEAN members have ratified the Haze Agreement.14

B. 2007 ASEAN Declaration on
Environmental Sustainability
The ASEAN Declaration on Environmental Sustainability is a soft law instrument
that undertakes to protect the environment, respond to climate change, and
conserve natural resources in the region.15 Leaders of ASEAN member states
adopted the declaration on 20 November 2007 in Singapore.
It envisions an ASEAN Community that is economically vibrant and
environmentally friendly, so that the present and future generations can enjoy
a clean and sustainable environment.16 At the same time, it acknowledges
10

11
12
13

14
15
16

ASEAN is composed of Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao People’s Democratic
Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Viet Nam.
ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, Kuala Lumpur, 10 June 2002. Art. 2.
Footnote 11, Art. 4.
ASEAN Haze Action Online. ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution
(Information Page).
ASEAN Haze Action Online. Status of Ratification.
ASEAN Declaration on Environmental Sustainability, Singapore, 20 November 2007.
Footnote 15, Preamble.
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that ASEAN member states are at different stages of economic development
(footnote 16). They thus require different levels of resources to effectively
address environmental issues without compromising competitiveness or social and
economic development (footnote 16).
The declaration’s environment protection plan references international and
regional cooperation to combat transboundary environmental pollution,
including haze pollution.17 This approach requires building capacity, enhancing
public awareness, strengthening law enforcement, promoting environmentally
sustainable practices, and combating illegal logging and its associated illegal trade
(footnote 17).
The declaration also promotes the sustainable management and use of soil,
forest, coastal, and marine environments as part of regional and global efforts
on biodiversity conservation, as these measures contribute toward mitigating
the effects of climate change and environmental degradation.18 It emphasizes,
in particular, sustainable forest management and development (afforestation,
reforestation, reduction in deforestation, forest degradation, and forest fires).19 The
declaration states an aspirational goal of significantly increasing the cumulative
forest cover in the ASEAN region by at least 10 million hectares by 2020.20
The climate change measures include improving energy efficiency21 and promoting
the use of renewable and alternative energy sources (such as solar, hydro, wind,
and geothermal energy).22 However, the declaration acknowledges that fossil
fuels will continue to be part of the energy landscape in the region (footnote 16).
It thus seeks to intensify cooperation on the joint research, development, and
deployment of low emission technologies for the cleaner use of fossil fuels,
recognizing that fossil fuels will still play a “major role in [the] energy mix.” 23

C. 2007 Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy,
and the Environment
The 2007 Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy, and the
Environment is the outcome document of the Third East Asia Summit (EAS),

17
18
19

20
21
22
23

Footnote 15, para. 6.
Footnote 15, para. 8.
Footnote 15, Preamble states, “Recognising the importance of sustainable forest management in
ASEAN, which will contribute significantly to the international efforts to promote environmental
sustainability, and to mitigate the effects of climate change as well as transboundary
environmental pollution…” Para. 10 states, “To call upon the international community to
participate in and contribute to afforestation and reforestation, and to reduce deforestation,
forest degradation, and forest fires, including by promoting sustainable forest management and
development, and combating illegal logging…”
Footnote 15, para. 28.
Footnote 15, para. 18.
Footnote 15, para. 17.
Footnote 15, para. 16.
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held on 21 November 2007 in Singapore.24 ASEAN member states as well as
Australia, the People’s Republic of China, India, Japan, New Zealand, and the
Republic of Korea attended the Summit.
The Singapore Declaration reaffirms the interrelatedness of the challenges of
climate change, energy security, and other environmental and health issues.25
It also emphasizes that adaptation is a critical issue for the region—emphasis
thus has to be on both mitigation and adaptation measures.26 These measures
include mobilization of financial support and cooperation to build capacity in EAS
developing countries; deployment of clean technology; scientific and technical
cooperation; promotion of sustainable patterns of consumption and production;
and sustainable planning and management of the region’s forests.27
However, the Singapore Declaration echoes the ASEAN Declaration on
Environmental Sustainability on the issue of fossil fuels. It acknowledges that
EAS participating countries are at different stages of economic development,
and in many cases are heavily dependent on fossil fuels (footnote 25). Thus,
actions to tackle global environmental issues should take into account diverse
national and regional circumstances in accordance with the principle of common
but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBRD-RC)
(footnote 25). While the Singapore Declaration urges intensified cooperation
on the use of renewable and alternative sources of energy, it also seeks the
development of “cleaner fossil fuel technologies including clean use of coal.” 28

D. 2012 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration
The ASEAN member states adopted the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration
on 18 November 2012 in Phnom Penh, Cambodia.29 It specifically affirms the
“universal, indivisible, interdependent and interrelated” human rights set forth in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),30 and categorizes them into
(i) civil and political rights; and (ii) economic, social, and cultural rights:



24

25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33

Civil and political rights include the right to life;31 the right to personal
liberty and security;32 the right to be free from servitude or slavery; 33 the
right not to be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading

2007 Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment, Singapore,
21 November 2007.
Footnote 24, Preamble.
Footnote 24, para. 4.
Footnote 24, paras. 7 and 9.
Footnote 24, para. 8(d).
ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, Phnom Penh, 18 November 2012.
Footnote 29, Preamble, paras. 7 and 26.
Footnote 29, para. 11.
Footnote 29, para. 12.
Footnote 29, para. 13.
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treatment; 34 the right to freedom of movement and residence; 35 the right
to seek and receive asylum; 36 the right to be free from arbitrary deprivation
of property; 37 the right to a nationality; 38 the right to marry and found a
family; 39 the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty of a criminal
offense; 40 the right to privacy; 41 the right to freedom of religion; 42 the right
to freedom of expression; 43 the right to freedom of peaceful assembly;44 and
the right to participate and vote.45



Economic, social, and cultural rights include the right to work in just,
decent and favorable conditions; 46 the right to an adequate standard
of living; 47 the right to enjoy the highest attainable standard of physical,
mental and reproductive health; 48 the right to social security; 49 the right
to education; 50 and the right, individually or in association with others, to
freely take part in cultural life.51

Notably, the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration substantively went beyond the
UDHR in several respects. The right to an adequate standard of living under the
ASEAN Declaration specifically includes the “right to safe drinking water and
sanitation” and “the right to a safe, clean and sustainable environment,” neither
of which were expressly stated in the UDHR.52 Similarly, the provision on the right
to health in the ASEAN Declaration requires member states to create a positive
environment in overcoming stigma, silence, denial, and discrimination in the
prevention, treatment, care, and support of people suffering from communicable
diseases, including HIV/AIDS.53
The ASEAN Declaration also identifies a right to development, which is
characterized as an “inalienable human right by which every human person…
is entitled to participate in, contribute to, enjoy, and benefit equitably and
sustainably from economic, social, cultural and political development.” 54 The right

34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54

Footnote 29, para. 14.
Footnote 29, para. 15.
Footnote 29, para. 16.
Footnote 29, para. 17.
Footnote 29, para. 18.
Footnote 29, para. 19.
Footnote 29, para. 20.
Footnote 29, para. 21.
Footnote 29, para. 22.
Footnote 29, para. 23.
Footnote 29, para. 24.
Footnote 29, para. 25.
Footnote 29, para. 27.
Footnote 29, para. 28.
Footnote 29, para. 29.
Footnote 29, para. 30.
Footnote 29, para. 31.
Footnote 29, para. 32.
Footnote 29, para. 28(e) and (f).
Footnote 29, para. 29(2).
Footnote 29, paras. 35 to 37.
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to development should be fulfilled to equitably meet the developmental and
environmental needs of present and future generations.55 Lastly, the ASEAN
Declaration recognizes the right to enjoy peace within a framework of security
and stability, neutrality, and freedom.56
The ASEAN Declaration has nevertheless been criticized for including language
that suggests variable benchmarks for human rights (e.g., “…the realisation of
human rights must be considered in the regional and national context bearing in
mind different political, economic, legal, social, cultural, historical and religious
backgrounds”).57

E.

2012 Action Plan on Joint Response to Climate Change

The Action Plan on Joint Response to Climate Change seeks to implement the
ASEAN Leaders’ Statement on Joint Response to Climate Change, which was
adopted on 9 April 2010 at the 16th ASEAN Summit.58 It consists of action
points on adaptation, mitigation, finance and investment, technology transfer,
and cooperation with other existing regional and subregional institutions and
initiatives. These action points include sharing of information and best practices on
(i)

research and development in hydrological and agricultural
management that aims to enhance food security, agricultural
productivity, and water resources sustainability; 59
(ii) adaptation efforts; 60
(iii) mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from energy production
and use, agriculture, LULUCF (including REDD/REDD+), industrial
processes, and waste; 61
(iv) strengthening science and policy interface toward low carbon
development and green economy; 62 and
(v) promoting, developing, and enhancing Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM) activities.63
The Action Plan also calls for enhancing existing ASEAN climate, meteorological,
and oceanographical centers and networks to assess climate change impacts and
strengthen regional climate data sharing.64 It further seeks a common understanding
on institutional arrangements for accessing multilateral funds (such as the Green
Climate Fund).65
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Footnote 29, para. 35.
Footnote 29, para. 38.
Footnote 29, para. 7.
ASEAN Action Plan on Joint Response to Climate Change, Phnom Penh, 18 October 2011. A.3 and A.4.
Footnote 58, C.1(i).
Footnote 58, C.1(ii).
Footnote 58, C.2(i).
Footnote 58, C.4(ii).
Footnote 58, C.2(iii).
Footnote 58, C.1(iii).
Footnote 58, C.3(i).
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The Action Plan was endorsed in principle during the 13th Informal ASEAN
Ministerial Meeting on the Environment on 18 October 2011 in Phnom Penh,
Cambodia.66 It is implemented by the ASEAN Working Group on Climate Change.67

F.

ASEAN Sociocultural Community Blueprint 2025

The ASEAN Sociocultural Community Blueprint (ASCC) 2025 is a strategy
and planning mechanism that features complementarities between the
region’s goals and the SDGs.68 It recognizes that a number of ASEAN member
states remain vulnerable to natural and human-induced disasters, which
tend to disproportionately and adversely affect the poor.69 Pollution, resource
degradation, and the fact that the ASEAN region is at the forefront of the adverse
impacts of climate change also present serious challenges (footnote 69).
The ASCC 2025 vision is an ASEAN community that engages and benefits
the people, and is inclusive, sustainable, resilient, and dynamic.70 In terms of
environment and climate change, it aims to realize
• a sustainable community that promotes social development and
environmental protection through effective mechanisms to meet the
ASEAN people’s current and future needs; and
• a resilient community with enhanced capacity and capability to adapt and
respond to social and economic vulnerabilities, disasters, and climate change.71
The ASCC 2025 lays out strategic measures to accomplish these objectives. A
“sustainable climate” requires comprehensive and coherent responses to climate
change challenges, as well as strengthened human and institutional capacity in
implementing adaptation and mitigation measures, especially in vulnerable and
marginalized communities.72 Access to new and innovative financing mechanisms
to address climate change should be explored, including leveraging on the private
sector.73 Sectoral institutions and local governments should also build capacity in
conducting GHG inventory, vulnerability assessments, and adaptation needs.74
Climate change risk management and GHG emission reduction should be
mainstreamed in sectoral planning.75
In addition, a “resilient ASEAN” requires that initiatives on disaster risk reduction,
climate change adaptation and mitigation, humanitarian actions, and sustainable
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75

Footnote 58, Adoption.
Footnote 58, D.8.
ASEAN Secretariat. 2016. ASEAN Sociocultural Community Blueprint 2025. Jakarta.
Footnote 68, para. 3.
Footnote 68, para. 5.
Footnote 68, paras. 5.3 and 5.4.
Footnote 68, para. 16, (C)(3)(i) to (ii).
Footnote 68, para. 16, (C)(3)(iii).
Footnote 68, para. 16, (C)(3)(iv).
Footnote 68, para. 16, (C)(3)(vi).

REGIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AND CLIMATE CHANGE INSTRUMENTS

development be synergized.76 This approach includes considering indigenous and
traditional knowledge and practices in responding and adapting to the impacts of
climate change.77 It also covers promotion and utilization of renewable energy and
green technologies.78

III. The Pacific
A. 1986 Convention for the Protection of the Natural
Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region
and Related Protocols
The Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the
South Pacific Region (also known as the SPREP Convention or Noumea Convention)
obliges states parties to take all appropriate measures to prevent, reduce, and control
pollution from any source in the marine and coastal environment of the South Pacific
Region, and to ensure sound environmental management and development of natural
resources, using the best practicable means at their disposal and in accordance with
their capabilities.79 Articles 6 to 13 of the convention identify possible sources of
pollution and environmental damage, such as vessels, land-based sources, sea-bed
activities, airborne pollution, dumping, storage of toxic and hazardous wastes, testing
of nuclear devices, and mining and coastal erosion. The convention does not
apply to internal waters or archipelagic waters of the states parties.80
The obligation to prevent, reduce, and control pollution applies even in cases of
emergencies. To this end, the parties are obliged to develop individual and joint
contingency plans for responding to emergency incidents involving pollution or
the threat thereof.81 Parties are also obliged to conduct environmental impact
assessments and invite public comment thereon.82
The convention did not set up a detailed liability regime. Instead, it invites the
parties to cooperate in formulating and adopting appropriate rules and procedures
regarding liability and compensation for damage resulting from pollution.83
Parties to the Noumea Convention are Australia, the Cook Islands, the Federated
States of Micronesia, Fiji, France, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Papua

76
77
78
79

80
81
82
83

Footnote 68, para. 19, (D)(1)(iv).
Footnote 68, para. 19, (D)(3)(iii).
Footnote 68, para. 19, (D)(5)(ii).
Convention for the Protection of the Natural Resources and Environment of the South Pacific Region,
Noumea, New Caledonia, 24 November 1986. Art. 5.
Footnote 79, Art. 1(2).
Footnote 79, Art. 15(1).
Footnote 79, Art. 16.
Footnote 79, Art. 20.
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New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, and the United States.84 Palau, Tuvalu, and
the United Kingdom (for the Pitcairn Islands) have signed but not yet ratified it
(footnote 84). The Noumea Convention entered into force on 22 August 1990.
The convention has two protocols: the Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the
South Pacific Region by Dumping (Dumping Protocol),85 and the Protocol Concerning
Co-operation in Combating Pollution Emergencies in the South Pacific Region
(Emergencies Protocol).86 The Dumping Protocol is a regional agreement consistent
with both the main Noumea Convention and the global London Convention (1972).87
The Emergencies Protocol seeks national preparation and mutual cooperation and
assistance between states parties in responding effectively to pollution emergencies.88
Both the Dumping Protocol and the Emergencies Protocol entered into force on
22 August 1990, and have the same states parties as the Noumea Convention
(except for Australia which is not a party to the Dumping Protocol) (footnote 84).
Three subsequent Protocols—the Oil Pollution Protocol, the Hazardous
and Noxious Substances Pollution Protocol, and the Dumping Protocol
Amendment—are not yet in force.

B. 2006 Pacific Islands Framework for Action on
Climate Change 2006–2015
The Pacific Islands Framework for Action on Climate Change 2006–2015
addresses climate change issues in all Pacific Island Countries and Territories
(PICTs), including American Samoa, the Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia,
Guam, Kiribati, the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas, the Marshall
Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Palau,
Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu,
and Wallis and Futuna.89 It consists of six themes, implemented through 2015 at
the national and regional levels:
(i)

84

85

86

87
88
89

90

Implementing tangible, on-ground adaptation measures. Best
practice adaptation and risk reduction measures aim to enhance
resilience to the adverse effects of climate change.90 These measures
should target priority development sectors, and be guided by policies
and strategies that integrate with broader national planning processes

Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme. Status as at July 2017 of the Apia,
Noumea (or SPREP) and Waigani Conventions, for which SPREP is the Secretariat.
Protocol for the Prevention of Pollution of the South Pacific Region by Dumping, Noumea, New Caledonia,
25 November 1986.
Protocol Concerning Co-operation in Combating Pollution Emergencies in the South Pacific Region,
Noumea, New Caledonia, 25 November 1986.
Footnote 85, Preamble.
Footnote 86, Preamble and Art. 3.
Secretariat of the Pacific Regional Environment Programme. 2011. Pacific Islands Framework for
Action on Climate Change 2006–2015. 2nd ed. Apia, Samoa. p. 8.
Footnote 89, p. 14
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(footnote 90). The framework also seeks improved access to, and
management and dissemination of, equitable amounts of climate
change financing at regional, national, and community levels.91
(ii)

Governance and decision-making. This theme covers strengthened
national and regional climate change governance mechanisms
(i.e., policy and institutional frameworks); enhanced cross sectoral and
multi-disciplinary coordination, collaboration, and decision-making
around climate change; and enhanced integration of climate change
risks into development decision-making process and assessment
cycles, sectoral planning, and management at all levels.92

(iii) Improving understanding of climate change. This theme
acknowledges that better understanding of climate change, variability,
and extreme events is needed to inform responses at the community,
national, and regional levels.93 This means understanding existing
observations, improving the quality and quantity of relevant data,
improving access to data and information, undertaking analysis to
understand key climate processes, and translating climate change
science into applicable information products and tools to inform
decision makers (footnote 93).
(iv) Education, training, and awareness. Increased awareness and
understanding of climate change issues among communities and
other stakeholders is critical in developing and implementing effective
responses to climate change challenges.94 This theme thus seeks
strengthened capacity to (i) monitor and assess environmental, social,
and economic risks and impacts of climate change, and (ii) identify,
design, and implement effective adaptation and mitigation measures
that integrate economic, scientific, and traditional knowledge.95
(v)

Mitigation of global GHG emissions. The framework recognizes
that PICTs’ contributions to the total global emission of GHGs are
insignificant compared with those of the rest of the international
community.96 Nonetheless, PICTs intend to contribute to the global
effort to reduce emissions by promoting cost-effective mitigation
measures, including increased energy efficiency, increased use of
appropriate low carbon and renewable energy technologies, enhanced
ability to engage in carbon market mechanisms including REDD+, and
development and implementation of CDM initiatives.97

(vi) Partnerships and cooperation. The framework advocates effective,
coordinated, and harmonized organizational arrangements between

91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Footnote 89, p. 15.
Footnote 89, pp. 16–17.
Footnote 89, p. 18.
Footnote 89, p. 21.
Footnote 89, p. 22.
Footnote 89, p. 23.
Footnote 89, pp. 23-24.
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government agencies, the private sector, civil society, the community,
and other stakeholders (such as relevant international partnerships).98
Active participation in global, regional, and multilateral programs and
forums, such as climate change negotiation meetings, is encouraged
(footnote 98).

C. 2016 Framework for the Resilient Development of
the Pacific
The Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific: An Integrated Approach
to Address Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management (2017–2030) is
a regional, non-political policy document that “provides high-level strategic
guidance to different stakeholder groups on how to enhance resilience to climate
change and disasters, in ways that contribute to, and are embedded in sustainable
development.” 99 It identifies three interrelated goals:
• strengthened integrated adaptation and risk reduction to enhance
resilience to climate change and disasters;
• low carbon development (with the greatest opportunities for reducing
GHG emissions in electricity generation and the transport and industrial
sectors);100 and
• strengthened disaster preparedness, response, and recovery.
All three goals are underpinned by the “All-Stakeholder Approach” (involving
all stakeholders from different sectors, organization types, and governance
levels).101 As such, the goals delineate a non-exhaustive list of priority actions to
be undertaken by national and subnational governments and administrations,
civil society and local communities, the private sector, regional organizations, and
other development partners.

D. 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security
The 2018 Boe Declaration on Regional Security recognizes an “expanded concept
of security,” which includes human security, humanitarian assistance, prioritizing
environmental and resource security, transnational crime, and cybersecurity.102 It
reaffirms that climate change remains the single greatest threat to the livelihoods,
security, and well-being of the people of the Pacific.103 Pacific states are therefore
committed to the implementation of the Paris Agreement (footnote 103).
98
99

100
101
102
103

Footnote 89, pp. 25-26.
Pacific Community (SPC) et al. 2016. Framework for Resilient Development in the Pacific: An
Integrated Approach to Address Climate Change and Disaster Risk Management (FRDP) 2017-2030.
Suva, Fiji. p. 2.
Footnote 99, p. 18.
Footnote 99, p. 8.
Boe Declaration on Regional Security, Yaren, Nauru, 5 September 2018. Preamble and para. 7.
Footnote 102, para. 1.
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In addition, Pacific states agreed to strengthen their respective national security
approaches because national security impacts on regional security.104 They also
agreed to strengthen the existing regional security architecture (inclusive of
regional law enforcement secretariats and regional organizations) to
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

104
105

account for the expanded concept of security;
identify and address emerging security challenges;
improve coordination among existing security mechanisms;
facilitate open dialogue and strengthened information sharing;
further develop early warning mechanisms;
support implementation;
promote regional security analysis, assessment, and advice; and
engage and cooperate, where appropriate, with international organizations,
partners, and other relevant stakeholders.105

Footnote 102, para. 8.
Footnote 102, para. 9.
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Renewable energy. Solar panels gather sun power
and turbines harvest wind power at the Burgos Wind
and Solar Farm in Ilocos Norte, Philippines. Shifting
to renewable energy from carbon-intensive energy
sources is a key mitigation strategy
(photo by Al Benavente/ADB).

PART FIVE

RIGHTS-BASED
INSTRUMENTS
I. Hard Law
A. 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention)
establishes the legal framework for treatment of refugees (i.e., a person who
is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a wellfounded fear of being persecuted because of his or her race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group, or political opinion; and is unable or
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or to return
there, for fear of persecution).1
The Refugee Convention lays out the rights to which refugees are entitled as a
minimum standard. These rights include protection of artistic rights and industrial
property,2 association in non-political and non-profit-making associations
and trade unions,3 access to the courts of law,4 engaging in wage-earning
employment,5 public education,6 freedom of movement,7 and issuance of identity
papers and travel documents.8
The core state obligation adopts the principle of non-refoulement, that is, states
parties are not permitted to expel or return (“refouler”) refugees in any manner
whatsoever to territories where their life or freedom would be threatened on
account of their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group,
or political opinion.9 This obligation is non-derogable and reservations are not
allowed.10

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva, 28 July 1951, United Nations Treaty Series,
Vol. 189, No. 2545, p. 137. Art. 1(A)(2).
Footnote 1, Art. 14.
Footnote 1, Art. 15.
Footnote 1, Art. 16.
Footnote 1, Art. 17.
Footnote 1, Art. 22.
Footnote 1, Art. 26.
Footnote 1, Arts. 27 and 28.
Footnote 1, Art. 33(1).
Footnote 1, Art. 42(1).
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Nonetheless, the principle of non-refoulement does not apply to a refugee who
(i) based on reasonable grounds, may be regarded as a danger to the security of the
country in which he or she is, or (ii) having been convicted by a final judgment of a
particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to the community of that country.
states parties are obliged to apply Refugee Convention provisions without
discrimination as to race, religion, or country of origin.11 They are also prohibited,
with a few exceptions, from penalizing refugees for their illegal entry or stay.12
The Refugee Convention does not apply to internally displaced persons (persons
who have been forced to flee their homes, but have not crossed international
borders).13 It also explicitly does not apply to any person who otherwise may
fall under the definition of refugee, but for whom there are serious reasons for
considering that he or she has committed a crime against peace, a war crime,
a crime against humanity, a serious non-political crime outside the country of
refuge prior to his or her admission to that country as a refugee, or acts contrary
to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.14 Lastly, the restrictive
definition of refugee under the convention suggests that “climate refugees”—
persons who are forced to flee their homes due to the effects of climate change,
such as sea level rise”—do not fall within the ambit of the convention.
The Refugee Convention entered into force on 22 April 1954. It had 146 states
parties as of October 2020.15
The 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, adopted by the Colloquium on the
International Protection of Refugees in Central America, Mexico, and Panama,
provides a more extensive definition of refugee.16 Its definition includes “persons
who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom have been
threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive
violation of human rights, or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed
public order.” 17 The inclusion of human rights and public order grounds opens
the possibility of categorizing “climate refugees” under the umbrella “refugee”
definition. Should courts, for instance, embrace an expanded concept of the
right to life or right to food security, there may be a colorable claim that “climate
refugees” suffer from massive violation of human rights.
Nonetheless, national court decisions around the world involving “climate
refugees” have not so far referred to the Cartagena Declaration. Its status as a soft
law instrument limited to the Latin American region, and the seeming reluctance
of courts to move beyond the convention definition of “refugee,” indicate that the
11
12
13
14
15

16
17

Footnote 1, Art. 3.
Footnote 1, Art. 31.
USA for UNHCR. Refugee Facts: What is a Refugee?
Footnote 1, Art. 1(F).
Including the Holy See. United Nations Treaty Collection. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (Information Page).
Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, 22 November 1984.
Footnote 16, III, para. 3.
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expanded Cartagena definition has not crossed over to customary law or general
principle of law status.

B. 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is a landmark
multilateral human rights treaty that identifies civil and political rights derived
from the inherent dignity of the human person.18 The ICCPR had 173 states
parties as of October 2020.19 It entered into force on 23 March 1976.
States parties are obliged to respect and ensure the civil and political rights of
all individuals within their territories or subject to their jurisdiction, without
distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status.20 These rights are
• the right to self-determination; 21
• the right to life; 22
• freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment; 23
• the right to not be enslaved; 24
• the right to liberty and security of person; 25
• the right of detainees to be treated with humanity and with respect for the
inherent dignity of the human person; 26
• the right to not be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfill a
contractual obligation; 27
• freedom of movement; 28
• the right of aliens in regard to expulsion from the territory of a state party; 29
• the right to equality before courts and tribunals and the right to a fair trial; 30
• the right to not be found guilty of any criminal offense on account of any
act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offense at the time
when it was committed; 31
• the right to recognition as a person before the law; 32
18
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, New York, 16 December 1966, United Nations
Treaty Series, Vol. 999, No. 14668, p. 171. Preamble.
United Nations Treaty Collection. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Information Page).
Footnote 18, Art. 2(1).
Footnote 18, Art. 1.
Footnote 18, Art. 6.
Footnote 18, Art. 7.
Footnote 18, Art. 8.
Footnote 18, Art. 9.
Footnote 18, Art. 10.
Footnote 18, Art. 11.
Footnote 18, Art. 12.
Footnote 18, Art. 13.
Footnote 18, Art. 14.
Footnote 18, Art. 15.
Footnote 18, Art. 16.
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• freedom from arbitrary or unlawful interference; 33
• freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 34
• the right to hold opinions without interference and the right to freedom
of expression; 35
• the right to be free from any propaganda for war or advocacy of national,
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence; 36
• the right of peaceful assembly; 37
• freedom of association; 38
• the right to marry; 39
• the rights of children to protection, registration, have a name, and acquire
a nationality; 40
• the right to political participation; 41
• the right to equality before the law; 42 and
• the right of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities to their own culture,
religion, and language.43
Article 2(2) of the ICCPR requires states parties to take the necessary steps
to adopt such laws or other measures to give effect to these rights. In addition,
they are obliged to ensure that any person whose rights are violated shall have
an effective remedy before competent judicial, administrative, or legislative
authorities.44
The ICCPR characterizes a subset of these rights as non-derogable under any
circumstances, including the right to life and the right to be free from torture or
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.45 For other rights, states
parties may take measures derogating from their obligations under the ICCPR
in times of public emergencies which threaten the life of the nation and the
existence of which is officially proclaimed.46
The ICCPR right most commonly associated with climate change issues is the
right to life (Article 6). The adverse effects of climate change may in some
circumstances pose a risk to human life, including, for example, the existential
impact of sea level rise on small island developing states.
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Footnote 18, Art. 17.
Footnote 18, Art. 18.
Footnote 18, Art. 19.
Footnote 18, Art. 20.
Footnote 18, Art. 21.
Footnote 18, Art. 22.
Footnote 18, Art. 23.
Footnote 18, Art. 24.
Footnote 18, Art. 25.
Footnote 18, Art. 26.
Footnote 18, Art. 27.
Footnote 18, Art. 2(3).
Footnote 18, Art. 4(2).
Footnote 18, Art. 4(1).

RIGHTS-BASED INSTRUMENTS

The United Nations Human Rights Committee’s resolution of a communication
filed by a Kiribati citizen against New Zealand demonstrates the distinctions
between right to life cases and “traditional” refugee cases (Box 5.1). The committee’s
views indicate that “the obligation not to extradite, deport or otherwise transfer
pursuant to Article 6 of the ICCPR may be broader than the scope of the principle
of non-refoulement under international refugee law, since it may also require the
protection of aliens not entitled to refugee status.” 47

Box 5.1: Views Adopted by the Human Rights Committee on the Right to Life,
the Principle of Non-Refoulement, and “Climate Refugees”
(Communication submitted by Ioane Teitiota against New Zealand)
Ioane Teitiota claimed that he fled his home in Kiribati due to the effects of climate change and sea level rise.
He sought asylum in New Zealand, but the Immigration and Protection Tribunal denied his claim. The tribunal
examined his claim for protection separately under both the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(Refugee Convention) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). As to the first, it
stated that he was not a “refugee” as defined in the Refugee Convention because he did not objectively face a
real risk of being persecuted if returned to Kiribati.a As to the second, it ruled that the evidence Teitiota provided
did not establish that he faced a risk of an imminent, or likely, risk of arbitrary deprivation of life upon return to
Kiribati.b The Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court denied Teitiota’s appeals, although the Supreme Court
did not rule out the possibility that environmental degradation resulting from climate change or other natural
disasters could “create a pathway into the Refugee Convention or other protected person jurisdiction.” c
Teitiota was then deported back to Kiribati. Subsequently, he filed a communication with the Human
Rights Committee under the auspices of the ICCPR Optional Protocol alleging that, with his removal to
Kiribati, New Zealand violated his right to life.
The committee opined that states parties under the ICCPR are obliged not to extradite, deport, expel
or otherwise remove a person from their territory when there are substantial grounds for believing that
there is a real risk of irreparable harm to his or her right to life.d Significantly, the committee acknowledged
that environmental degradation, climate change, and unsustainable development constitute some of the
most pressing and serious threats to the ability of present and future generations to enjoy the right to life.e
Nonetheless, the risk must be personal. It cannot derive merely from the general conditions in the receiving
State (in this case, Kiribati), except in the most extreme cases.f In addition, there is a high threshold for
providing substantial grounds to establish that a real risk of irreparable harm exists (footnote f).
The committee was of the view that New Zealand did not violate Teitiota’s right to life when he was
removed to Kiribati. It noted that Teitiota appeared to accept that he was alleging not a risk of harm specific
to him, but rather a general risk faced by all individuals in Kiribati.g He also stated that he had never been
involved in a land or overcrowding dispute between different land claimants. As to his claim that he would
be seriously harmed by the lack of access to potable water in Kiribati, the committee noted the findings of
New Zealand authorities that there was no evidence thereof. While there may be some hardship caused by
water rationing, there was not sufficient information indicating that the supply of fresh water is inaccessible,
insufficient, or unsafe so as to produce a reasonably foreseeable threat of a health risk that would impair
Teitiota’s right to enjoy a life with dignity or cause his unnatural or premature death (footnote g).
continued on next page
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United Nations, Human Rights Committee, Views Adopted by the Committee under Article 5(4)
of the Optional Protocol, Concerning Communication No. 2728/2016, CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016
(24 October 2019). p. 9, para. 9.3.
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Box 5.1 continued

Teitiota also claimed that his right to life had been violated because he had been deprived of his means
of subsistence, as his crops had been destroyed due to salt deposits on the ground.h The committee
acknowledged that in certain places, the lack of alternatives to subsistence livelihoods may place
individuals at a heightened risk of vulnerability to the adverse effects of climate change (footnote h).
However, the information made available to the committee does not indicate that when Teitiota’s
removal occurred, there was a real and reasonably foreseeable risk that he would be exposed to a
situation of indigence, deprivation of food, and extreme precarity that could threaten his right to life,
including his right to a life with dignity (footnote h). While it was difficult to grow crops, it was not
impossible (footnote h). In fact, most nutritious crops remained available in Kiribati.
Finally, Teitiota claimed that he faces a risk to his right to life because of overpopulation and frequent
and increasingly intense flooding and breaches of seawalls.i The committee noted that both suddenonset events (such as intense storms and flooding) and slow-onset processes (such as sea level rise,
salinization, and land degradation) can propel cross-border movement of individuals seeking protection
from harms related to climate change.j Without robust national and international efforts, the effects of
climate change in receiving states may expose individuals to a violation of their rights under Article 6
(right to life) or Article 7 (freedom from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment)
of the ICCPR, thereby triggering the non-refoulement obligations of the sending states (footnote j).
Furthermore, given that the risk of an entire country becoming submerged under water is such an
extreme risk, the conditions of life in such a country may become incompatible with the right to life with
dignity before the risk is realized (footnote j).
In Teitiota’s case, the committee accepted his claim that sea level rise is likely to render Kiribati
uninhabitable. However, even if it were to accept the time frame of 10 to 15 years as suggested by Teitiota,
the committee opined that this timeframe could allow for intervening acts by Kiribati, with the assistance
of the international community, to take affirmative measures to protect and, where necessary, relocate
its population.k Kiribati was in fact taking adaptive measures to reduce existing vulnerabilities and build
resilience to harms related to climate change (footnote k).
The committee was thus unable to hold that the assessment conducted by New Zealand authorities
was arbitrary, erroneous, or amounted to a denial of justice. Nonetheless, this conclusion was without
prejudice to the continuing responsibility of New Zealand to take into account, in future deportation
cases, the situation at the time in Kiribati and new and updated data on the effects of climate change and
rising sea levels.l
United Nations, Human Rights Committee, Views Adopted by the Committee under Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol, Concerning
Communication No. 2728/2016, CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 (24 October 2019). para. 2.8.
b
Footnote a, para. 9.6.
c
Footnote a, para. 2.10 (quoted from the Supreme Court decision).
d
Footnote a, para. 9.3.
e
Footnote a, para. 9.4.
f
Footnote d. N.B. Para. 9.7 gives examples of “extreme cases” in relation to a general situation of violence in the receiving state
(e.g., where there is a real risk of harm simply by virtue of an individual being exposed to such violence upon return, or where the
individual in question is in a particularly vulnerable situation).
g
Footnote a, para. 9.7.
h
Footnote a, para. 9.9.
i Footnote a, para. 9.10.
j
Footnote a, para. 9.11.
k
Footnote a, para. 9.12.
l
Footnote a, para. 9.14.
a

Source: United Nations, Human Rights Committee, Views Adopted by the Committee under Article 5(4) of the Optional Protocol,
Concerning Communication No. 2728/2016, CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 (24 October 2019).
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C. 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) is
a landmark multilateral human rights treaty that identifies economic, social, and
cultural rights derived from the inherent dignity of the human person.48 The ICESCR
had 171 states parties as of October 2020.49 It entered into force on 3 January 1976.
Article 1 of the ICESCR defines the right to self-determination, using identical language
as the ICCPR. By virtue of this right, people freely determine their political status
and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.50 They may, for
their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources; in no case may
they be deprived of their own means of subsistence.51 Other ICESCR rights include
• the right to work; 52
• the right to just and favorable conditions of work, including a decent living
and safe and healthy working conditions; 53
• the right to form and join trade unions; 54
• the right to social security; 55
• the right to family life, including paid maternal leave and the protection
of children; 56
• the right to an adequate standard of living, including the right to adequate
food, clothing, and housing; 57
• the right to health, specifically the highest attainable standard of physical
and mental health; 58
• the right to education; 59 and
• the right to take part in cultural life.60
Article 2 of the ICESCR establishes the concept of progressive realization. States
parties are obliged to take steps, to the maximum of their available resources,
toward achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in
the covenant. In doing so, they are to adopt all appropriate means, including
particularly the adoption of legislative measures.
48
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International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, New York, 16 December 1966,
United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 993, No. 14531, p. 3. Preamble.
United Nations Treaty Collection. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (Information Page).
Footnote 48, Art. 1(1).
Footnote 48, Art. 1(2).
Footnote 48, Art. 6.
Footnote 48, Art. 7.
Footnote 48, Art. 8.
Footnote 48, Art. 9.
Footnote 48, Art. 10.
Footnote 48, Art. 11.
Footnote 48, Art. 12.
Footnote 48, Arts. 13 and 14.
Footnote 48, Art. 15.

91

92

INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

The language of ICESCR’s Article 2 (“take steps,” “available resources,” “achieving
progressively”) is comparatively weaker than that of ICCPR’s Article 2 (an immediate
obligation “to respect and to ensure”). The Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights clarified that Article 2 of the ICESCR merely recognizes that, in
general, it is not possible to achieve, in a short period of time, the full realization
of all economic, social and cultural rights, especially in the context of resource
availability.61 Progressive realization is thus a necessary flexibility device that
generally disallows deliberately retrogressive measures (footnote 61). The minimum
core obligation of each state party is to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least,
the minimum essential levels of each ICESCR right.62
The adverse effects of climate change can impact several ICESCR rights:







61

62
63

64

The right to self-determination (Common Article 1 of both the ICCPR
and the ICESCR). The effects of climate change on small island developing
states are often described as existential, with rising sea levels foreseen to
completely submerge entire countries in a few decades.
The right to an adequate standard of living under Article 11. Food
insecurity (e.g., decreased agricultural productivity and crop yields)
undermines the “fundamental right to be free from hunger.” 63 This, in turn,
jeopardizes the realization of the right to food. Rising sea levels, extreme
weather events, drought, erosion, and flooding displace communities,
thereby impacting on the right to housing.
The right to health under Article 12. The World Health Organization
identified the health risks posed by climate change—increasingly intense
heat waves and fires; greater risk of food-, water- and vector-borne
diseases; greater likelihood of undernutrition; negative impacts on food
systems; lowered work capacity and productivity, especially in vulnerable
populations; and violent conflict associated with resource scarcity
and population movement.64 These health risks can worsen poverty
and exacerbate existing health inequalities both between and within
populations (footnote 64). In addition, the landmark treaties on climate
change reflect the close link between the right to health and climate
change. Article 4(1)(f) of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC) obliges states parties to take climate change
into account and employ appropriate methods to minimize its adverse

United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 3:
The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant), E/1991/23
(14 December 1990). para. 9.
Footnote 61, para. 10.
Footnote 57; and C. Mbow et al. 2019. Chapter 5: Food Security. In P.R. Shukla et al., eds. Climate
Change and Land: An IPCC Special Report on Climate Change, Desertification, Land Degradation,
Sustainable Land Management, Food Security, and Greenhouse Gas Fluxes in Terrestrial Ecosystems.
In press.
United Nations, General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Analytical Study on the Relationship
between Climate Change and the Human Right of Everyone to the Enjoyment of the Highest
Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health: Report of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, A/HRC/32/23 (6 May 2016). para. 6.
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effects on, among other things, public health. The Preamble of the Paris
Agreement states that, when taking action to address climate change, the
parties should respect, promote, and consider their respective obligations
on human rights and the right to health.
The right to education under Articles 13 and 14. Climate change effects,
such as decreased productivity and extreme weather events, can cause
children to be out-of-school and forced to work to augment family income.
State funds earmarked for education may also be diverted to respond to
immediate emergencies, such as disaster relief.

D. 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women (CEDAW) is an international convention that promotes equal rights for
men and women.65 It is frequently characterized as an international bill of rights
for women. CEDAW had 189 states parties as of October 2020.66 It entered into
force on 3 September 1981.
Discrimination against women is defined as “any distinction, exclusion or
restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing
or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of
their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights
and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any
other field.” 67 Temporary special measures aimed at accelerating de facto equality
between men and women are not considered discrimination.68
The rights enumerated under CEDAW cover
• women’s rights in the political and public life of the country, such as the right
to vote in all elections and public referenda; the right to be eligible for election
to all publicly elected bodies; the right to participate in the formulation of
government policy and the implementation thereof; the right to hold public
office; the opportunity to represent their governments at the international
level; and the right to acquire, change, or retain their nationality; 69
• economic and social rights of women in the fields of education,
employment, health and other areas of economic and social life, including
special protections for rural women; 70 and
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Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, New York,
18 December 1979, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1249, No. 20378, p. 13.
United Nations Treaty Collection. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (Information Page).
Footnote 65, Art. 1.
Footnote 65, Art. 4(1).
Footnote 65, Art. 7-9.
Footnote 65, Art. 10–14.
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• women’s personal and family rights, such as (i) the right of equality with
men before the law, including a legal capacity identical to that of men and
the same opportunities to exercise that capacity; and (ii) the same rights
as men relating to marriage and family relations, including the right to enter
into marriage, the right to freely choose a spouse and to enter into marriage
only with their free and full consent, the rights and responsibilities during
marriage and at its dissolution, the rights and responsibilities as parents,
and the right to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of
their children.71
General Comment No. 37 of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women specifically discusses gender-related dimensions of disaster risk
reduction in the context of climate change.72 Under Articles 2 and 24 of CEDAW,
states parties are obliged to take “all appropriate measures” including legislation,
in all fields, to guarantee the full development and advancement of women on the
basis of equality with men.73
General Comment No. 37 thus clarifies that states parties should ensure that all
policies, legislation, and activities related to disaster risk reduction and climate
change are gender responsive and based on human-rights based principles.74
These principles include substantive equality and non-discrimination,
participation and empowerment, and accountability and access to justice.75
Discrimination that relates to property, land, and natural resources—including
ownership, access, use, disposal, control, governance, and inheritance—should
be prioritized. So should barriers that impede women’s full legal capacity and
autonomy in areas such as freedom of movement and equal access to economic,
social, and cultural rights (including food, health, work, and social protection).76
Effective mechanisms to guarantee that the rights of women and girls are a
primary consideration in devising disaster risk reduction and climate change
measures at the domestic and global levels—local, national, regional, and
international—are necessary (footnote 76).
Furthermore, the guarantee of political equality under Articles 7, 8, and 14 of
CEDAW encompasses women’s leadership, representation, and participation.77
These are essential in developing and implementing effective disaster risk
reduction and climate change programs that consider the different needs of the
population, in particular women (footnote 77).
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Footnote 65, Art. 15–16.
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Comment No. 37
(2018) on the Gender-Related Dimensions of Disaster Risk Reduction in the Context of Climate
Change, CEDAW/C/GC/37 (13 March 2018).
Footnote 72, para. 28.
Footnote 72, paras. 26–27.
Footnote 72, para. 27.
Footnote 72, para. 31.
Footnote 72, para. 35.
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General Comment No. 37 notes that the Paris Agreement acknowledges the
factors that should inform climate change adaptation: the best available science
and, as appropriate, by traditional, indigenous and local knowledge systems.78
The local traditional knowledge held by women located in agricultural regions
is especially relevant. “These women are well positioned to observe changes in
the environment and to respond to these through different adaptive practices
in crop selection, planting, harvesting, land conservation techniques, and careful
management of water resources.” 79
In line with Article 15(1) of CEDAW, women should be accorded equality before
the law.80 This is of utmost importance in situations of disasters and climate
change. Women may encounter significant access to justice barriers, such as in
claiming compensation and other forms of reparation to mitigate their losses and
to adapt to climate change (footnote 80).
Box 5.2 summarizes other specific areas of concern discussed in General Comment
No. 37.

Box 5.2: Gender-Related Dimensions of Disaster Risk Reduction
in the Context of Climate Change
Women, girls, men, and boys are affected differently by climate change and disasters, with many women
and girls experiencing greater risks, burdens, and impacts.a Situations of crisis exacerbate pre-existing
gender inequalities and compound the intersecting forms of discrimination against, among others, women
living in poverty; indigenous women; women belonging to ethnic, racial, religious, and sexual minority
groups; women with disabilities; refugee and asylum-seeking women; internally displaced, stateless, and
migrant women; rural women; unmarried women; and adolescents and older women, who are often
disproportionately affected compared with men or other women (footnote a).
General Comment No. 37 highlights the nexus between women’s and girl’s rights recognized by the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and disaster risk reduction
and climate change. Specific areas of concern include the following:

 The right to live free from gender-based violence against women and girls. Situations of disaster



and the degradation and destruction of natural resources are factors that affect and exacerbate
gender-based violence against women and girls.b Sexual violence is common in humanitarian crises
and may become acute in the wake of a national disaster.c In a time of heightened stress, lawlessness,
and homelessness, women face an increased threat of violence (footnote c).
The right to education. Girls’ and women’s access to education is often already limited as a result
of social, cultural and economic barriers.d In the aftermath of disasters, they may face even greater
obstacles to participation in education due to the destruction of infrastructures, lack of teachers and
other resources, economic hardship, and security concerns (footnote d).
continued on next page
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Box 5.2 continued

 The rights to work and social protection. The burden of caretaking and domestic work often increases







a

b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
k
l

for women following disasters.e Gendered inequalities increase the vulnerability and mortality of
women and girls (footnote e). These inequalities also frequently leave them with less time to engage in
economic activities or to access important resources, including information and education, which are
necessary for recovery and adaptation (footnote e). Social and legal inequalities further restrict the ability
of women to move to safer, less disaster-prone areas and may limit women’s rights to access financial
services, credit, social security benefits, and secure tenure of land and other productive resources.f
The right to health. Health services and systems, including sexual and reproductive health services,
should be available, accessible, acceptable, and of good quality even in contexts of disasters.g Climate
change and disasters, including pandemics, influence the prevalence, distribution, and severity of new
and re-emerging diseases.h The susceptibility of women and girls to disease is heightened as a result of
inequalities in access to food, nutrition, and health care as well as social expectations that women will
act as primary caregivers for children, the elderly, and the sick (footnote h).
The right to an adequate standard of living. As a result of discriminatory laws and social norms, women
have limited access to secure land tenure and their farmlands tend to be of inferior quality and more
prone to flooding, erosion or other adverse climatic events.i Increasingly, due to male out-migration,
women are being left with responsibility for farming in climate change affected areas (footnote i).
However, they do not possess legal and socially recognized land ownership necessary for adapting to
changing climatic conditions (footnote i). This situation implicates (i) Articles 12 and 14 of CEDAW,
which contain specific guarantees on nutrition and women’s equal participation in decision-making
about food production and consumption, (ii) the state’s obligation to eliminate discrimination under
Article 2, (iii) the state’s obligation under Article 5(a) to modify cultural patterns of behavior based on
discriminatory stereotypes, (iv) the state’s obligation under Article 15 to ensure equality before the law,
and (v) the state’s obligation under Article 16 to guarantee equality within marriage and family relations.j
The right to freedom of movement. In several regions, climate change and disasters are
contributing to an increase in the feminization of migration (i.e., the migration of women on their
own into feminized sectors of work to support family members who no longer have local livelihood
opportunities.k At the same time, women who are left behind when male family members migrate may
also find themselves having to take on non-traditional economic and community leadership tasks
for which they have had little preparation or training.l This situation is of particular relevance when
disasters occur and women are responsible for coordinating mitigation, recovery, and adaptation
efforts without the assistance of male community members (footnote l).

Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Comment No. 37 (2018) on the Gender-Related
Dimensions of Disaster Risk Reduction in the Context of Climate Change, CEDAW/C/GC/37 (13 March 2018). para. 2.
Footnote a, para. 55.
Footnote a, para. 56.
Footnote a, para. 59.
Footnote a, para. 62.
Footnote a, para. 63.
Footnote a, para. 65.
Footnote a, para. 66.
Footnote a, para. 70.
Footnote a, para. 71.
Footnote a, para. 74.
Footnote a, para. 77.

Source: Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Comment No. 37 (2018) on the Gender-Related
Dimensions of Disaster Risk Reduction in the Context of Climate Change, CEDAW/C/GC/37 (13 March 2018).
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E.

1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child

The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is an
international human rights convention that enumerates the civil, political,
economic, social, health, and cultural rights of children.81 The CRC had 196 states
parties as of October 2020.82 It came into force on 2 September 1990.
The CRC is based on four guiding principles: the principle of equality and nondiscrimination; 83 the best interests of the child; 84 the right to life, survival and
development; 85 and respect for the views of the child in matters that affect him or her,
according to his or her age and maturity.86 “Child” is defined as every person below
the age of 18 years unless under domestic legislation, majority is attained earlier.87
The CRC establishes the basic minimum standards and rights to which children
are entitled, including
• the right to life (footnote 85);
• the right to a name, to acquire a nationality and, as far as possible, to know
and be cared for by his or her parents; 88
• the right to preserve his or her identity; 89
• the right to freedom of expression and access to information; 90
• the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; 91
• the right to freedom of association and to freedom of peaceful assembly; 92
• the right to privacy; 93
• the right to be protected from all forms of physical or mental violence, injury
or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or exploitation,
including sexual abuse; 94
• the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health; 95
• the right to an adequate standard of living; 96
• the right to education, including compulsory primary education; 97
81

82

83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97

Convention on the Rights of the Child, New York, 20 November 1989, United Nations Treaty Series,
Vol. 1577, No. 27531, p. 3.
Including the Holy See. United Nations Treaty Collection. Convention on the Rights of the Child
(Information Page).
Footnote 81, Art. 2.
Footnote 81, Art. 3.
Footnote 81, Art. 6.
Footnote 81, Art. 12.
Footnote 81, Art. 1.
Footnote 81, Art. 7.
Footnote 81, Art. 8.
Footnote 81, Arts. 13 and 17.
Footnote 81, Art. 14.
Footnote 81, Art. 15.
Footnote 81, Art. 16.
Footnote 81, Arts. 19 and 34.
Footnote 81, Art. 24.
Footnote 81, Art. 27.
Footnote 81, Arts. 28 and 29.
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• the right to rest and leisure; 98
• the right to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing
any work that is likely to be hazardous, harmful, or to interfere with the
child’s education; 99 and
• the right to be protected from torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment, including capital punishment and life
imprisonment without possibility of release. 100
In addition, a child belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, as well
as a child of indigenous origin, has the right to enjoy his or her own culture, to
profess and practice his or her own religion, or to use his or her own language.101
The CRC has been invoked in climate litigation, the most notable of which is the
petition filed by 16 children against Argentina, Brazil, France, Germany, and Turkey
before the Committee on the Rights of the Child, under the Optional Protocol
to the CRC on a Communications Procedure.102 The Optional Protocol had
46 parties as of May 2020.103 The petitioners could only include as respondents
states that are parties to the Optional Protocol. Box 5.3 briefly summarizes the
case brought by the petitioners against the five respondent states, itemizing the

Box 5.3: Chiara Sacchi et al. v. Argentina et al.

(Communication to the Committee on the Rights of the Child,
Submitted on 23 September 2019)
Sixteen children submitted a communication to the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC). The
petitioners claim that Argentina, Brazil, France, Germany, and Turkey (respondent states) breached their
human rights duties by causing and perpetuating the climate crisis, despite their decade-long knowledge
of the deadly and foreseeable consequences of climate change.a The respondent states, petitioners assert,
have all failed to (i) reduce their emissions at the “highest possible ambition,” and (ii) protect children
from the acts of the major carbon emitters.b
Petitioners thus allege that the respondent states violated and continue to violate the following rights:

 Right to life under Article 6 of the CRC. The petitioners invoke the precautionary principle and claim
that respondent states “[take] dangerous actions with uncertain but foreseeable fatal consequences
and accept the risks of those foreseeable consequences[.]” c This constitutes ‘depraved indifference,
reckless endangerment, or dolus eventualis’ sufficient to trigger an Article 6 violation (footnote c).

continued on next page
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99
100
101
102

103

Footnote 81, Art. 31.
Footnote 81, Art. 32.
Footnote 81, Art. 37.
Footnote 81, Art. 30.
Chiara Sacchi et al. v. Argentina et al. Communication to the Committee on the Rights of the
Child, submitted on 23 September 2019. The petition was submitted under Art. 5 of the Third
Optional Protocol to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
United Nations Treaty Collection. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on a Communications Procedure (Information Page).
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Box 5.3 continued

 Right to health under Article 24 of the CRC. The petitioners have suffered from various illnesses





under circumstances that were either brought about or exacerbated by climate change. For instance,
two of them have suffered asthma attacks because of wildfires and heat-related pollution.d Three of
the petitioners contracted vector-borne diseases (malaria, dengue, and chikungunya), whose spread
and intensification, they allege, were worsened by climate change (footnote d).
Right to culture under Article 30 of the CRC. Several of the petitioners are children of indigenous
origin. They allege that the respondents’ acts and omissions perpetuating the climate crisis have
already jeopardized thousands of years-old subsistence practices of indigenous people.e These
practices (e.g., subsistence hunting, fishing, and gathering [Akiak, Alaska]; reindeer herding [Sapmi,
Sweden]; and fishing and ancient cultural traditions [Marshall Islands]) are not just main source of
livelihoods, but directly relate to a specific way of being, seeing, and acting in the world, and form part
of their cultural identity (footnote e).
Right to have the children’s best interests a primary consideration in the respondent states’
climate actions under Article 3 of the CRC. The petitioners assert that by delaying decarbonization,
despite all scientific evidence, the respondents’ climate policies have under-valued children’s lives and
treated their present and future interests as lesser considerations.f

The petitioners do not seek compensation in their request for relief. Instead, they request that the
Committee on the Rights of the Child
• find that climate change is a children’s rights crisis;
• find that each respondent, along with other states, has caused and is perpetuating the climate crisis
by knowingly acting in disregard of the available scientific evidence regarding the measures needed to
prevent and mitigate climate change;
• find that by recklessly perpetuating life-threatening climate change, each respondent is violating
the petitioners’ rights to life, health, and the prioritization of the child’s best interests, as well as the
cultural rights of the petitioners from indigenous communities;
• recommend that the respondents review, and where necessary, amend their laws and policies
to ensure that mitigation and adaptation efforts are being accelerated to the maximum extent
of available resources and on the basis of the best available scientific evidence to (i) protect the
petitioners’ rights and (ii) make the best interests of the child a primary consideration, particularly in
allocating the costs and burdens of climate change mitigation and [adaptation];
• recommend that each respondent initiate cooperative international action—and increase its efforts
with respect to existing cooperative initiatives—to establish binding and enforceable measures to
mitigate the climate crisis, prevent further harm to the petitioners and other children, and secure their
inalienable rights; and
• recommend that pursuant to Article 12, the respondents shall ensure the child’s right to be heard
and to express their views freely, in all international, national, and subnational efforts to mitigate or
adapt to the climate crisis, and in all efforts taken in response to the Communication submitted to the
Committee.g
a

b
c
d
e
f
g

Chiara Sacchi et al. v. Argentina et al. Communication to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, submitted on
23 September 2019. pp. 54–59.
Footnote a, pp. 59–70.
Footnote a, p. 80.
Footnote a, p. 83.
Footnote a, p. 87.
Footnote a, p. 89.
Footnote a, pp. 7–8.

Source: Chiara Sacchi et al. v. Argentina et al. Communication to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, submitted on
23 September 2019.
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rights under the CRC they claim to have been violated. The Committee on the
Rights of the Child is still deliberating on the petition as of September 2020.

F.

Tabular Summaries of Treaty Status

Tables 5.1 and 5.2 summarize the status of each country covered in this report in
relation to the human rights treaties discussed in Part Five Section I.

Table 5.1: Summary of Status (Human Rights Treaties)—
Southeast Asia and South Asia Developing Member Countries
1951 Refugee
Convention

ICCPR

ICESCR

CEDAW

CRC

−

−

−

24 May 2006 a

27 Dec 1995 a

Cambodia

15 Oct 1992 a

26 May 1992 a

26 May 1992 a

15 Oct 1992 a

15 Oct 1992 a

Indonesia

−

23 Feb 2006 a

23 Feb 2006 a

13 Sep 1984 r

5 Sep 1990 r

Lao PDR

−

25 Sep 2009 r

13 Feb 2007 r

14 Aug 1981 r

8 May 1991 a

Malaysia

−

−

−

5 Jul 1995 a

17 Feb 1995 a

Myanmar

−

−

6 Oct 2017 r

22 Jul 1997 a

15 Jul 1991 a

Philippines

22 Jul 1981 a

23 Oct 1986 r

7 Jun 1974 r

5 Aug 1981 r

21 Aug 1990 r

Singapore

−

−

−

5 Oct 1995 a

5 Oct 1995 a

Thailand

−

29 Oct 1996 a

5 Sep 1999 a

9 Aug 1985 a

27 Mar 1992 a

Viet Nam

−

24 Sep 1982 a

24 Sep 1982 a

17 Feb 1982 r

28 Feb 1990 r

Afghanistan

30 Aug 2005 a

24 Jan 1983 a

24 Jan 1983 a

5 Mar 2003 r

28 Mar 1994 r

Bangladesh

−

6 Sep 2000 a

5 Oct 1998 a

6 Nov 1984 a

3 Aug 1990 r

Bhutan

−

−

−

31 Aug 1981 r

1 Aug 1990 r

India

−

10 Apr 1979 a

10 Apr 1979 a

9 Jul 1993 r

11 Dec 1992 a

Maldives

−

19 Sep 2006 a

19 Sep 2006 a

1 Jul 1993 a

11 Feb 1991 r

Nepal

−

14 May 1991 a

14 May 1991 a

22 Apr 1991 r

14 Sep 1990 r

Pakistan

−

23 Jun 2010 r

17 Apr 2008 r

12 Mar 1996 a

12 Nov 1990 r

Sri Lanka

−

11 Jun 1980 a

11 Jun 1980 a

5 Oct 1981 r

12 Jul 1991 r

Country
Southeast Asia
Brunei
Darussalam

South Asia

CEDAW = Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, CRC = Convention on the Rights of the
Child, ICCPR = International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ICESCR = International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic.
Notes: a = accession, r = ratification.
Sources:
United Nations Treaty Collection. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. Convention on the Rights of the Child (accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (accessed 31 October 2020).
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Table 5.2: Summary of Status (Human Rights Treaties)—
Pacific Developing Member Countries
1951 Refugee
Convention

ICCPR

ICESCR

CEDAW

CRC

−

−

−

11 Aug 2006 a

6 Jun 1997 a

12 Jun 1972 d

16 Aug 2018 a

16 Aug 2018 a

28 Aug 1995 a

13 Aug 1993 r

Kiribati

−

−

−

17 Mar 2004 a

11 Dec 1995 a

Marshall Islands

−

12 Mar 2018 a

12 Mar 2018 a

2 Mar 2006 a

4 Oct 1993 r

Micronesia, Federated
States of

−

−

−

1 Sep 2004 a

5 May 1993 a

Nauru

28 Jun 2011 a

12 Nov 2001a

−

23 Jun 2011 a

27 Jul 1994 a

Palau

−

20 Sep 2011b

20 Sep 2011b

20 Sep 2011b

4 Aug 1995 a

Papua New Guinea

17 Jul 1986 a

21 Jul 2008 a

21 Jul 2008 a

12 Jan 1995 a

2 Mar 1993 r

Samoa

21 Sep 1988 a

15 Feb 2008 a

−

25 Sep 1992 a

29 Nov 1994 r

Solomon Islands

28 Feb 1995 a

20 May 1976c

17 Mar 1982 dc

6 May 2002 a

10 Apr 1995 a

Timor-Leste

7 May 2003 a

18 Sep 2003 a

16 Apr 2003 a

16 Apr 2003 a

16 Apr 2003 a

Tonga

−

−

−

−

6 Nov 1995 a

Tuvalu

7 Mar 1986 d

20 May 1976c

20 May 1976c

6 Oct 1999 a

22 Sep 1995 a

−

21 Nov 2008 r

−

8 Sep 1995 a

7 Jul 1993 r

Country
Cook Islands
Fiji

Vanuatu

CEDAW = Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, CRC = Convention on the Rights of the
Child, ICCPR = International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ICESCR = International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights.
Notes: a = accession, d = succession, r = ratification.
a
b
c

Nauru signed the ICCPR on 12 November 2001, but has not yet ratified it.
Palau signed the ICCPR, the ICESCR, and the CEDAW on 20 September 2011, but has not yet ratified these instruments.
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland’s ratification of the ICCPR and ICESCR on 20 May 1976 has territorial
application on Solomon Islands and Tuvalu.

Sources:
United Nations Treaty Collection. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
(accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. Convention on the Rights of the Child (accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (accessed 31 October 2020).
United Nations Treaty Collection. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (accessed 31 October 2020).

101

102

INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

II. Soft Law
A. 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a historic international
human rights instrument adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on
10 December 1948.104 It was drafted in the context of the two preceding world wars.
The UDHR lays out the fundamental human rights rooted in the dignity and
worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women.105 These
rights include civil and political rights, such as the right to life, liberty and security
of person;106 the right to be free from slavery or servitude;107 the right to be free
from torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;108 the right
to equal protection of the law;109 and the right to be free from arbitrary arrest,
detention, or exile.110 The UDHR also defines economic, social, and cultural
rights, such as the right to social security;111 the right to work, to free choice of
employment, and to just and favorable conditions of work;112 the right to health;113
and the right to education.114
The UDHR does not directly bind states because it is not a treaty. This was the
clear understanding at the time it was drafted.115 However, the rights it defines
have made their way into landmark human rights treaties such as the ICCPR and
the ICESCR. In addition, some academics and scholars have argued that at least
part of the declaration has attained the status of customary law (and is therefore
binding as such).116 Jayawickrama (1992) states that at least 90 constitutions
104

105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115

116

General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, A/RES/217(III)
(10 December 1948).
Footnote 104, Preamble.
Footnote 104, Art. 3.
Footnote 104, Art. 4.
Footnote 104, Art. 5.
Footnote 104, Art. 7.
Footnote 104, Art. 9.
Footnote 104, Art. 22.
Footnote 104, Art. 23.
Footnote 104, Art. 25.
Footnote 104, Art. 26.
Eleanor Roosevelt, then the Chair of the UN Commission on Human Rights and simultaneously
a United States representative to the General Assembly, stated, “In giving our approval to the
declaration today, it is of primary importance that we keep clearly in mind the basic character
of the document. It is not a treaty; it is not an international agreement. It is not and does not
purport to be a statement of law or of legal obligation. It is a declaration of basic principles
of human rights and freedoms, to be stamped with the approval of the General Assembly by
formal vote of its members, and to serve as a common standard of achievement for all peoples
of all nations.” Quoted in M.M. Whiteman. 1965. Digest of International Law 5. Washington, DC:
Department of State Publication 7873. p. 243; and in H. Hannum. 1998. The UDHR in National
and International Law. Health and Human Rights. 3 (2). p. 147.
H. Hannum. 1998. The UDHR in National and International Law. Health and Human Rights.
3 (2). p. 147–149. See also I. Zamfir. 2018. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its
Relevance for the European Union. European Parliamentary Research Service. November.
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promulgated since 1948 have either been inspired by the UDHR or contain
statements of fundamental rights drawn from it.117

B. 2007 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples
The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
(UNDRIP)118 is a framework instrument that establishes minimum standards
for the survival, dignity and well-being of indigenous peoples.119 The General
Assembly adopted the declaration on 13 September 2007.
The UNDRIP identifies both individual and collective rights of indigenous
peoples. It takes into account the concern that other international human
rights instruments emphasize individual rights, but may not have addressed
collective rights that are “indispensable for the existence, well-being and
integral development of indigenous peoples.” 120 At the same time, the UNDRIP
amplifies existing human rights standards as they apply specifically to indigenous
peoples.121
Climate change affects indigenous peoples disproportionately, due to their
intricate relationship with their lands, environment, territories, and resources.122
The UNDRIP provisions thus help mitigate vulnerability and strengthen resilience
and adaptive capacity by identifying elements that have a significant role in
environmental management.
Article 29(1) of the UNDRIP states that indigenous peoples have the right
to the conservation and protection of the environment and the productive
capacity of their lands and resources. The provision emphasizes that hazardous
materials should not be stored or disposed in their lands without their free,
prior, and informed consent.123 Furthermore, Article 25 acknowledges their
right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual relationship with their
traditionally owned (or otherwise occupied and used) lands, territories, waters,
and coastal seas and other resources, and to uphold their responsibilities to future
generations in this regard.

117

118

119
120
121

122

123

N. Jayawickrama. 1992. Hong Kong and the International Protection of Human Rights.
In R. Wicks, ed. Human Rights in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
General Assembly Resolution 61/295, United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, A/RES/61/295 (13 September 2007).
Footnote 118, Art. 43.
Footnote 118, Preamble.
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, Impact
of Climate Change Mitigation Measures on Indigenous Peoples and on Their Territories and Lands:
Report of the Special Rapporteurs, E/C.19/2008/10 (20 March 2008).
Footnote 118, Art. 29(2).
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The rights stated in the UNDRIP also include the right to autonomy or
self-government, in the exercise of the indigenous peoples’ right to selfdetermination, in matters relating to
• their internal and local affairs; 124
• the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic,
social, and cultural institutions; 125
• the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their
culture; 126
• the right to not be relocated without their free, prior, and informed consent,
and after agreement on just and fair compensation and, where possible,
with the option of return; 127
• the right to revitalize, use, develop, and transmit to future generations
their histories, languages, oral traditions, philosophies, writing systems,
and literatures; 128
• the right to establish and control their educational systems; 129
• the right not to be subjected to any discriminatory conditions of labor; 130
• the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for exercising
their right to development; 131
• the right to the lands, territories, and resources which they have traditionally
owned, occupied or otherwise used; 132 and
• the right to maintain, control, protect, and develop their cultural heritage,
traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions.133

C. 2011 United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights
The United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs)
include 31 principles that relate to the issue of human rights and transnational
corporations and other business enterprises.134 They are anchored on the
United Nations’ “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework.135 The Special
Representative of the Secretary General, John Ruggie, developed the UNGPs,
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134

135

Footnote 118, Art. 4.
Footnote 118, Art. 5. See also Art. 20.
Footnote 118, Art. 8.
Footnote 118, Art. 10.
Footnote 118, Art. 13.
Footnote 118, Art. 14.
Footnote 118, Art. 17.
Footnote 118, Art. 23.
Footnote 118, Art. 26.
Footnote 118, Art. 31.
United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2011. Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy”
Framework.” New York and Geneva.
United Nations, General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises, John Ruggie–Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing
the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011).
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and the United Nations Human Rights Council unanimously endorsed them on
16 June 2011.136
The “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework is composed of three essential
components featuring an interrelated and dynamic system of preventative and
remedial measures:
• the state duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties,
including business enterprises, through appropriate policies, regulation,
and adjudication;
• the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, which means that
business enterprises should act with due diligence to avoid infringing on
the rights of others and to address adverse impacts with which they are
involved; and
• the need for greater access by victims to effective remedy, both judicial
and non-judicial.137
The state duty to protect is a “duty of conduct,” not an obligation of result.138
Thus, human rights abuse by private actors do not necessarily implicate state
responsibility (footnote 138). However, states may breach their international
human rights obligation to respect, protect, and fulfill the human rights of
individuals within their territory and/or jurisdiction
(i) if these abuses are attributable to them—either through conduct of a
state organ;139 or conduct of persons or entities exercising elements of
governmental authority;140 or conduct of organs placed at the disposal
of a state by another state;141 or conduct by private actors directed or
controlled by a state;142 or conduct that may not have been attributable
to the state at the time of commission, but is later acknowledged and
adopted by a state as its own;143 or
(ii) where states fail to take appropriate steps to prevent, investigate, punish,
and redress private actors’ abuse (footnote 138).
UNGP Principle 3 thus states that, in meeting their duty to protect, states should
• enforce laws that are aimed at, or have the effect of, requiring business
enterprises to respect human rights, and to assess periodically the adequacy
of such laws and address any gaps;
136

137
138
139

140
141
142
143

United Nations, General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Resolution 17/4: Human Rights and
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, A/HRC/RES/17/4 (16 June 2011).
Footnote 135, para. 6.
Footnote 134, p. 3 (commentary under Principle 1).
International Law Commission. 2001. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts. Art. 4.
Footnote 139, Art. 5.
Footnote 139, Art. 6.
Footnote 139, Art. 8.
Footnote 139, Art. 11.
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• ensure that other laws and policies governing the creation and ongoing
operation of business enterprises, such as corporate law, do not constrain
but enable business respect for human rights;
• provide effective guidance to business enterprises on how to respect
human rights throughout their operations; and
• encourage, and where appropriate, require business enterprises to
communicate how they address their human rights impacts.
The corporate responsibility to respect human rights refers to internationally
recognized human rights—understood, at a minimum, as those expressed in
the International Bill of Human Rights (consisting of the UDHR and the main
instruments through which it has been codified: the ICCPR and the ICESCR) and
the principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the International Labour
Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.144
Thus, when national standards fall below international standards, the UNGP
clarifies that businesses should respect the latter as minimum reference points.
The responsibility to respect human rights requires that business enterprises
avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through their own
activities, and address such impacts when they occur.145 Moreover, businesses
should seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly
linked to their operations, products, or services by their business relationships,
even if they have not contributed to those impacts (footnote 145).
UNGP Principle 15 states that in order to meet their responsibility to respect human
rights, business enterprises should have in place policies and processes appropriate
to their size and circumstances. These policies and processes include the following:





144
145
146
147

A policy commitment to meet their responsibility to respect human
rights. This statement of policy should be approved at the most senior level
of the business enterprise; be informed by relevant internal and/or external
expertise; stipulate the enterprise’s human rights expectations of personnel,
business partners, and other parties directly linked to its operations,
products, or services; be publicly available and communicated internally
and externally; and be reflected in operational policies and procedures.146
A human rights due diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate, and
account for how businesses address their impacts on human rights. Human
rights due diligence should cover adverse human rights impacts that the
business enterprise may cause or contribute to through its own activities,
or which may be directly linked to its operations, products, or services by
its business relationships.147 It should also be ongoing, recognizing that the
human rights risks may change over time (footnote 147).

Footnote 134, Principle 12.
Footnote 134, Principle 13.
Footnote 134, Principle 16.
Footnote 134, Principle 17.
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Processes to enable the remediation of any adverse human rights
impacts they cause or to which they contribute.148

Access to effective remedy requires states to take appropriate steps to ensure
the effectiveness of domestic judicial mechanisms when addressing businessrelated human rights abuses.149 These steps include considering ways to reduce
legal, practical, and other relevant barriers that could lead to a denial of access to
remedy (footnote 149). There should also be non-judicial grievance mechanisms,
both state-based and non-state-based.150 Non-judicial state-based mechanisms
are administrative, legislative, and other similar mechanisms, including national
human rights institutions.151 Non-judicial non-state-based mechanisms include
(i) those administered by a business enterprise alone or with stakeholders,
by an industry association or a multi-stakeholder group; and (ii) regional and
international human rights bodies.152
The UNGPs are relevant for climate change considerations in a dual context,
depending on how courts construe environmental rights. They may be directly
linked to environmental rights (e.g., the right to a healthy environment) if such
rights—in and of themselves, separate from civil, political, economic, social, and
cultural rights—are considered part of the international human rights regime.
However, even if environmental rights are not considered a “proper” category
of rights under the international human rights regime, the UNGPs may still be
relevant if these environmental rights are triangulated with more established
human rights (e.g., the right to life).

D. 2003 Equator Principles
The Equator Principles serve as a common baseline and framework for
participating financial institutions (Equator Principles Financial Institutions,
or EPFIs) to identify, assess, and manage environmental and social risks when
financing projects.153 EPFIs commit not to provide project finance advisory
services, project finance, project-related corporate loans, bridge loans, projectrelated refinancing, or project-related acquisition finance to projects that do
not comply with the relevant Equator Principles requirements.154 However,
these institutions adopt and implement the Equator Principles voluntarily and
independently, without reliance on or recourse to the International Finance
Corporation, the World Bank Group, the Equator Principles Association, or other
financial institutions.155
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
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Footnote 134, Principle 15.
Footnote 134, Principle 26.
Footnote 134, Principles 27–31.
Footnote 134, p. 30 (commentary under Principle 27).
Footnote 134, p. 31 (commentary under Principle 28).
Equator Principles. 2020. The Equator Principles. Preamble, p. 3.
Footnote 153, Preamble, pp. 3–4. There are qualifying criteria for each of the financial
products mentioned.
Footnote 153, Disclaimer, p. 18.
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Broadly, EPFIs commit to respect human rights in line with the UNGPs by carrying
out human rights due diligence (footnote 153). They also commit to supporting
the objectives of the Paris Agreement and recognize that they have a role to play
in improving the availability of climate-related information (footnote 153). Lastly,
EPFIs support conservation, including as it relates to biodiversity (footnote 153).
Box 5.4 provides a brief overview of the 10 Equator Principles.
As of 15 November 2020, a total of 111 financial institutions in 37 countries have
adopted the Equator Principles.156

Box 5.4: The Equator Principles
Principle 1 – Review and categorization. When a project is proposed for financing, the Equator Principles
Financial Institution (EPFI) categorizes the project based on the magnitude of potential environmental
and social risks and impacts, including those related to human rights, climate change, and biodiversity. This
is part of its internal environmental and social review and due diligence. The categories are category A
(significant risks), category B (limited risks), and category C (minimal or no risks).
Principle 2 – Environmental and Social Assessment. The EPFI requires the client to conduct an
appropriate assessment process to address—to the EPFI’s satisfaction—the relevant environmental
and social risks and scale of impacts of the proposed project. The assessment documentation should
propose measures to minimize, mitigate, and where residual impacts remain, to compensate, offset, and/
or remedy for risks and impacts to workers, affected communities, and the environment. A Climate Change
Risk Assessment is required (i) for all category A and, as appropriate, category B projects; and (ii) for all
projects, in all locations, when combined emissions are expected to be more than 100,000 tonnes of CO2
equivalent annually.
Principle 3 – Applicable Environmental and Social Standards. The assessment process should address
compliance with relevant host country laws, regulations, and permits that pertain to environmental
and social issues. The EPFI’s due diligence includes its review and confirmation of how the project and
transaction—for all category A and category B projects globally—meet each of the Equator Principles.
Principle 4 – Environmental and Social Management System and Equator Principles Action Plan.
The clients are required to develop or maintain an environmental and social management system for all
category A and category B projects. Where the applicable standards are not met to the EPFI’s satisfaction,
the client and the EPFI will agree to an Equator Principles Action Plan.
Principle 5 – Stakeholder Engagement. For all category A and category B projects, the EPFI requires the
client to demonstrate effective stakeholder engagement as an ongoing process in a structured and culturally
appropriate manner, with affected communities, workers and, where relevant, other stakeholders. All
projects affecting indigenous peoples are subject to a process of informed consultation and participation,
and need to comply with the rights and protections for indigenous peoples contained in relevant national
law, including those laws implementing host country obligations under international law.
Principle 6 – Grievance Mechanism. For all category A and, as appropriate, category B projects, the EPFI
requires the client, as part of the environmental and social management system, to establish effective
continued on next page
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Box 5.4 continued

grievance mechanisms. These mechanisms are designed for use by affected communities and workers,
as appropriate, to receive and facilitate resolution of concerns and grievances about the project’s
environmental and social performance.
Principle 7 – Independent Review. For all category A and, as appropriate, category B projects, an
independent environmental and social consultant, carries out a review of the assessment process to assist
the EPFI’s due diligence and determination of Equator Principles compliance.
Principle 8 – Covenants. For all projects, where a client is not in compliance with its environmental
and social covenants, the EPFI works with the client on remedial actions to bring the project back into
compliance. If the client fails to re-establish compliance within an agreed grace period, the EPFI reserves
the right to exercise remedies, including calling an event of default, as considered appropriate.
Principle 9 – Independent Monitoring and Reporting. The EPFI requires independent monitoring
and reporting for all category A and, as appropriate, category B projects, in order to assess project
compliance with the Equator Principles after financial closure and over the life of the loan. An independent
environmental and social consultant should do the monitoring and reporting. Alternatively, the EPFI
can require that the client retain qualified and experienced external experts to verify its monitoring
information, to be shared with the EPFI.
Principle 10 – Reporting and Transparency. The client ensures, at a minimum, that (i) a summary of
the environmental and social impact assessment is accessible and available online; and (ii) it includes a
summary of human rights and climate change risks and impacts when relevant. The client also reports
publicly, on an annual basis, greenhouse gas (GHG) emission levels during the operational phase for
projects emitting more than 100,000 tonnes of CO2 equivalent annually. Lastly, the EPFI encourages the
client to share commercially non-sensitive, project-specific biodiversity data with the Global Biodiversity
Information Facility and relevant national and global data repositories.
Source: Equator Principles. 2020. The Equator Principles. July.

E.

2014 International Law Association Declaration of
Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change

The Declaration of Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change contains 10 Draft
Articles that, according to the International Law Association, set out legal
principles applicable to states in addressing climate change and its adverse
effects.157 The association adopted the declaration during its 76th Conference
in April 2014. The declaration intended to influence climate negotiations for the
2015 Paris Agreement.
Draft Article 3 characterizes the climate system as a common natural resource
for the benefit of present and future generations, within the broader context of

157

Committee on Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change, International Law Association.
Declaration of Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change. Draft Art. 2.

109

110

INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LEGAL FRAMEWORKS

the international community’s commitment to sustainable development.158 In
the context of addressing climate change and its adverse effects, sustainable
development requires states to balance economic and social development and
the protection of the climate system.159 Sustainable development also supports
the realization of the right of all human beings to an adequate living standard and
the equitable distribution of the benefits thereof (footnote 159). States shall thus
anticipate, prevent, and minimize the causes of climate change, and mitigate its
adverse effects for the benefit of present and future generations.160
Protection on the basis of equity acknowledges that (i) present generations in
developing states have a legitimate expectation of equitable access to sustainable
development, and (ii) future generations in all states have a legitimate expectation
of equitable access to the earth’s resources.161 The common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) of states requires developed
states (in particular, the most advanced among them) to take the lead in addressing
climate change.162 They can do this by committing to more stringent mitigation and
assisting developing states (in particular, the least developed among them, small
island developing states, and other vulnerable states), to the extent of their need,
to address climate change and adapt to its adverse effects (footnote 162).
At the same time, developing states shall be subject to less stringent mitigation
commitments, and benefit from delayed compliance schedules and financial,
technological, and other assistance (footnote 162). The rights and obligations of
developing countries with regard to climate change and its impacts shall also be
differentiated based on their special circumstances and vulnerability.163
Draft Article 7A references the responsibility of states to avoid transboundary
environmental harm. However, it goes beyond previous international law instruments
by explicitly tying this principle to climate change. States are to exercise due diligence
to avoid, minimize, and reduce environmental and other damage through climate
change.164 In exercising due diligence, states shall take all appropriate measures to
anticipate, prevent, or minimize the causes of climate change, especially through
effective measures to reduce GHG emissions, and to minimize the adverse effects of
climate change through the adoption of suitable adaptation measures (footnote 164).
Similarly, Draft Article 7B ties the precautionary principle with climate change.
Precautionary measures include proactive and cost-effective measures which
enable sustainable development, maintain the stability of the climate system,
and protect the climate system against human-induced change.165 The obligation
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165

Footnote 157, Draft Art. 3(1).
Footnote 157, Draft Art. 3(3).
Footnote 157, Draft Art. 3(2).
Footnote 157, Draft Art. 4.
Footnote 157, Draft Art. 5(3).
Footnote 157, Draft Art. 6(2).
Footnote 157, Draft Art. 7A(2).
Footnote 157, Draft Art. 7B(2).
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of prevention on the part of states—as well as the need for precautionary
measures—should be subject to continuing assessment, as new scientific
knowledge regarding climate change becomes available.166 Where there is
a reasonably foreseeable threat that a proposed activity may cause serious
transboundary environmental damage, an environmental impact assessment
on the potential impacts of such activity is required.167 Damage in this context
includes serious or irreversible damage through climate change to vulnerable
states (footnote 167).
Draft Article 9 requires states to act in good faith in addressing climate change
and its adverse effects and to achieve internationally agreed objectives.168 This
includes engaging in constant monitoring and supervision at both domestic and
international levels (footnote 168). The principle of good faith also requires
states, when negotiating legal instruments on climate change, not to insist on
their own position without contemplating any modification of it.169

F.

2015 Oslo Principles on Climate Change Obligations

The Oslo Principles on Climate Change Obligations (Oslo Principles) articulate
a set of principles comprising the essential obligations of states and enterprises
to avert the critical level of global warming.170 An international group of jurists,
academics, and experts in international law, human rights law, and environmental
law adopted the Oslo Principles in March 2015.171 Box 5.5 summarizes the legal
bases underpinning the Oslo Principles.
Principle 1 of the Oslo Principles references the precautionary principle. In the
context of climate change, the precautionary principle requires that GHG
emissions be reduced to the extent, and at a pace, necessary to protect against
the threats of climate change that can still be avoided.172 Reductions in this
context should be based on a worst-case scenario that is (i) credible, (ii) realistic,
and (iii) accepted by a substantial number of eminent climate change experts
(footnote 172). These precautionary measures should be adopted without regard
to the cost, unless that cost is “completely disproportionate” to the anticipated
reduction in emissions (footnote 172).
As such, all states and enterprises must reduce their GHG emissions to the extent
that they can achieve such reduction without relevant additional cost.173 Principle 7
gives several examples, such as switching off power-consuming equipment
166
167
168
169
170
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Footnote 157, Draft Art. 7B(3).
Footnote 157, Draft Art. 7B(4).
Footnote 157, Draft Art. 9(1).
Footnote 157, Draft Art. 9(2).
Expert Group on Global Climate Obligations. 2015. Oslo Principles on Global Climate Change
Obligations. Legal Perspectives for Global Challenges. 3. Preamble.
Footnote 170, Introduction.
Footnote 170, Principle 1.
Footnote 170, Principle 7.
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Box 5.5: Legal Bases of the Oslo Principles
The Oslo Principles are premised on the expert group’s belief that the “amalgamation of legal sources” a
existing at the time the principles were adopted (i.e., before the 2015 Paris Agreement) obliges states to
assess the environmental impact of their activities, address climate change, and reduce emissions, even in the
absence of a specific treaty. This amalgamation covers the following:

 International law and human rights. This includes the “Principle of Human Dignity,” a core human value
throughout international and regional human rights law.b States have a stringent duty to respect, protect,
and fulfill human dignity, which requires that they act urgently to mitigate climate change (footnote b).
Further, given the imminent threat that climate change poses to human life, states also have a duty to
immediately curtail activities that contribute to climate change and to take positive measures to protect
and promote the right to life.c

The following rights and duties are also implicated: the right to property, in particular, the extent to which
it meets the essential needs of “dignified human living;” d the right to health, which extends to securing
a healthy environment and preventing environmental degradation; e the duty to adopt appropriate
economic, environmental, and social policies to ensure access to adequate and nutritious food and
prevent hunger;f and the duty to provide for a clean and healthy environment conducive to human
well‑being.g

 Tort Law. An act or omission will be unlawful if (i) it subjects the life, well-being, or property of others to

a risk of damage; (ii) the risk is considerable; (iii) the potential damage is colossal; and (iv) the risk can be
avoided without undue detriment to the party/parties causing that risk.h The group of experts opined that
obligations to mitigate climate change meet all these requirements.
Responding to arguments regarding relationship or proximity (between, for example, an enterprise in
Germany and the people living in Bangladesh), the group asserted that this is not a serious obstacle. Even
if the relationship requirement is interpreted narrowly, it remains just one of the relevant factors.i Besides,
there are many people in the close vicinity whose interests will be jeopardized by the consequences of
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (footnote i).
On the dangerousness of the activity, emissions from a global angle are obviously dangerous.j However,
it is arguable that the emissions brought about by each single actor (the majority of states) are not
dangerous in this legal sense (footnote j). The group of experts opined, nevertheless, that even a small
contribution to a very harmful outcome should, in any event, suffice for legal purposes.k If, for example,
1 billion people will be seriously impaired in one way or another (some will lose their life; others will no
longer have access to water or will fall ill, whereas again others will “only” face damage to property),
a minor contribution to the global evil may be sufficient for the imposition of a legal duty (footnote k).
The extent of the risk of harm to others affects the extent of the burden or duty to avoid injury (footnote k).
Oslo Principle 11 thus states that no country or enterprise is relieved of its obligations even if its
contributions to total GHG emissions are small.

a
b
c
d
e
f
g
h
i
j
k

Expert Group On Global Climate Obligations. 2015. Commentary to the Oslo Principles on Climate Change Obligations. Section 4.2, p. 15.
Footnote a, section 4.3, p. 16.
Footnote a, section 4.3, p. 21.
Footnote a, section 4.3, p. 22.
Footnote a, section. 4.3, p. 23.
Footnote a, section. 4.3, p. 25.
Footnote a, section. 4.3, p. 27.
Footnote a, section 4.4, p. 31.
Footnote a, section 4.4, p. 35.
Footnote a, section 4.4, p. 36.
Footnote a, section 4.4, p. 37.

Source: Expert Group On Global Climate Obligations. 2015. Commentary to the Oslo Principles on Climate Change Obligations.

RIGHTS-BASED INSTRUMENTS

when not in use, and eliminating excessive power consumption where possible
(footnote 173). Further, states and enterprises must generally avoid new activities
that create excessive GHG emissions, unless they take countervailing measures.174
Principle 8 does recognize an exception to this general rule: if the relevant activities can
be shown to be indispensable in light of prevailing circumstances, e.g., if undertaken
in the least developed countries (footnote 174). Developed and developing countries,
as well as enterprises, must implement GHG reduction measures that entail costs if
the costs will be compensated by future savings or financial gains.175
Principle 14 states that the obligations of states are common but differentiated.
Least developed countries do not have a legal obligation to reduce GHG
emissions at their own expense.176 If a country’s level of GHG emissions is close
to the permissible quantum, it is not obliged to reduce its emissions to the
permissible quantum if doing so would create undue hardship.177 This calculus
requires consideration of the country’s historical GHG contributions, its
capabilities in terms of its wealth, its needs, its dependence on fossil fuel, and its
access to renewable energy (footnote 177).
The permissible quantum of GHG emissions will decrease as time progresses.178
Every above-permissible-quantum country is required to reduce GHG emissions
within its jurisdiction or control to the permissible quantum within the shortest
time feasible.179 Should this country fail to fulfill this obligation even if it has taken
all steps reasonably available, it must provide financial or technical means to
below-permissible-quantum countries to achieve the reduction of GHG emissions
that the responsible above-permissible-quantum country has failed to achieve.180
Principle 20 declares that states must make their best efforts to bring about
lawful and appropriate trade consequences for states that fail to comply with
their obligations.181 Neither high cost nor the lack of financial means can alone
excuse a state’s failure to meet its obligations to achieve GHG reductions.182 They
also do not constitute a defense against legal sanctions that may be imposed as a
consequence of such failure (footnote 182). To avoid such trade consequences,
a state must show excessive hardship or extraordinary circumstances beyond its
control that have prevented it from meeting its obligations (footnote 182).
On the part of enterprises, they must assess their facilities and properties to evaluate
(i) their vulnerability to climate change, (ii) the financial effect of future climate
change on the enterprises, and (iii) the enterprises’ efforts to increase their resilience

174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182

Footnote 170, Principle 8.
Footnote 170, Principle 9.
Footnote 170, Principle 15.
Footnote 170, Principle 16.
Footnote 170, Principle 17.
Footnote 170, Principle 13.
Footnote 170, Principle 18.
Footnote 170, Principle 20.
Footnote 170, Principle 23.
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to future climate change.183 This information must be publicly disclosed. Before
committing to plans to build any major new facilities, enterprises must conduct
environmental impact assessments, which must include an analysis of the proposed
facility’s carbon footprint.184 Enterprises in the banking and finance sectors should
take into account the GHG effects of any projects they consider financing.185

G. 2016 World Declaration on the Environmental Rule of Law
The International Union for Conservation of Nature World Declaration on the
Environmental Rule of Law (World Declaration) was made by a group of experts
from the World Commission on Environmental Law at the International Union
for Conservation of Nature World Environmental Law Congress in April 2016.186
The group drafted the World Declaration to build environmental rule of law as
the legal foundation for environmental justice.187 It highlights the role of judges
and courts in strengthening the environmental rule of law, characterizing their
role as “essential” through the effective application of laws, and through fair and
independent decision-making (footnote 187).
Like other progressive instruments, the World Declaration links the environment to
economic development. It recognizes the close relationship between human rights
and environmental conservation and protection, and the significance of ecological
integrity toward achieving human well-being and tackling poverty (footnote 187).
The World Declaration consists of four parts:



183
184
185
186

187
188
189

Foundations of the Environmental Rule of Law. The environmental
rule of law is understood as the legal framework of procedural and
substantive rights and obligations that incorporates the principles of
ecologically sustainable development in the rule of law.188 It is premised
on key governance elements including, but not limited to: clear, strict,
enforceable, and effective laws, regulations, and policies that are efficiently
administered; respect for human rights, including the right to a safe, clean,
healthy, and sustainable environment; measures to ensure effective
compliance with laws, regulations, and policies (e.g., adequate criminal, civil,
and administrative enforcement, and liability for environmental damage);
access to information, public participation in decision-making, and access
to justice; environmental auditing and reporting, together with other
effective accountability, transparency, ethics, integrity, and anti-corruption
mechanisms; and use of the best available scientific knowledge.189

Footnote 170, Principle 27.
Footnote 170, Principle 29.
Footnote 170, Principle 30.
International Union for Conservation of Nature. 2016. World Declaration on the Environmental
Rule of Law. 26–29 April.
Footnote 186, Preamble.
Footnote 186, Section I, p. 2.
Footnote 186, Section I, pp. 2–3.
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General and Emerging Substantive Principles. The World Declaration
lays out 13 principles that promote the achievement of environmental
justice through environmental rule of law. The list is not to be construed as
exhaustive.190 The 13 principles are as follows:
Principle 1 – the obligation of each state, public or private entity, and
individual to protect nature.
Principle 2 – the right of each human and other living being to the
conservation, protection, and restoration of the health and
integrity of ecosystems; and the inherent right of nature to
exist, thrive, and evolve.
Principle 3 – the right of each human, present and future, to a safe, clean,
healthy, and sustainable environment.
Principle 4 – taking legal and other measures to protect and restore
ecosystem integrity and to sustain and enhance the
resilience of social-ecological systems.
Principle 5 – the principle of in dubio pro natura (i.e., in cases of doubt,
all matters before courts, administrative agencies, and other
decision makers shall be resolved in a way most likely to favor
the protection and conservation of the environment, with
preference to be given to alternatives that are least harmful to
the environment).
Principle 6 – the duty of any natural or legal person or group of people, in
possession or control of land, water, or other resources, to
maintain the essential ecological functions associated with
those resources and refrain from activities that would impair
such functions.
Principle 7 – the principle of intragenerational equity (i.e., the fair and
equitable sharing of the benefits of nature, efforts, and burdens).
Principle 8 – the principle of intergenerational equity (i.e., the present
generation must ensure that the health, diversity, ecological
functions, and beauty of the environment are maintained or
restored to provide equitable access to the benefits of the
environment by each successive generation).
Principle 9 – the incorporation of gender equity into all policies, decisions,
and practices.
Principle 10 – the participation of minority and vulnerable groups.
Principle 11 – the duty to respect the indigenous and tribal peoples’
rights over, and relationships with, their traditional and/or
customary lands and territories, with their free, prior, and
informed consent to any activities on or affecting their land
or resources being a key objective.
Principle 12 – the principle of non-regression (i.e., states, subnational
entities, and regional integration organizations shall not allow
or pursue actions that have the net effect of diminishing
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the legal protection of the environment or of access to
environmental justice).
Principle 13 – the principle of progression (i.e., states, subnational entities,
and regional integration organizations shall regularly revise
and enhance laws and policies in order to protect, conserve,
restore, and ameliorate the environment, based on the most
recent scientific knowledge and policy developments).



Means of Implementation of the Environmental Rule of Law. This
section provides a non-exhaustive list of mechanisms to help build the
procedural and substantive components of the environmental rule of law
at the national, subnational, regional, and international levels.191 These
mechanisms include monitoring and reporting systems, anti-corruption
measures, environmental assessments, addressing environmental crimes
in the context of other types of crime (e.g., money laundering, corruption,
and organized crime), enabling public interest dispute resolution, and
strengthening the independence and capacity of courts in the effective
application and interpretation of environmental law.



Appeal to the World Community. States, subnational governments,
regional integration organizations and other relevant international
organizations, legislators, civil society, and the private sector are urged
to contribute to the building, maintenance, and promotion of the
environmental rule of law, as part of their shared responsibility to the
present and future generations.192

H. 2016 Charter of the Global Judicial Institute
on the Environment
The Global Judicial Institute on the Environment (GJIE) was founded on 29 April 2016
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Its mission is to support the role of courts and tribunals in
applying and enforcing environmental laws and in promoting the environmental
rule of law and the fair distribution of environmental benefits and burdens.193
The need for continued opportunities—led by judges and for judges—for
education; capacity building; collaboration; and exchange of information, practices,
and experiences, led to the establishment of GJIE.194 Article III of the Charter
specifies GJIE’s objectives:
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Footnote 186, Section III, pp. 4–5.
Footnote 186, Section IV, p. 5.
World Environmental Law Congress. Charter of the Global Judicial Institute for the Environment.
Art. 2. The Charter established the Global Judicial Institute for the Environment, but
subsequent institutional documents referred to the institute as the Global Judicial Institute
on the Environment (italics supplied). See, e.g., the Statute of the Global Judicial Institute on the
Environment, established under Arts. 60 and 79 of the Swiss Civil Code and registered in Geneva,
Switzerland in 2017.
World Environmental Law Congress. Charter of the Global Judicial Institute for the Environment.
Preamble.
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Provide research, analysis, and publications on environmental adjudication,
environmental dispute resolution, court practices and procedures,
court administration, legal claims and actions, judicial remedies, and
environmental justice, including access to environmental information, public
participation in environmental decision-making, and access to justice.
Strengthen the capacity of judges in administration and resolution of cases
and disputes related to the environment.
Provide a forum for convening international, regional, national, and subnational
judges, court officials, and judicial institutions, to create partnerships for
collaboration and information exchange on environmental law issues.
Pursue such other objectives as consistent with its mission and Charter.

At present, the GJIE is directed by an Interim Governing Committee, composed of 12
senior judges from a number of countries, chosen from the GJIE founding members.195

I.

2018 Principles on the Climate Obligations of Enterprises

The Principles on the Climate Obligations of Enterprises (Enterprises Principles)
were a follow up to the Oslo Principles, which had focused on state obligations in the
context of climate change. The Enterprises Principles, on the other hand, focus on
investors and enterprises.196 They were drafted by a group of international experts
(on international, environmental, tort, human rights, and company law), and
reflect the group’s understanding of the law as it stands or will likely develop.197
Similar to the Oslo Principles, the Enterprises Principles are based on an
amalgamation of legal sources—in this case, international law, human rights law,
tort law, environmental law (international conventions, domestic legislation, case
law, and legal doctrine), and numerous codes of conduct or governance.198
The Enterprises Principles state five kinds of obligations for enterprises:
• reduction of GHG emissions from enterprises’ activities (Principles 2–8, 12–16);
• reduction of GHG emissions from enterprises’ products and services
(Principles 9–11);
• consideration of suppliers’ GHG emissions (Principle 17);
• procedural obligations on disclosure and impact assessment
(Principles 18–24); and
• incorporation of enterprises’ performance by financiers and investors in
their banking and investment strategy (Principles 25–30) (footnote 198).
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Global Judicial Institute on the Environment. Interim Governing Committee.
Expert Group on Climate Obligations of Enterprises. 2018. Principles on Climate Obligations of
Enterprises. Legal Perspectives for Global Challenges. 5.
Climate Principles for Enterprises. About.
T. Challe. 2018. Principles on the Climate Obligations of Enterprises: Guest Blog. Climate Law
Blog, Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, Columbia Law School. 23 January.
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In general, enterprises should reduce the GHG emissions of their own activities
to the same extent as the country or countries in which those activities take place
(footnote 197). Therefore, the burden will primarily be carried by enterprises
in developed countries (footnote 197). Global enterprises (in particular
multinationals listed on the major stock exchanges) have a further-reaching
responsibility to reduce GHG emissions.199
Enterprises must also ascertain and take into account the emissions of their
suppliers, to the extent reasonably and feasibly possible.200 The phrase “take into
account” gives enterprises some leeway to tailor the obligation in accordance
with their particular circumstances, i.e., an assessment on a case-to-case basis.201
Challe (2018) explains this as a duty to comparably assess the emissions of
suppliers as against alternative suppliers (footnote 198). The results of the
assessment must be given serious and genuine weight (footnote 201).
Investors must also ascertain and take into account the emissions of potential
investees and whether they comply with their obligations under both the Enterprises
Principles and the Oslo Principles.202 They may invest in a non-complying entity,
on the condition that they provide a justification for doing so (e.g., the need to
achieve an adequate return and/or lack of satisfactory alternatives) (footnote 198).
Investment in enterprises engaged in energy generation from excessively emitting
fossil fuels requires a compelling justification (footnote 202).

J.

Climate Action 100+ Initiative

Climate Action 100+ is a 5-year investor initiative to ensure the world’s largest
corporate GHG emitters take critical action to align with the goals of the
Paris Agreement.203 It was launched in December 2017, and aims to fulfill the
commitment made in the 2014/15 Global Investor Statement on Climate Change
which states that “…as institutional investors and consistent with our fiduciary
duty to our beneficiaries, we will work with the companies in which we invest
to ensure that they are minimizing and disclosing the risks and maximizing the
opportunities presented by climate change.” 204
Climate Action 100+ focuses on companies that are key to low carbon transition,
and considered to be systemically important GHG emitters (footnote 203).
The 161 focus companies selected account for over 80% of corporate GHG
emissions, based on 2018 emissions data (footnote 203). These companies
belong to sectors including oil and gas, utilities, mining and metals, transportation,
industrials, and consumer products.205
199
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Footnote 196, p. 4; and footnote 198.
Footnote 196, Principle 17.
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Climate Action 100+ requires investors to sign the Climate Action 100+ Sign-on
Statement. The Sign-on Statement aims to secure commitments from the boards
and senior management to
• implement a strong governance framework which clearly articulates
the board’s accountability and oversight of climate change risk and
opportunities;
• take action to reduce GHG emissions across their value chain, consistent
with the Paris Agreement’s goal of limiting global average temperature
increase to well below 2°C above preindustrial levels; and
• provide enhanced corporate disclosure in line with the final
recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related Financial
Disclosures and, when applicable, sector-specific Global Investor Coalition
on Climate Change Investor Expectations on Climate Change, to enable
investors to assess the robustness of companies’ business plans against
a range of climate scenarios, including well below 2°C, and improve
investment decision-making (footnote 204).
Currently, more than 450 investors from six continents, collectively managing
more than $40 trillion in assets under management, have signed the Climate
Action 100+ Sign-on Statement (footnote 204).
Climate Action 100+ released a progress report in September 2019. The report
indicates the status of each of the following areas:







206
207

Climate governance. While 77% of companies have clear board
responsibility for climate, less than 8% of companies have climate policy
positions that are consistent with those taken by the industry associations
of which the companies are members.206
Climate action. Around 70% of companies have set long-term quantitative
targets for reducing GHG emissions, but only 9% of companies have targets
that are aligned with emissions reductions pledged by governments as part
of the Paris Agreement (i.e., nationally determined contributions [NDCs])
(footnote 205).
Climate disclosure. Only 40% of companies undertake and disclose
climate scenario analysis.207

Footnote 203, p. 20.
Footnote 203, p. 23.
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Renewable energy. Aerial shot of the drilling station
and well testings station at Supreme Energy, Muara Laboh
Geothermal Power Project site (Indonesia). The country
has the world’s biggest geothermal potential, estimated
at 29,000 megawatts. Maximizing geothermal energy is
critical to Indonesia’s renewable energy and climate change
mitigation goals (photo by Gerhard Jörén/ADB).

PART SIX

KEY TAKEAWAYS

T

he development of international climate law broadly suggests two emerging
strands. First is an interdependent human-rights-centric approach
where environmental and climate-related claims are anchored to universally
acknowledged human rights (i.e., greening existing human rights).1 Second is an
approach where international climate law is independently norm-generating.
These strands are not mutually exclusive. The first approach may have even
bolstered the second, as the second approach only came into fore over the last
decade. Key takeaways are discussed in detail against this backdrop.
Human rights norms can be interpreted through a climate change lens, and
vice versa. Judges are especially able to directly triangulate climate change-related
causes of action with the traditional human rights framework if the latter is
reflected in constitutionally protected rights. Courts in South Asia, for example,
have clearly tied state obligation to address climate change with constitutional
rights (e.g., the right to life and the right to human dignity).2 This approach
involves interpreting fundamental rights (i) as extending to a right to a clean
and healthy environment, and (ii) in light of international human rights and
environmental law principles.3
Even outside constitutional interpretation, however, judges can still domesticate
international human rights norms and standards in climate change cases. Monist
states are able to do this in an uncomplicated fashion. International law is considered
automatically part of domestic law and no express legislative act is required.
United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Special Rapporteur (to the United Nations Human
Rights Council) on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean,
Healthy and Sustainable Environment, A/HRC/37/59 (24 January 2018).
2 See e.g., Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan, PLD 2018 Lahore 364.
3
Paragraph 12 of the Court’s judgment in Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan (footnote 2) states,
“Fundamental rights, like the right to life (Article 9) which includes the right to a healthy and
clean environment and right to human dignity (Article 14)[,] read with constitutional principles
of democracy, equality, social, economic and political justice[,] include within their ambit
and commitment, the international environmental principles of sustainable development,
precautionary principle, environmental impact assessment, inter and intragenerational equity[,]
and [the] public trust doctrine. Environment and its protection [have] taken a center stage
in the scheme of our constitutional rights. It appears that we have to move on. The existing
environmental jurisprudence has to be fashioned to meet the needs of something more urgent
and overpowering i.e., Climate Change.”
Paragraph 21 of the same judgment states in part, “Climate [j]ustice links human rights
and development to achieve a human-centered approach, safeguarding the rights of the
most vulnerable people and sharing the burdens and benefits of climate change and its
impacts equitably and fairly. Climate justice is informed by science, responds to science and
acknowledges the need for equitable stewardship of the world’s resources.”
1
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For dualist states, the process is less straightforward. International law is not
self-executing; it must be incorporated or transformed (usually by an enabling
legislative act) to be formally considered part of domestic law. Still, national courts
have ways to apply international law norms in their judgments, even if these norms
have not yet been incorporated into domestic law. The Bangalore Principles4 on
the domestic application of international human rights law indicate that national
courts may have regard to international obligations which a country undertakes—
whether or not they have been incorporated into domestic law—for the purpose
of (i) removing ambiguity or uncertainty from national constitutions, legislation, or
common law,5 or (ii) where the domestic law has a gap or is incomplete.6
Certainly, courts in Asia and the Pacific have applied international human
rights treaties as interpretative tools in different (non-climate-related) types of
litigation. The following are examples of such cases:



Bangladesh: Bangladesh National Women’s Lawyers Association Vs.
Government of Bangladesh & Ors7 – This is a case involving sexual
harassment of women at the place of work or study. There was no domestic
law on the matter. Bangladesh has acceded to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
The Supreme Court held, “The international conventions and norms are
to be read into the fundamental rights in the absence of any domestic
law occupying the field when there is no inconsistency between them.
It is now an accepted rule of judicial construction to interpret municipal
law in conformity with international law and conventions when there is
no inconsistency between them or there is a void in the domestic law. […]
Our courts will not enforce those Covenants (i.e., ICCPR, ICESCR, and
CEDAW), as treaties and conventions, even if ratified by the State, are not
part of the corpus juris of the State unless those are incorporated in the
municipal legislation. However, the court can look into these conventions
and covenants as an aid to interpretation of the provisions of Part III [of the
Constitution], particularly to determine the rights implicit in the rights like the
right to life and the right to liberty, but not enumerated in the Constitution.”

4

5
6
7

The Bangalore Principles, Bangalore, India, 24–26 February 1988. The Bangalore Principles is
the outcome document of the 1988 Bangalore Judicial Colloquium. The high-level colloquium
was attended by Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg (United States); Recorder Anthony Lester, QC
(United Kingdom); Justice Michael D. Kirby, AC, CMG (Australia); Justice P. N. Bhagwati
and Justice M. P. Chandrakantaraj Urs (India); Tun Mohamed Salleh Bin Abas (Malaysia);
Justice Rajsoomer Lallah (Mauritius); Chief Justice Muhammad Haleem (Pakistan);
Deputy Chief Justice Mari Kapi (Papua New Guinea); Justice P. Ramanathan (Sri Lanka); and
Chief Justice E. Dumbutshena (Zimbabwe).
Footnote 4, Principle No. 7.
Footnote 4, Principle No. 4.
Bangladesh National Women’s Lawyers Association Vs. Government of Bangladesh & Ors, Supreme
Court of Bangladesh, Petition No. 5916 of 2008 (14 May 2009).
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India: Vishaka & Ors v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.8 – This case resulted from
a gang rape of a publicly employed social worker during the course of her
employment. It sought to establish the enforcement of constitutional rights
relating to women in the workplace. The fundamental rights invoked were
the right to equality, the right to non-discrimination, the right to practice
one’s profession, and the right to life. In addition, the petitioners invoked
Articles 119 and 2410 of CEDAW. India is a state party to CEDAW.
The Supreme Court ruled, “The international conventions and norms are
to be read into them in the absence of enacted domestic law occupying the
fields when there is no inconsistency between them. It is now an accepted
rule of judicial construction that regard must be had to international
conventions and norms for construing domestic law when there is no
inconsistency between them and there is a void in the domestic law.”



Malaysia: Lee Lai Ching v Lim Hooi Teik11 – The issue was whether a person
could be compelled to undergo a DNA test against his will to determine
paternity of a child. Malaysia had no specific provision of statute to order DNA
testing, but has acceded to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
The High Court of Malaya, Pulau Pinang, ruled that the defendant could
be compelled to undergo a DNA test on the basis of the CRC standard of
“best interests of the child.” Invoking Article 7 of the CRC, which states
that a child has the right to know and be cared for by his or her parents,
the High Court held that the subject of the case has the right to determine
whether the defendant is his father. Malaysia did express reservations to
Article 7 of the CRC when it acceded to the treaty (i.e., that Article 7 shall
be applicable only if it is in conformity with the constitution, national laws,
and national policies of Malaysia). However, the High Court found Article 7
applicable, as it did not contradict and in fact was in conformity with
domestic laws and policies.

These cases indicate that courts in Asia and the Pacific seem amenable to the
use of international human rights norms (even if not formally incorporated into
domestic law) as interpretative aids to resolve various disputes. This willingness
strongly suggests the same approach to climate litigation. As mentioned
previously, climate change implicates a lot of human rights, including but not
limited to the rights to life, health, food security, an adequate standard of living,
culture, and education. A human-rights-centric approach to adjudication

8
9

10

11

Vishaka & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., (1997) 6 SCC 241.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, New York,
18 December 1979, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1249, No. 20378, p. 13. Art. 11 states in part,
“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women
in the field of employment in order to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women, the
same rights.”
Footnote 9, Art. 24 states, “States Parties undertake to adopt all necessary measures at the
national level aimed at achieving the full realization of the rights recognized in the present
Convention.”
Lee Lai Ching v Lim Hooi Teik [2013] 4 MLJ 272.
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of domestic climate change cases opens the door to a rich trove of international
principles, and “cross-pollination” of doctrines across jurisdictions.
Climate litigation in dualist states may be based on the Paris Agreement
even if the agreement has not been incorporated in municipal law. In theory,
international law (including treaties) operates in the international sphere.
Thus, legal obligations under the Paris Agreement in principle take effect at the
international level, unless incorporated in municipal law. There may be instances,
however, in the interim stage between ratification and incorporation, when the
Paris Agreement may provide some legal grounding for a cause of action before
national courts.
In the leading case of Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh,
the High Court of Australia ruled that ratification of a convention provides the
basis for a legitimate expectation, absent indications to the contrary, that the
executive branch of government will act in conformity with the convention.12 The
case involved a determination by Australia’s immigration authorities that Teoh
was not eligible for resident status because he had a criminal record. The assailed
Federal Court decision held that the immigration authorities’ power had been
improperly exercised because they failed to make appropriate investigations into
the hardship that could be experienced by Teoh’s wife and her children were he
refused resident status. The decision was based on Article 3.1 of the CRC, which
provides that “(i)n all actions concerning children ... the best interests of the child
shall be a primary consideration.” While Australia had ratified the CRC, it had not
yet incorporated its provisions into its national law by statute.
On appeal, the High Court of Australia ruled:
[R]atification by Australia of an international convention is not to be
dismissed as a merely platitudinous or ineffectual act, particularly when
the instrument evidences internationally accepted standards to be
applied by courts and administrative authorities in dealing with basic
human rights affecting the family and children. Rather, ratification
of a convention is a positive statement by the executive government
of this country to the world and to the Australian people that the
executive government and its agencies will act in accordance with the
Convention. That positive statement is an adequate foundation for a
legitimate expectation, absent statutory or executive indications to the
contrary, that administrative decision makers will act in conformity with
the Convention and treat the best interests of the children as ‘a primary
consideration.’ It is not necessary that a person seeking to set up such
a legitimate expectation should be aware of the Convention or should
personally entertain the expectation; it is enough that the expectation is
reasonable in the sense that there are adequate materials to support it. […]

12

Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh (1995) 183 CLR 273.
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The existence of a legitimate expectation that a decision maker will
act in a particular way does not necessarily compel him or her to act in
that way. That is the difference between a legitimate expectation and
a binding rule of law. To regard a legitimate expectation as requiring
the decision maker to act in a particular way is tantamount to treating
it as a rule of law. It incorporates the provisions of the unincorporated
convention into our municipal law by the back door.
But, if a decision maker proposes to make a decision inconsistent with
a legitimate expectation, procedural fairness requires that the persons
affected should be given notice and an adequate opportunity of presenting
a case against the taking of such a course. So, here, if the delegate proposed
to give a decision which did not accord with the principle that the best
interests of the children were to be a primary consideration, procedural
fairness called for the delegate to take the steps just indicated.13
Lord Robert Carnwath (Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom
[retired]) notes that the Teoh approach “may have particular resonance in the
context of the Paris Agreement, where the emphasis within a global pact is on
national commitments to be supported by domestic measures.” 14
Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement may constitute
legally binding unilateral declarations. Article 4.2 of the Paris Agreement requires
states parties to (i) prepare and submit nationally determined contributions
(NDCs), and (ii) pursue domestic mitigation measures. As discussed earlier,
this is an obligation of conduct (an obligation to take relevant steps) and
not an obligation of result. Nevertheless, NDCs—under a specific set of
circumstances—may be considered unilateral declarations that are capable of
creating legal obligations outside the treaty framework.15
Unilateral declarations are a source of law independent of treaties, customary
law, and general principles of law. In the Case Concerning Nuclear Tests (Australia v.
France), the International Court of Justice stated that, “[w]hen it is the intention
of the State making the declaration that it should become bound according to its
terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of a legal undertaking,
the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct
consistent with the declaration.” 16 The Court continued, “[n]othing in the nature of
a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the declaration, nor even any reply
or reaction from other States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since

13
14

15

16

Paragraphs 34, 36, and 37 of the Decision (footnote 12).
See The Paris Agreement–A Judge’s Perspective. Speech delivered during the Asia Pacific Judicial
Conference on Environmental and Climate Change Adjudication. 29–30 October 2018.
Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar.
B. Mayer. 2018. International Law Obligations Arising in Relation to Nationally Determined
Contributions. Transnational Environmental Law. 7 (2). pp. 251–275.
Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1974, p. 253.
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such a requirement would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the
juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State was made” (footnote 16).
To create legal obligations, unilateral declarations must
(i)
(ii)

be publicly made; 17
manifest the will to be bound, as shown by their content, the factual
circumstances in which they were made, and the reactions to which
they gave rise; 18
(iii) be made by an authority vested with the power to do so; 19
(iv) be stated in clear and specific terms; 20 and
(v) not be in conflict with a peremptory norm of general international law
(jus cogens).21

Unilateral declarations may be formulated orally or in writing,22 and may be
addressed to the international community as a whole, to one or several states,
or to other entities.23 Pursuant to the principle of good faith, those interested in
these unilateral declarations may rely on them and are entitled to require that the
obligation thus created be respected.24
In this context, academic and legal scholar Benoit Mayer25 (2018) observes that
some NDCs may be considered unilateral declarations.26
NDCs are publicly made (and are in fact submitted to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC] secretariat). They are presumably made
by the competent national authority. Judges may determine whether the NDCs
conflict with a peremptory norm of international law by comparing the language

17

18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25

26

International Law Commission. 2006. Guiding Principles Applicable to Unilateral Declarations of
States Capable of Creating Legal Obligations, with Commentaries Thereto. Principle 1.
Footnote 17, Principles 1 and 3.
Footnote 17, Principle 4.
Footnote 17, Principle 7.
Footnote 17, Principle 8. A peremptory norm of general international law (jus cogens) is “a norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from
which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of
general international law having the same character.” See International Law Commission.
2019. Draft Conclusions on Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens). Draft
Conclusion 2.
Footnote 17, Principle 5.
Footnote 17, Principle 6.
Footnote 16, para. 46.
Professor Mayer is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Law of the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
He is an academic specializing in international governance of climate change.
Footnote 15. Professor Mayer however notes, “Just as within a treaty, a distinction needs to be
made between those provisions of a unilateral declaration which actually create legal obligations
and those provisions which do not. To determine whether a provision creates an obligation,
regard must be had to the content of the provision as well as its context. For example, the
sections of [NDCs] which describe national circumstances or recount the steps that a state has
already taken do not create any obligations.”
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of the NDCs with a universally accepted list of jus cogens norms.27 As to clarity
and specificity, Article 4.8 of the Paris Agreement requires states to provide the
information necessary for clarity, transparency, and understanding of their NDCs.
The core question therefore deals with whether NDC provisions manifest the state’s
will to be bound. The language used in the NDCs is critical to this analysis. For
instance, some NDCs reflect a mandatory tone in relation to how a state’s climate
plan is to be effected. Professor Mayer notes that Macedonia’s NDC includes a
clear state commitment to refrain from building nuclear power plants.28 Similarly,
Brazil’s NDC articulates the government’s commitment “to implementing its [NDC]
with full respect to human rights, in particular rights of vulnerable communities,
indigenous populations, traditional communities and workers in sectors affected
by relevant policies and plans, while promoting gender-responsive measures.”29
Professor Mayer asserts that the kind of commitment reflected in Brazil’s and
Macedonia’s NDCs (i.e., dealing with internal issues) is unlikely to be invoked
in interstate disputes (footnote 15). However, they may have implications for
climate change issues before national courts (i.e., “obligations under international
human rights law or international environmental law [arising from the NDC as a
unilateral declaration] could arguably be raised before domestic jurisdictions”).30
States that have signed but have not ratified international conventions are still
bound by the obligation of good faith. A number of states from Asia and the
Pacific have signed, but not yet ratified, various human rights, environmental,
and climate change treaties that have already entered into force. These treaties,
states, and dates of signature are








27

28

29
30

ICCPR – Nauru (12 November 2001), Palau (20 September 2011);
ICESCR – Palau (20 September 2011);
CEDAW – Palau (20 September 2011);
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety – Cook Islands (21 May 2001), Nepal
(2 March 2001);
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) – Afghanistan
(18 March 1983), Bhutan (10 December 1982), Cambodia (1 July 1983); and
Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization – Bangladesh
(6 September 2011), Thailand (31 January 2012).

The Annex to the Draft Conclusions on Peremptory Norms of General International Law
(Jus Cogens) enumerates a non-exhaustive list of peremptory norms: prohibition of aggression,
prohibition of genocide, prohibition of crimes against humanity, basic rules of international
humanitarian law, prohibition of racial discrimination and apartheid, prohibition of slavery,
prohibition of torture, and the right of self-determination. See International Law Commission.
2019. Draft Conclusions on Peremptory Norms of General International Law (Jus Cogens).
Macedonia’s NDC, under the mitigation section, states, “Nuclear power plant shall not be
constructed in the analyzed period.” See Government of Macedonia. 2018. First Nationally
Determined Contributions. Skopje. p. 3.
Government of Brazil. 2016. First Nationally Determined Contribution. Brasília. p. 1.
Footnote 15. Professor Mayer references, by analogy, the orders of 4 September 2015 and
14 September 2015 in Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan.
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The lack of ratification means that these states are not yet legally bound by the
text of these treaties. However, Article 18(a) of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties imposes an interim obligation—a state that has signed but has
not yet ratified a treaty, is obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat its object
and purpose, until such state has made its intention clear not to become a party
to the treaty.31 Consequently, the states enumerated in the previous paragraph are
required to avoid acts that would defeat the treaties’ object and purpose.
However, not every act that departs from the text of the treaty, pending
ratification, defeats its object and purpose. Otherwise, the treaty would in effect
become de facto applicable even before the state signals its consent to be bound
by it (via ratification).32 Defeating the object and purpose of a treaty is thus
logically a higher threshold, compared with violations of the text of the treaty
itself (footnote 32).
That “defeat” constitutes a higher bar relative to other thresholds mentioned in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties also draws support from Article 19(c),
which prohibits a state from formulating a reservation that is “incompatible with
the object and purpose of the treaty.”33 The stronger term “defeat” in Article 18
connotes actions of a much more severe nature than those merely “incompatible”
with the treaty’s object and purpose under Article 19 (footnote 32).
Customary law may be a key tool in adjudicating climate change cases. A treaty
binds only the states parties to it, and generally does not create either obligations
or rights for a third party (non-party) state without the latter’s consent.34
However, customary norms are binding on third party states independent of

31

32

33

34

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969, United Nations Treaty Series,
Vol. 1155, No. 18232, p. 331. Art. 18. N.B. Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nauru, and Nepal have signed
but not yet ratified the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Bangladesh, Bhutan, the
Cook Islands, Palau, and Thailand are not signatories. However, there is considerable scholarship
supporting the theory that while Art. 18 was progressive development at the time the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties was drafted, it has since gained customary law status binding
on all states. See M. Villiger. 2009. Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff. p. 252. Cited in C. Bradley. 2012. Treaty Signature.
In D.B. Hollis, ed. The Oxford Guide to Treaties. Oxford: OUP. pp. 208–219; L. Boisson de
Chazournes, A. La Rosa, and M. Mbengue. Article 18 of the 1969 and 1986 Vienna Conventions
on the Law of Treaties. In O. Corten and P. Klein, eds. 2011. The Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties: A Commentary. 1. Oxford: OUP. pp. 382–383; P. Palchetti. Article 18 of the 1969
Vienna Convention: A Vague and Ineffective Obligation or a Useful Means of Strengthening
Legal Cooperation? In E. Cannizarro, ed. 2011. The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention.
Oxford: OUP. pp. 25, 26.
O. Dörr. 2012. Article 18. Obligation Not to Defeat the Object and Purpose of a Treaty Prior to
Its Entry Into Force.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, 23 May 1969, United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1155,
No. 18232, p. 331. Art. 19 states, “A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or
acceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless (a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
(b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation
in question, may be made; or (c) in cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the
reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty.” (italics supplied)
Footnote 33, Art. 34.
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treaty law, even though they may deal with the same subject matter.35 Courts may
thus legitimately invoke customary norms in their climate change decisions, even if
their states may not be parties to the treaties which (also) articulate these norms.
The primary question to consider is what norms have matured into customary
status—that is, what norms satisfy the elements of customary law (state practice
and opinio juris, or the subjective belief of states that the practice is required as a
matter of legal obligation). In the realm of international environmental law, legal
scholars and tribunals have identified the following, either as current or emerging
customary norms: the duty to prevent transboundary harm and the associated
duty to undertake an environmental impact assessment prior to engaging in
activities that pose a potential risk of transboundary harm (see Box 6.1),36 the
duty to cooperate in good faith in the form of notification in cases of emergency,37
the precautionary principle (see Box 6.2),38 the polluter pays principle,39 the
obligation of reparation for environmental damage,40 and the principle of
sustainable development.41 Recently, there have also been suggestions that the
duty to conduct a climate assessment before authorizing a proposed activity likely
to contribute significantly to climate change, is emerging as a customary norm.42
This list of norms is not intended to be exhaustive. Moreover, there is certainly
still some debate about whether they are customary norms at all (and if so, the
parameters of any particular norm). This report does not endorse any conclusion
or recommendation, but leave this to judges to decide based on their own
assessment of state practice and opinio juris. The cited references are intended to
serve as a starting point for such assessments.

35

36

37

38

39

40
41

42

Footnote 33, Art. 38 states, “Nothing in articles 34 (general rule regarding third states) to 37
(35: treaties providing for obligations for third States; 36: treaties providing for rights for third
States; 37: revocation or modification of obligations or rights of third States) precludes a rule set
forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law,
recognized as such.” (italics supplied)
United Nations, General Assembly, Gaps in International Environmental Law and EnvironmentRelated Instruments: Towards a Global Pact for the Environment—Report of the United Nations
Secretary-General, A/73/419 (30 November 2018).
P. Okowa. 2015. Principle 18: Notification and Assistance in Case of Emergency. In J. Viñuales,
ed. 2015. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. Oxford University Press. p. 471.
Cited in footnote 36, p. 10.
For scholars arguing that the precautionary principle is a customary norm, see J. Cameron and
J. Abouchar. The Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law. In D. Freestone and
E. Hey, eds. 1996. The Precautionary Principle and International Law. The Hague: Kluwer Law
International. p. 30. For the opposite view, see P.W. Birnie and A.E. Boyle. 1992. International Law
and the Environment (reprint 1994). Oxford: Clarendon Press. p. 98.
S. Kravchenko, T. Chowdhury, and Md. Bhuiyan. 2012. Principles of International Environmental
Law, Chapter 3. November. In S. Alam, et al., eds. Routledge Handbook of International
Environmental Law. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
Footnote 36, para. 101.
Case Concerning the Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, [1997] ICJ Rep. 7
(25 September 1997). Per separate opinion of Vice-President Weeramantry. pp. 88–116.
B. Mayer. 2019. Climate Assessment as an Emerging Obligation under Customary International
Law. International and Comparative Law Quarterly. 68 (2). pp. 271–308.
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Box 6.1: The Prevention Principle in International Law
States are required to exercise their sovereignty over natural resources in a manner which
ensures that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not significantly damage the
environment beyond their territorial boundaries. Since it first appeared in the 1938 Trail
Smelter arbitration,a the prevention of transboundary harm has been framed as a principle in
foundational instruments of international environmental law,b United Nations instruments,c
regional instruments,d texts drafted by civil societye and the decisions of the International Court
of Justice.f This principle is intrinsic to a core preference in international law for preventing
environmental harm rather than compensating for harm that has already occurred. The
prevention principle is well established as a rule of customary international law, supported by
relevant practice in many environmental treaties and major codification initiatives.g In practice,
this principle is also related to due diligence obligations, particularly the duty to undertake an
environmental impact assessment prior to engaging in activities which pose a potential risk of
transboundary harm.h
a

b

c

d

e

f

g

h

Trail Smelter Case (United States, Canada). 1938, 1941. Reports of the International Arbitral Awards. Volume III. p. 1905,
et. seq.
See Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration), Principle
21; World Charter for Nature (WCN), Articles 13, 19, and 21; UNCLOS, Article 194; Convention on Environmental
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention), Preamble and Article 2; Convention on Biological
Diversity (CBD), Preamble and Article 3; Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (Rio Declaration),
Principles 2, 14, 18, and 19; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Preamble.
Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities. In Yearbook of the International Law
Commission. 2001. Volume II, Part 2. para. 97. See also Resolution 62/68, Annex.
See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), Article 191; Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (ASEAN Agreement), Article 20.
See Earth Charter, Principle 6 (d); IUCN Draft Covenant, Articles 6, 14, and 41; Centre international de droit compare
de l’environnement, Draft International Covenant on the Human Right to the Environment (CIDCE Draft Covenant),
Articles 4 (2)–(4).
Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of April 9th 1949, ICJ Reports 1949, pp. 4 and 22; Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1997, p. 7, para. 140; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay),
Judgment, ICJ Reports 2010, p. 14, para. 101.
See L.A. Duvic-Paoli and J.E. Viñuales. Principle 2: Prevention. In J.E. Viñuales, ed. 2015. The Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development: A Commentary. Oxford University Press. pp. 107, 120 and 121.
Ibid., p. 118.

Source: United Nations, General Assembly, Gaps in International Environmental Law and Environment-Related
Instruments: Towards a Global Pact for the Environment—Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, A/73/419
(30 November 2018). para. 11, p. 7.

Money talks: businesses and investors are becoming climate and environmental
norm entrepreneurs. Norm entrepreneurs are people interested in changing
social norms.43 They introduce and endorse disruptive acts that lead other people
to consider “new templates of collective action, by adverting to issues, or even
creating them, using discourses that name, shame, reinterpret, and/or dramatize
and problematize the incumbent norms.” 44

43

44

C. Sunstein. 1996. Social Norms and Social Roles. Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics
Working Paper Series. No. 36. Chicago: University of Chicago.
A. Mendez and D. Patrick Houghton. 2020. Sustainable Banking: The Role of Multilateral
Development Banks as Norm Entrepreneurs. Sustainability. 12 (3). p. 972.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

Box 6.2: The Precautionary Principle in International Law
The precautionary principle stipulates that States are required to adopt a precautionary
approach when taking decisions or in regard to potential omissions which may harm the
environment. Such a duty remains intact irrespective of the absence of scientific certainty
as to the existence or extent of such risk. While the principle as formulated in Principle 15 of
the Rio Declaration reflects other critical principles, such as the effective implementation of
international environmental law, the legal basis of precaution as a principle is a matter of some
controversy and debate. However, the exercise of precaution in this respect is expressed in
other foundational instruments of international environmental law,a regional instruments,b texts
drafted by civil society,c and rulings of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.d
a

b

c

d

See World Charter for Nature, Art. 11(b); Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Preamble;
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Cooperation, 1990, Preamble; Convention on
Biological Diversity, Preamble; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Art. 3(3); Protocol to the
1979 Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution on Further Reduction of Sulphur Emissions, Preamble;
Protocol to the 1972 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter,
Preamble and Art. 3; Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity (Cartagena Protocol),
Arts. 10(6) and 11(8); Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, Preamble, Arts. 1 and 8(7)(a).
See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 191(2); Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the North-East Atlantic, Art. 2(2)(a).
See IUCN Draft Covenant, Art. 7; 2015 Oslo Principles on Global Climate Change Obligations, paras. 1(a-b); Centre
international de droit compare de l’environnement, Draft International Covenant on the Human Right to the
Environment (CIDCE Draft Covenant), Arts. 3(1-2).
Southern Bluefin Tuna (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Provisional Measures, Order of 27 August 1999,
ITLOS Reports 1999, p. 280, para. 77; Activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion, Case No. 17, para. 135.

Source: United Nations, General Assembly, Gaps in International Environmental Law and Environment-Related
Instruments: Towards a Global Pact for the Environment—Report of the United Nations Secretary-General, A/73/419
(30 November 2018). para. 12, p. 8.

If norm entrepreneurs are successful, they will produce “norm bandwagons”
and “norm cascades” (footnote 43). According to legal scholar and academic
Cass Sunstein, norm bandwagons occur “when the lowered cost of expressing
new norms encourages an ever-increasing number of people to reject previously
popular norms, to a ‘tipping point’ where it is adherence to the old norms that
produces social disapproval. Norm cascades occur when societies are presented
with rapid shifts toward new norms.” 45
Business-driven climate and environmental norms have emerged over the last
decade. For example, the Equator Principles provide guidelines to participating
financial institutions regarding environmental and social impacts of potential projects,
allowing them to withhold or grant financing in accordance with the principles.
On the intergovernmental plane, multilateral development banks have
integrated environmental safeguards in their operations and lending decisions.46
In December 2019, 10 multilateral development banks presented their joint
45

46

Footnote 43, pp. 9–10. Professor Sunstein is the Robert Walmsley University Professor at
Harvard Law School. He specializes in constitutional law and environmental law, among other
fields of law.
See, e.g., Asian Development Bank. Environment Safeguards.
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Paris Alignment approach. This approach aims to support climate resilience
and assist clients in developing long-term pathways (including financial flows)
in accordance with the objectives of the Paris Agreement.47 These multilateral
development banks are expected to support global climate action investments in
the amount of $175 billion by 2025 (footnote 47).
Significant changes are also being made in the private sector, such as in the oil
and gas sector. In 2017, 62% of ExxonMobil’s shareholders (including major
investment firm Blackrock) voted in favor of a climate change disclosure
resolution, against the management’s wishes.48
The resolution would have ExxonMobil disclose the business impact of
technological advances and global climate change policies. It states that the
company “should analyze the impacts on its oil and gas reserves and resources
under a scenario in which reduction in demand results from carbon restrictions
and related rules or commitments adopted by governments consistent with the
globally agreed upon 2-degree [Celsius] target.” It further states that “[t]his
reporting should assess the resilience of the company’s full portfolio of reserves
and resources through 2040 and beyond, and address the financial risks
associated with such a scenario.”
The resolution is advisory (i.e., non-binding), but shareholders can choose to vote
against board directors who are not responsive to investor demands.49 Similar
shareholder resolutions were adopted at Occidental Petroleum and PPL, a large
utility holding company (footnote 48).
In 2017, the investor-spearheaded Climate Action 100+ Initiative backed an
activist shareholder group to compel Royal Dutch Shell to establish targets for
reducing carbon emissions.50 Only 6% of those eligible to vote supported the
plan, but Shell subsequently stated a long-term “ambition” to cut its carbon
dioxide emissions by half by 2050 (footnote 50). Shareholders still criticized this
“ambition,” as it did not have binding targets.51 A year later (December 2018),
Shell announced its intention to set, on a rolling annual basis, specific Net Carbon
Footprint targets for shorter-term periods (3 or 5 years), starting from 2020 and
running to 2050.52 Significantly, these targets are linked to executive pay, subject
to a shareholder vote at the 2020 Annual General Meeting (footnote 52).

47

48

49

50

51
52

V. Bennett. 2019. Multinational Development Banks Present their Paris Alignment Approach.
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 10 December.
S. Mufson. 2017. Financial Firms Lead Shareholder Rebellion against ExxonMobil Climate
Change Policies. Washington Post. 1 June.
E. Lewis. 2017. Shareholders Force ExxonMobil to Plan for a World with Paris Agreement's
Emissions Restrictions. World Resources Institute. 20 June.
A. Raval and A. Mooney. 2018. Money Managers: The New Warriors of Climate Change.
Financial Times. 27 December.
BBC. 2018. Royal Dutch Shell Ties Executive Pay to Carbon Reduction. 3 December.
Joint Statement between Institutional Investors on Behalf of Climate Action 100+ and Royal
Dutch Shell plc (Shell). 3 December 2018.
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In January 2020, Microsoft committed to be carbon negative and cut its carbon
footprint by more than half by 2030.53 It also announced an ambitious pledge
to remove from the environment, by 2050, all the carbon the company has
emitted—either directly or by electrical consumption—since it was founded in
1975 (footnote 53). These reductions will account for both Microsoft’s direct
emissions and the emissions of its entire supply and value chain (footnote 53).
Microsoft will publish an annual Environmental Sustainability Report to track its
progress (footnote 53).
These business- and investor-driven norms complement academic efforts
to define the responsibility of business enterprises (e.g., the United Nations
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, the Oslo Principles on
Climate Change Obligations, and the Principles on the Climate Obligations of
Enterprises). However, these norms have the added benefit of quickly driving
business response due to (i) financial repercussions on the bottom line, and
(ii) threats of stockholder action. The financial risk of these investments is
certainly staggering—The Economist Intelligence Unit (2015) estimated that
present-day losses in manageable assets at risk due to climate change could go
from $4.2 trillion to $43 trillion from now until the year 2100.54
Recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic presents an opportunity for “the great reset.”
Governments, financial institutions, and businesses need to make important
decisions as they gear up to restart economic activities.55 One of the top queries
is whether to continue with business as usual, or, in the alternative, to integrate
climate change considerations more meaningfully in business processes, fiscal
incentives, and bailout packages.

This crisis offers us a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to rebuild
our economy in order to withstand the next shock coming our
way: climate breakdown. Unless we act now, the climate crisis
will be tomorrow’s central scenario and, unlike COVID-19,
no one will be able to self-isolate from it.
Source: A. Bailey et al. 2020. The World Must Seize This Opportunity to Meet the Climate
Challenge. The Guardian. 5 June.
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B. Smith. 2020. Microsoft Will Be Carbon Negative by 2030. Official Microsoft Blog. 16 January.
The Economist Intelligence Unit. 2015. The Cost of Inaction: Recognising the Value at Risk from
Climate Change. Cited in A. Raval and A. Mooney. 2018. Money Managers: The New Warriors of
Climate Change. Financial Times. 27 December.
K. Whiting. 2020. How the World Can ‘Reset’ Itself After COVID-19–According to These
Experts. World Economic Forum. 3 June.
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Some governments use aid packages to exact stronger climate commitments
from private companies.56 For instance, one of the conditions the Government of
France imposed on Air France’s €7 billion ($10.8 billion) COVID-19 aid package
was a ban on short-haul domestic air travel (defined as applying to routes where
trains offer a journey time of two and a half hours or less).57
Economic stimulus packages are effective vehicles to incorporate international
climate norms—including Paris Agreement objectives—in public and private
decision-making processes. Indeed, current and former heads of central banks
around the world have stated:
[As] we consider the next stage of recovery [from COVID-19], we must
look beyond the immediate crisis and think more strategically about
how we do it. […]
Acting early will help to smooth the transition and avoid a sharp and
disorderly adjustment. To meet the goals of the Paris [A]greement
requires a whole economy transition: every business, bank and financial
institution will need to adapt. The pandemic has shown that we can
change our ways of working, living and travelling, but it has also shown
that making these adjustments at the height of a crisis brings enormous
costs. To address climate breakdown, we can instead take decisions
now that reduce emissions in a less disruptive manner. That requires us
to be strategic. To build back better.
This will only happen if financial decisions, including those made by
businesses, investors, banks and governments, take the climate crisis
into account. The economic recovery plans being developed today offer
the chance to build a sustainable, competitive new economy.58
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U. Irfan. 2020. How South Korea, France, and Italy are Using the COVID-19 Response to Fight
Climate Change. Vox. 8 June.
D. Briginshaw. 2020. Air France Ordered to Curb Competition with Rail in France. International
Railway Journal. 1 May.
A. Bailey et al. 2020. The World Must Seize This Opportunity to Meet the Climate Challenge.
The Guardian. 5 June.
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Mangrove ecosystems. Mangroves grow along the
beach of Tarawa, Kiribati. Mangroves help fight the
effects of climate change by protecting shorelines and
trapping carbon emissions (photo by Eric Sales/ADB).

PART SEVEN

CONCLUSION

T

he nature of climate change warrants a more in-depth look into the important
role of international law in domestic adjudication. Climate change law—
perhaps more than any other field of law—intersects with numerous branches of
public and private law.
In writing this report, ADB seeks to provide a handy tool that can be used by
judges in Asia and the Pacific to determine
(i)

which international instruments and principles are applicable to
their states;
(ii) in case of conventional law, how applicability is impacted by treaty
status (i.e., as the treaty relates specifically to their states);
(iii) the interplay between climate law and other fields of international law;
and
(iv) the various ways (direct and indirect) that international legal norms
and principles may be used to adjudicate climate change disputes.
Domestic courts, however, do not only apply international law. The crosspollination across jurisdictions shows that they also “create,” or at least inform,
the evolution of international law. This symbiotic relationship augurs well for the
crucial contribution of national courts to global climate governance—that is,
linking international obligations of conduct with national obligations of results.1

1

A.J. Saiger. 2020. Domestic Courts and the Paris Agreement’s Climate Goals: The Need for a
Comparative Approach. Transnational Environmental Law. 9 (1). pp. 37–54.
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International Climate Change Legal Frameworks

Climate Change, Coming Soon to A Court Near You—Report Four
In 2020, the Paris Agreement is the pinnacle of international law on climate change. It orchestrates global
climate action over the coming decades. Countries agreed to limit global warming to well below 2ºC above
preindustrial times, closer to 1.5ºC. Humankind will only achieve this temperature goal if we domesticate our
international climate commitments. Judges have proven to be instrumental in holding their governments
accountable for their climate pledges. Report Four of this four-part series explores the nature of the
Paris Agreement, its history, and the framework of international instruments and international legal principles
that support global and domestic climate action.
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